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Chapter One: 
 
Introduction: Locke on Moral and Political Obligation 
 
I. Introduction 
Locke’s theories of moral and political obligation are instructive both in their 
successes and in their failures. Writing during a time in which previous assumptions were 
being widely challenged in science, religion, and politics, Locke resists this trend and 
judiciously accepts the wisdom of his predecessors as a firm foundation upon which to 
build his own arguments. Nonetheless, both Locke’s theory of moral obligation and his 
theory of political obligation meet with serious criticism. On the moral obligation side, 
Locke faces the charge of internal inconsistency: his theory of natural law cannot meet 
the standards set by his naturalist empiricism. On the political obligation side, critics 
complain that consent theory is descriptively inadequate: if citizens could consent to their 
governments, then they would be morally bound, but most citizens have never consented 
nor have they ever been in a position to perform a genuine act of consent. So two of 
Locke’s crucial arguments seem to be in trouble. In my dissertation, I take another look at 
these criticisms. 
In the first half of the dissertation, I argue that though Locke’s natural law theory 
is too vague to count as a decisive theory of moral obligation, he could enrich his account 
using features of a Kantian approach in order to develop a coherent and internally 
consistent theory of moral obligation. In the second half, I build upon this comprehensive 
theory of moral obligation in order to argue for a more charitable interpretation of 
Locke’s theory of political obligation, which I think survives the toughest objections to 
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consent theory. According to my view, although consent is necessary and sufficient for 
political obligation, there are nonetheless universal moral constraints upon the individual 
choice to consent. Thus, though it is true that individuals are bound to obey only those 
political institutions to which they have consented, there is a natural moral duty1 to 
consent when certain conditions are met. If I am correct, Locke comes closer to having a 
unified theory of obligation than most scholars give him credit for. By developing a 
credible theory of moral obligation, which Locke can then use to defend himself against 
critics of his consent theory of political obligation, I provide Locke with the tools to save 
both projects.  
 
II. Part I: Moral Obligation 
Because Locke never published a treatise on morality, the challenging task of 
understanding his thoughts concerning moral obligation requires fitting together different 
pieces from different works. My main argument, though, focuses upon Locke’s 
unpublished manuscript, later edited and titled Essays on the Law of Nature by W. von 
Leyden,2 in which Locke sketches his early theory of natural law. According to his 
argument in the Essays, it is possible for human beings to discover the content of the 
universal moral law through the use of reason operating upon experience provided by 
sense perception. He envisions the process working in something like the following way:                                                         
1 Although some, such as R.B. Brandt (1964) and H.L.A. Hart (1958), have thought it important to 
distinguish between duties and obligations, the former referring to natural obligations and the latter 
referring to obligations that must be voluntarily acquired, I use the two terms interchangeably throughout 
the dissertation. 
 
2 First published in 1954 by Oxford University Press. 
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recognizing regularities in nature, e.g., the changing of the seasons, we infer that nature is 
governed by certain fixed laws; and further, we infer that human beings, as part of nature, 
must also be governed by certain fixed laws. But also, recognizing differences between 
human beings and the rest of nature—the most important of which being the human 
capacity for rational thought—we infer that human beings are governed not only by 
physical laws but also by moral laws. Still, from this picture, we get only a basic sense of 
Locke’s moral theory. He must say much more in order to explain how human beings 
come to know the content of the natural law.  
Though he struggled throughout his career to further develop this empiricist 
natural law theory into a theory of moral obligation that would fit with his metaphysics, 
epistemology, and religious beliefs, he never manages to fill in the details of his early 
theory. Beyond the issue of knowability, he also struggles with the problem of 
normativity. Even if Locke could explain how human beings come to know the natural 
law, he must also explain why it is binding upon them. Here Locke vacillates between 
two possibilities: either the natural moral law has authority because it is the manifestation 
of God’s perfect will or because it is somehow intrinsically binding upon rational human 
beings who are capable of discovering it. Unfortunately, both Locke’s explanation for 
how human beings come to know the content of the natural moral law and his 
explanation for why they are bound to obey its commands are incomplete. Thus, in part I 
(chapters two and three), I suggest a direction for filling out Locke’s skeletal theory of 
moral obligation. 
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In chapter two, I look carefully at those natural law theories that most influenced 
Locke’s own distinctive natural law theory with the hope that these theories might 
provide us with clues as to the direction that Locke was heading. As a result, the aim of 
this chapter is to place Locke’s moral theory in its historical context and to examine the 
main interpretive debate springing from this analysis.  
Locke witnessed, during his lifetime, a shift in emphasis between the Scholastic 
theory of natural law to the modern theory of natural rights. In his own moral theory, we 
see evidence that Locke wishes to mediate this split. Although he maintains, along with 
the Scholastics, the view that there is a pre-existing moral theory handed down by the 
supreme lawgiver, he also attempts to follow some of the Protestant figures and other of 
his contemporaries in agreeing that individuals have certain moral rights. From the older 
conception of natural law, Locke borrows the idea of man’s subordination to a law, which 
is, in a sense, internal to him, though he rejects the Scholastic contention that the law is 
known by revelation or otherwise written on one’s heart. Agreeing with the relatively 
recent trend toward secularizing the natural law, as first seen in the work of Grotius and 
later taken to its logical conclusion in Hobbes’s Leviathan, Locke argues that the natural 
law must be known by human reason or “the light of nature.” But whereas Hobbes’s 
commitment to developing a secularized natural law theory leads him to an unlimited, 
though morally and politically decisive, natural right, Locke sees individuals as 
partaking, through their reasoning capacities, in a moral or divine natural law, which 
places certain limits upon their natural rights. 
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From the pre-Socratics and Aristotle, Locke adopts the notion of a hierarchy of 
being according to which the essential feature of human nature is the ability to control 
one’s passions by allowing reason to guide one’s desires. However, the ancient account 
of morality and natural justice seems to be missing a crucial element of natural law 
theory, a concept of natural duty. The Stoics supply this missing element and are the first 
to develop a complete theory of natural law recognizable as such. Unlike their 
predecessors, the Stoics take a cosmic view of what it means to be a human being as one 
who ought to live in accordance with nature. Therefore, the Stoics supply the idea that 
there is an objective right or system of law (i.e., reason) that supplies individuals with a 
duty to take others into consideration. Thus, Locke borrows from the Stoics the notion 
that living well involves more than simply individual success or human flourishing; 
living well also requires living in accordance with the natural order of things. However, 
Locke importantly breaks from the Stoic’s deterministic, physicalist view of the natural 
law, accepting the view that the natural law is a moral law given by the divine lawgiver 
and is external to and discoverable by human beings. 
This break with Stoic determinism marks Locke’s acceptance of an aspect of yet 
another natural law theory, that of the Scholastics. Locke accepts the Scholastic notion 
that God creates and lends authority to the natural moral law. For Aquinas, man tends 
toward his natural end, which God has built into his very nature. Unlike the Stoics, 
Aquinas thinks that human beings ought to obey the natural law precisely because it is 
the manifestation of the divine will. Here Aquinas articulates the principle of divine right: 
God, as the omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient creator of the universe, has proper 
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authority and dominion over his creation giving him a right to rule, which Locke accepts 
as well. So, in some passages, Locke seems to accept the voluntarism of the Scholastics, 
but in others he seems to side with the early Protestant thinkers such as Hugo Grotius, 
offering a more secularized justification for the authority of the natural law. 
Given Locke’s ambiguous and multi-faceted notion of the natural law, it is 
difficult to understand how he views the relationship between natural law and natural 
rights. Indeed, it is difficult to know whether he has a unified view about it at all. It is no 
wonder, then, that Locke scholars seize upon the opportunity for an interpretive debate. 
On one side, arguing that Locke’s view is essentially the same as Hobbes’s, is Leo 
Strauss. Strauss says that, for Locke, natural rights are prior to the natural law and the 
state of nature is a state of unlimited freedom ruled only by the natural right of self-
preservation. On the other side are those such as John Dunn, James Tully, and Richard 
Ashcraft, who argue that the natural law is prior to natural rights and that natural rights 
derive from the natural law. Yet, recently, A. John Simmons advocates a third 
interpretation arguing that both natural law and natural rights are fundamental in Locke’s 
view. I agree with Simmons’s interpretation because I see no clear indication that Locke 
wishes to privilege either the principles of natural law or natural rights. Unfortunately, 
this interpretation gives us little insight into potential directions to expand Locke’s 
theory. 
From here, my daunting task in chapter three is to take the muddled beginnings of 
a natural law theory that Locke offers in his early work and form them into a coherent 
theory of moral obligation. However, it becomes increasingly evident that in order to 
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develop a comprehensive theory of moral obligation, Locke needs significant help from 
others. I argue that Kant’s theory of moral obligation can supply the crucial elements that 
Locke needs.  
There are two main barriers to Locke having a credible theory of moral 
obligation, to which I have already alluded. He fails to answer two important questions: 
(1) how can human beings discover their moral obligations? And (2) what gives the 
natural law moral authority? First, Locke maintains that it is possible to deduce or derive 
the moral law from sense data just as we might demonstrate the solution to a geometric 
proof from the principles of geometry; however, he never successfully produces such a 
moral demonstration. So initially, at least, the prospects look bleak for deriving 
normative rules from physical facts about the world. Secondly, Locke gives two different 
answers to the question about the natural law’s moral authority. Either the moral law is 
binding because it is legislated by God (voluntarism) or it is binding because obedience 
to the moral law is intrinsically good for rational human beings who are capable of 
discovering it (realism). The problem here is that both responses seem to conflict with 
Locke’s commitment to his naturalist empiricism. Thus, as it stands, Locke’s natural law 
theory lacks crucial elements of a theory of moral obligation. 
In the end, I argue that incorporating a broadly Kantian analysis of the Formula of 
Humanity would provide Locke with an example of a deduction from observation and 
reflection to a normative principle, i.e., a duty to respect humanity. Though it will require 
Locke to relax slightly his commitment to empiricism, I think Kant’s rationalist 
deduction is of the sort Locke ultimately had in mind. Also, though I think Kant and 
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Locke are similarly imprecise about the source of moral authority, I find Christine 
Korsgaard’s reconstruction of Kant’s conception of normativity both compelling in its 
own right and not too far removed from Locke’s naturalist empiricism. By using certain 
features of Kant’s moral theory to enrich Locke’s skeletal theory of natural law, I aim to 
provide Locke with a coherent and internally consistent theory of moral obligation. 
 
III. Part II: Political Obligation 
Now having a comprehensive theory of moral obligation is important for the 
success of Locke’s theory of political obligation as well because political obligation is a 
subset of moral obligation. Locke himself seems to recognize this, since arguments in the 
Second Treatise assume the existence of the law of nature as a premise. For example, in 
chapter five, in the argument showing how one might justly come to own property that is 
originally given by God to all mankind in common, Locke relies upon the following 
principle of natural law: that God has given to man the faculty of reason to be used to his 
best advantage. According to Locke, what follows from this is that man may acquire 
property at will, but only so much as reason tells him he might make proper use of. 
Hence, we see an example of a natural duty limiting a natural right. As we will later see, 
Locke relies upon similar moral concepts to bolster claims throughout his political works. 
Therefore, I argue that in order for Locke to have a plausible theory of political 
obligation, he must build upon a plausible theory of moral obligation. Thus, in part II 
(chapters four and five), I explore the implications of my reconstructed theory of moral 
obligation for Locke’s political theory.  
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Political philosophers from Rawls to Simmons uniformly interpret Locke as a 
diehard consent theorist; it is vexing, however, that this nearly universal interpretation 
relies upon only a few chapters of the Second Treatise of Government. I argue that 
Locke’s views on political obligation are actually more complicated than the traditional 
consent theory label suggests. Moreover, when we broaden our focus to include some of 
his nonpolitical works, a new interpretation emerges featuring a natural duty to consent as 
the foundation for his theory of obligation. To interpret Locke as a consent theorist 
according to the standard view, then, is to ignore the complexities of Locke’s theory of 
political obligation and its connection with his natural law theory of moral obligation. 
In chapter four, I begin by raising a conceptual challenge and two interpretive 
challenges to the standard consent theory view. First, supporters of consent theory cannot 
explain how consent, as the justification for political obligation, can avoid giving too 
much respect to those who fail to consent for immoral, irrational, and unprincipled 
reasons. I call this objection the over-permissive objection. I also show that an appeal to 
Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent cannot solve the problem. Second, we see natural duties 
limiting individual consent in Locke’s argument against selling oneself into slavery and 
in his conception of property acquisition calling into question Locke’s status as a strict 
consent theorist. Next, I offer my reinterpretation of Locke’s theory of political obligation 
arguing that were Locke to adopt a natural moral duty to consent, his theory of political 
obligation would be more consistent with his other commitments. Accepting this natural 
moral duty to consent, not only solves the two interpretive issues raised above, but it also 
neatly fits with his view of the relationship between citizen and state and his defense of a 
 10 
remedial right to revolution. In addition to the interpretive advantages, such a 
reinterpretation adequately responds to the conceptual challenge and, as I show in the 
following chapter, gives Locke’s theory additional conceptual advantages over other 
contemporary theories of political obligation.  
  I find support for this natural moral duty to consent in three sources. First, the 
seeds of a theory of civil government according to which the state actually helps 
individuals to fulfill their natural moral duties lie hidden in Locke’s description of human 
nature and the state of nature. Second, if, as Locke contends in his theory of revolution in 
an argument based upon natural law principles, there are conditions under which dissent 
is obligatory, then it seems at least plausible that he would also accept that there are 
conditions under which consent is obligatory. Third, adopting such a natural moral duty 
could revive consent theory as a plausible solution to the problem of political obligation 
and charity recommends that we ought to attribute to Locke the strongest argument that is 
available. Therefore, we ought to make explicit the commitments that require Locke’s 
acceptance of the natural moral duty to consent. 
Finally, in chapter five, I move on from explaining my reinterpretation of Locke’s 
consent theory to defending it as philosophically tenable in its own right. The 
contemporary debate concerning what has been called the problem of political obligation 
hopes to answer the following question: is there a moral duty to obey the law? This 
debate surrounds the issue of discovering the normative grounding for political 
obligation. Consent has been considered one plausible answer to the question because of 
its intuitive appeal and similarity to the social practice of making promises; however, as 
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we have seen, the consent theory of political obligation faces serious objections. I have 
already discussed the conceptual problem of consent being overly permissive, but the 
more common objection to consent theory is a practical one. While the principle of 
consent, being derived from the freedom of individuals in the state of nature, is an 
intuitively plausible way to explain the historical rise of political systems, critics are right 
to point out that it cannot be the basis for a contemporary theory of political obligation 
because it is impossible to show that most people, who are not born into the state of 
nature (with the possible exception of naturalized citizens), consent to their particular 
political systems. Unlike individuals dwelling in the state of nature, it looks like most do 
not have the opportunity to choose their forms of government, especially given the 
extreme costs of emigration. This is a practical objection to consent theory, which I refer 
to as descriptive inadequacy.  
In response to this objection, three groups have emerged: those who wish to 
modify consent theory or to defend some other type of transactional account; those who 
argue for a moral obligation to obey the law on the basis of associative or natural duties; 
and anarchists who are not only convinced by the descriptive inadequacy objection to 
consent theory, but also reject all other attempts to prove that there are independent moral 
reasons to obey the law. They argue that though consent would theoretically justify the 
individual moral obligation to obey the law, no other theory offers a suitably general 
principle of morality that could explain one’s duty to obey the particular state of which 
one is a member. I argue that because the anarchist challenge defeats all prevailing 
contemporary theories of political obligation, consent theory deserves another look. 
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My Lockeian account of political obligation responds to the anarchist challenge 
because it provides a special duty to obey a particular state, being a voluntaristic account, 
while also acknowledging the general moral duty to politically obligate oneself. It is the 
natural duty to consent, which best respects autonomy, by allowing individuals to 
voluntarily incur an obligation to obey a particular state, while at the same time 
recognizing the duties that citizens owe to one another because it makes the responsibility 
to accept the authority of a particular government part of what we owe to one another. 
Therefore, in order to make Locke’s theory of political obligation more palatable, it 
seems that he needs something like the natural moral duty to consent. 
The position I advocate is Rawlsian in spirit. Rawls introduces the natural duty of 
justice as the duty requiring us to “support and comply with just institutions that exist and 
apply to us.”3 Because all human beings, regardless of their political allegiances owe a 
general duty of justice to their fellow human beings, they must do whatever they can to 
ensure that they act according to such a duty. However, this duty cannot meet the 
anarchist’s particularity requirement because it does not explain why individuals have a 
special duty to discharge their general duty of justice by obeying their particular state. 
My Lockeian theory has the advantage here. I argue that though Rawls, and others, are 
correct that (just) states are in a position to help citizens to fulfill their natural moral 
duties, because the state gains moral authority only when individuals voluntarily agree to 
accept certain limits to their autonomy, the natural duty of justice is not enough to give 
individuals a moral obligation to obey the law. However, because we do have a natural                                                         
3 A Theory of Justice (1999), p. 99. 
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moral obligation to do all that we can to fulfill our moral obligations, which we owe 
especially to those in close proximity to us, we do have the further natural moral duty to 
voluntarily politically obligate ourselves by consenting. Thus, individuals have a natural 
duty to transfer moral authority to the state, which they owe to their fellow citizens. 
While some have argued that Locke the philosopher and Locke the political 
scientist ought to be carefully separated, such a view is clearly contrary to Locke’s own 
intentions given that the foundation for his political philosophy is his theory of natural 
law and natural rights. Also, examining Locke’s theory of morality and his theory of 
political obligation in conjunction and the ways in which they influence one another 
offers potentially valuable insight into Locke’s larger philosophical ambitions. Therefore, 
an interpretive project paying equal attention to both of these aspects of Locke’s work is 
long overdue. 
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Part I, Chapter Two: 
Natural Law: The Search for Normativity 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 The field of normative ethics has developed, largely within the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, devoid of much debate about natural law theory. At least since the 
publication of Smart and Williams’ Utilitarianism: For and Against4, the focus has been 
upon the battle between consequentialists and deontologists and the attempt to find a 
more palatable theory combining the best elements of both. If natural law theory is 
mentioned at all, it is subsumed under virtue ethics. The main reason that serious 
discussion of natural law as an independent moral theory has languished recently is that 
many remain skeptical of its metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. Indeed, 
natural law theorists themselves are deeply divided about how best to characterize human 
nature (both metaphysically and epistemologically), even while maintaining that the 
standard of moral and political conduct is to be determined by and discovered in the very 
nature of human beings.  
Most natural law theorists, following Aristotle and Aquinas, argue that rationality, 
understood as intimately linked with virtue, is the distinctive function of human beings. 
But others, following Hobbes, emphasize the quite regular failure of human beings to act 
according to the above narrow conception of reason, understood as opposed to prudence, 
and, as a result, find the passions or instinct to be a more accurate predictor and motivator 
of human action. Yet, despite disagreement within the natural law tradition, the                                                         
4 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1973). 
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theoretical aims of each distinctive approach coincide, such that it is possible to identify a 
unified natural law theory. Natural law theory, broadly speaking, aims at discovering a 
set of principles, which is based upon a theory of human nature and can guide human 
action in an effort to attain what is best for human beings. But beyond the discovery of 
moral principles, natural law theory strives to discover the origin and justification of 
these principles. When done properly, it is at its core a theory of moral obligation. 
Now, by far the most difficult conceptual question for a natural law theory of 
moral obligation is how to derive moral rules from some set of relevant facts about the 
world and human nature without falling prey to the naturalistic fallacy. Virtually every 
natural law theory has been criticized for failing to answer this conceptual challenge 
sufficiently and for making unjustifiable metaphysical or epistemological assumptions. 
Thus, at least at the outset, skepticism about the possibility of developing a plausible 
moral theory based upon the natural law seems warranted. Still, it seems to me that any 
moral theory that makes claims about universal values, that is to say any moral theory, 
cannot avoid making some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of its own. So, 
that natural law theorists make such assumptions is far from a decisive criticism. True, 
early natural law theorists had a very different view of crucial moral issues than we do 
today. True, most natural law theorists did not question the existence of God and many 
did not hesitate to use theological and teleological arguments. But we ought not let our 
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skepticism about these issues deter us from the study of a theory that might very well 
provide valuable insight into our own philosophical work.5 
In what follows, I look closely at Locke’s distinctive brand of natural law theory 
pointing out its strengths and weaknesses as well as the significance of his early moral 
theory for his later political work. Locke is no exception among natural law theorists, 
though I think he is more keenly aware of the skeptical opposition to natural law than 
earlier natural law theorists had been. He struggles throughout his career to develop a 
theory of moral obligation that would line up with his metaphysics, his epistemology, his 
religious views, and his political philosophy.6 In 1660, Locke penned eight essays on the 
law of nature, not published until long after his death under the title Essays on the Law of 
Nature,7 representing his first attempt to lay down his thoughts about morality. Although 
he never published these essays, or any other treatise on morality, it is evident that much 
of his later work depends upon a theory of natural law. So my task in the following 
chapter will be to discover whether one can build a coherent theory of moral obligation                                                         
5 Indeed, many of the debates taking place within normative ethics and meta-ethics today also concerned 
early natural law theorists, for example, the debate between realists and non-realists, the controversies 
regarding naturalism, intuitionism, and constructivism, the question of whether lawfulness or spontaneous 
goodness is central to morality, and so on. By tracing back the history of such issues, we gain valuable 
insight that helps us better to understand these contemporary debates (J.B. Schneewind. “Pufendorf’s Place 
in the History of Ethics.” in Grotius, Pufendorf and Modern Natural Law. Knud Haakonssen (ed.). 
Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co. (1999), p. 226). If nothing else, the history of natural law teaches 
that we ought to think carefully about why human beings have generally thought themselves bound by 
moral rules. 
 
6 Locke believed that it must be possible to deduce the principles of natural law from the operation of 
reason upon data provided by sense experience, but many have criticized him for never actually providing 
such a demonstration. Locke seems aware of this shortcoming. He revisits the issue several times 
throughout his career first, in the Essays on the Law of Nature; later, in the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690); and finally, in the Reasonableness of Christianity (1695). 
 
7 One of Locke’s earliest works, he wrote the eight essays in manuscript form during the early 1660’s, 
probably 1664, but it remained unpublished until it was edited by W. von Leyden and published as the 
Essays on the Law of Nature in 1954. 
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from the bits and pieces that Locke offers throughout his corpus (and with a little help 
from Kant). But before turning to Locke’s own theory of moral obligation in chapter 
three, we first must understand the many forces that influenced his particular brand of 
natural law. The main focus of this chapter, then, is first, to place Locke’s natural law 
theory within its historical context and second, to examine the ongoing interpretive 
debate regarding the relationship between natural duties and natural rights as it plays a 
significant role in understanding the link between Locke’s theory of moral obligation and 
his theory of political obligation.  
Evidence suggests that Locke was influenced in varying degrees by nearly all of 
the major theorists of natural law and natural rights from antiquity to his own lifetime.8 It 
would be, however, tedious and unavoidably speculative to catalogue all of the possible 
ways in which each of those theorists may have inspired the philosopher. Instead, I have 
chosen to discuss only those whose work best demonstrates the historical shift that took 
place between natural law and natural rights and those whose work most clearly guides 
Locke’s unique theory of natural law and his doctrine of limited natural rights.  
I begin, in section II, by examining the development of natural law thinking that 
precedes Locke. There is clearly a shift among those who were most concerned with 
questions of justice, or jus. Whereas the Scholastics were concerned with that which 
would make individuals virtuous according to a pre-existing moral theory, the modern 
theory of natural rights instead focuses upon the individual as an autonomous agent, 
                                                        
8 For a concise, yet comprehensive, summary of natural law theorists who influenced Locke’s thoughts on 
the subject see von Leyden’s introduction to John Locke: Essays on the Law of Nature Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (1954), pp. 30-43. 
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naturally free to pursue morally permissible, though not necessarily morally required, 
goals. Consequently, we find in Locke an attempt to mediate this split; I discuss his 
attempt to do so in the third section. But Locke’s alleged ambiguity on the question of the 
relationship between natural law and natural rights has spawned a debate among Locke 
scholars, which I discuss in the fourth section. Ultimately, Locke needs a coherent theory 
of moral obligation relating the individual’s natural freedom from others to both the 
natural limits imposed by others’ natural freedom and the natural limits imposed by 
God’s subjugation of mankind. But Locke never fully develops the moral theory that he 
provides in his earliest writings. So in the next chapter, I show how Kant’s moral theory 
could be the basis for a Lockeian theory of moral obligation that answers two important 
questions: how human beings know the content of their moral duties and what justifies 
the claims that morality makes upon us.  
 
II. Locke’s Predecessors 
In order to understand fully how Locke comes to articulate his moral theory, it is 
important first to look more carefully at the history of natural law prior to the seventeenth 
century and the important transition from natural law to natural rights. This tradition 
greatly influenced Locke’s thoughts about the relationship between reason, justice, and 
the laws of nature. 
Although nothing resembling a complete theory of natural law was written until 
the Hellenistic period, we find even in the work of the earliest Greek philosophers the 
seeds of a structured natural law theory. Recognizing an inherent regularity in the world 
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at large, the pre-Socratics deemed nature both metaphysically and philosophically prior to 
man-made objects and institutions. So the notion of a hierarchy among natural and non-
natural goods was born.9 Consequently, subsequent ancient philosophers begin to explore 
how man might best come into contact with the true nature of things, especially his own 
true nature. Socrates and Plato answer that human beings ought to cultivate the parts 
which participate most readily in the highest good, i.e., the unchanging, non-sensible, 
ideal world, and work toward controlling the parts which keep them bound to the 
uncertainties of the sensible world. Virtuous individuals, then, constantly strive to allow 
reason to regulate their desires because reason is connected to that perfect ideal, while 
desires for fleeting, material goods represent a void that can never be filled.10  
Additionally, according to Aristotle, it is the human capacity for reason that distinguishes 
men from beasts, which are solely ruled by their non-rational desires. It is in exercising 
this capacity for self-regulation that one is most fully human.11 Hence, we see in the 
ancient tradition the development of a hierarchy of being or nature, which later becomes 
a central tenet of natural law theory. 
Also, the above theory of human nature reflects another important ancient idea 
that later natural law theorists adopt, Aristotle’s devotion to a general teleological theory 
of nature. According to Aristotle’s teleology, everything in the universe can be described                                                         
9 Parmenides and Heraclitus were perhaps the first to make the hierarchy of being central to their 
metaphysical and epistemological views. For more about the pre-Socratics and the early development of 
metaphysics, see G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield’s The Presocratic Philosophers. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (1983), chapter VIII “Parmenides of Elea” and G.S. Kirk’s Heraclitus: The 
Cosmic Fragments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1954).  
 
10 See book II of the Republic, for example. 
  
11 In book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defends the view that the philosophical life is best. 
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as dynamic, as constantly striving to attain its end. For human beings, the telos is virtue 
or well-being, which requires fulfilling one’s function as a rational being to the greatest 
extent possible; virtue or excellence means actively making the right decisions based 
upon what right reason prescribes.12  
From the ancient connection between reason and virtue, it is easy to see how a 
theory of natural justice might arise. According to Aristotle, a human being cannot attain 
excellence in isolation, but is by nature a political animal.13 So the polis in providing 
protective laws, cultural life, and most importantly, moral education, offers the best 
environment within which human beings might cooperate with one another, thrive 
mutually, and develop the appropriate moral character. And just as each individual has a 
telos, so does each state. Therefore, attaining justice within civil societies requires 
discovering natural laws and making civil laws that best serve the function of that 
particular civil society.  
Aristotle’s teleology, his dynamic picture of human nature, his view of the ethical 
end of the polis, and his moral understanding of law and justice lead him to recognize the 
concepts of universal law and natural justice.14 However, these concepts do not yet 
encapsulate a full theory of natural law. In Aristotle, natural justice remains subordinate 
to the final end of the individual: happiness or well-being. Aristotle’s ethical picture, 
                                                        
12 N.E. 1097b22-1098a20. 
 
13 Politics. I., 2, 1253a1-7. 
 
14 Eterovich, Francis H. Approaches to Natural Law from Plato to Kant. New York: Exposition Press 
(1972), p. 35. 
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then, seems to be missing a crucial element of natural law theory: concern for others or 
the common good from which springs a concept of natural duty. 
The Stoics first supply this crucial element and build a complete theory of natural 
law on the foundation laid by Plato and Aristotle. Like their predecessors, the Stoics 
thought that the moral ideal was to live in harmony with nature including one’s own 
nature; and since they equate nature and reason, living in harmony with nature means 
living according to reason. However, the Stoic view of human nature differs importantly 
from that of Plato and Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle equates what is good for human 
beings with whatever allows them to flourish, e.g., health and education, the Stoics focus 
upon ‘what is appropriate’ for human beings. In opposition to Aristotle, they recognize 
that even things like health and education might not be beneficial for all individuals in all 
circumstances (e.g., a well-educated tyrant does not benefit anyone). Therefore, only the 
virtues, wisdom, prudence, justice, temperance, and courage, are truly called good. 
Consequently, while the Stoics agree that, all things being equal, goods like health and 
education are appropriate for me, they add that living among other rational human beings 
is also a good that is appropriate for me and that taking others into consideration will 
undoubtedly affect my choices about whatever allows me to flourish.15 Thus, the Stoics 
recognize two basic and sometimes competing human inclinations: self-love and respect 
for the concerns of others, which they believe to be the driving forces behind all virtues 
and duties.  
                                                        
15 For example, Cicero argues that what is appropriate to me is not just the perfection of my own rational 
nature, but also relationships with others, when he says, quoting Terence: “nothing human is alien to me” 
(On Duties I. 30). 
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On the one hand, when an individual follows her impulses, she seeks her own 
satisfaction at the expense of all mankind; on the other hand, when she acts according to 
duty, she follows the established order of the universe. But it is only right reason that can 
establish order among these inclinations and give them the proper direction. Reason, 
then, is the unwritten law in the nature of the world and in human nature: 
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal 
application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its 
commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does 
not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though 
neither have any effect on the wicked.16 
 
Like Aristotle, the Stoics thought that living in accordance with reason meant living a life 
of virtue, but they go so far as to say that there is no virtue without reason’s insight and 
direction. Therefore, the Stoics supply a crucial element of natural law, the idea that there 
is an objective right or system of law (i.e., reason) that supplies individuals with a duty to 
take others into consideration. Notice that this notion of the objective right is different 
from Plato and Aristotle’s view of the objective good as that which is good for the 
individual soul. The Stoics take a wider view of what it means to be a human being as 
one who ought to live in accordance with nature, where living in accordance with nature 
means living in agreement with the predetermined unfolding of the natural law. 
In the Scholastic tradition, Augustine and others further build upon the Stoic 
theme of living in accordance with the natural order of things, but here end the 
similarities between the Stoics and the Scholastics. Augustine’s notion of divine reason                                                         
16 Cicero. De res publica. George Holland Sabine and Stanley Barney Smith (trans.). Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press (1929), III. 22., p. 215. In the dialogue, Cicero has Gaius Laelius say these lines. Born in 
186 B.C. Laelius was a soldier, a statesman, and a patron of literature. He was one of the chief members of 
the Scipionic Circle.  
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as belonging to the will of a personal God, who transcends nature, directly opposes the 
Stoic concept of an impersonal reasoning force permeating the whole universe and 
determining the natural order of things.17 As a result, Augustine argues that human 
beings, using reason and free will, ought to follow divine reason, which is the source of 
every good and value including the natural law. In a moment we shall see how this idea 
of the natural law emanating from the divine will plays a crucial role in the transition 
from natural law to natural rights.  
Because of the Scholastics’ theological commitments, which are inescapably 
linked to their view of natural law, the stoic idea of objective right takes on a very 
different meaning in the Middle Ages.18 For the Scholastics, natural law takes a decidedly 
legalistic turn. God determines what is objectively right and makes his decrees known in 
the content of the natural law. As the creator of the universe, God has the right and the 
power to sanction those who fail to fulfill their obligations. We shall later see Locke 
siding with the Scholastics against the Stoics on this point insofar as he partially defines 
natural law as a divine decree of God rather than a mechanistic system of natural reason. 
Now let us turn to the most prominent natural law theorist in the Scholastic 
tradition, Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas accepts Augustine’s voluntarism (his understanding 
of natural law as binding because it is willed by God) and is clearly influenced by the 
theology of the early Church Fathers, but he also adopts Aristotle’s principle of teleology                                                         
17 Eterovich (1972), p. 47-48. 
 
18 Henrik Syse rightly points out that several different natural law traditions come to light during this time, 
such that, “one cannot speak of the natural-law tradition in the Middle Ages” (Natural Law, Religion, & 
Rights (2007), p. 194). I will distinguish the diffuse meanings of natural right (jus) among philosophers of 
the thirteenth-sixteenth centuries in due course. 
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blending these three elements together to create his own theory of natural law. For 
Aquinas, man tends toward his natural end, which God has built into his very nature. He 
famously defines the natural law as “participation of the eternal law in the rational 
creature,”19 by which he means to explain that there is an eternal law that is God’s plan 
for the universe and all of creation participates in this eternal plan, in ways appropriate to 
its specific kind. But just what is this specific end toward which man strives? In contrast 
to the ancients, Aquinas does not describe it as a single end or object, such as happiness, 
well-being, or virtue, rather he says that all things toward which human beings are 
naturally inclined are understood by reason as being good and their contraries as evil.20 
He offers a list, though probably incomplete, of examples of what he takes to be natural 
inclinations: to preserve oneself, to procreate, to know God, to live in society, and to 
develop all of one’s faculties, particularly the intellect, whose object is truth.21 Hence, 
natural law is the “natural inclination to [man’s] proper act and end.”22 It is this natural 
end, along with God’s commands made known in the natural law, that dictates a system 
of objective right (i.e., what one can rightly do) according to Aquinas.  
From this picture of natural law and natural right, we see how a system of 
subjective or individual rights, though far from the highly developed views of natural 
rights we later find in the sixteenth century, might begin to emerge. Aquinas’s 
                                                        
19 Summa Theologicae. I-II., q. 91, 2. 
 
20 Ibid.,  q. 94, 3. 
 
21 In the next chapter, we will see Locke offering a list of natural moral duties similar to Aquinas’s list of 
natural inclinations here. 
 
22 Summa Theologicae. I-II., q. 91, 2. 
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voluntarism provides new ground for the obligation to obey the natural law setting up a 
relationship between rights-holder (i.e., God) and duty-bearer (i.e., an individual human 
being). Unlike the Stoics, Aquinas thinks that human beings ought to obey the natural law 
precisely because it is the manifestation of the divine will. Here Aquinas articulates the 
principle of divine right: God, as the omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient creator of 
the universe, has proper authority and dominion over his creation giving him a right to 
rule. This right to rule creates corresponding duties for his subjects, both with regard to 
their creator and with regard to one another. Thus, Aquinas’s principle of divine right 
introduces an element of subjectivity into the stoic understanding of objective right. 
However, he does not go so far as to acknowledge genuine subjective rights for 
individual human beings, in the liberal sense, for instance, because Aquinas does not 
think that a system of right or law can exist independent of a theory of the good.23  
Consequently, if an individual, subjective right is to have any legal or moral force, it must 
be a dictate of right reason; and since God is the only being who always acts perfectly in 
accordance with the dictates of right reason, he is the only individual with subjective 
rights. 
The modern period in the history of natural law features the rise of the idea of 
genuine individual rights and a reaction against both Stoic and Scholastic approaches to 
natural law. Just prior to Locke’s most productive period, Francisco Suarez (1547-1617) 
and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), both important transitional figures in the history of 
natural law, did much to explain the relationship between objective and subjective senses                                                         
23 Syse (2007), p. 131. 
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of right. They point out that the original Latin term, jus, has two meanings: (a) that which 
is just or objectively right as in a system of law; and (b) that which signifies a subjective 
right, i.e., what belongs to one individual to the exclusion of all others, as in a personal 
right.24 In other words, in dealing with questions of right and law, a distinction ought to 
be made between the right by which one acts in a certain way and the right to act in a 
certain way. It is this second sense of jus that Aquinas fails to recognize.  
Suarez, as a committed Thomist, crafts a natural law theory, which makes use of 
the subjective sense of jus suggesting that Aquinas could have consistently supported the 
idea of subjective rights.25 When Aquinas defines a right objectively as that which one 
can rightly do, i.e., that which one is allowed to do, thereby creating spheres of right 
within which individuals may permissibly act, he also inadvertently carves out some 
individual subjective rights. If, for example, I have a duty under the natural law to refrain 
from killing innocent people because killing innocents is outside of the sphere of 
permissible action, then it follows that all innocent people have a corresponding right (a 
“claim-right,” in Hohfeldian terms) not to be attacked, which they hold against me. 
However, not every objective right entailed by the natural law must have a corresponding 
subjective right. If, to use one of Aquinas’s examples, I have a duty to worship God, it is 
difficult to see what subjective right might correspond to my duty. It looks as if the 
obvious answer is that it is God’s right to be worshipped that corresponds to my duty and, 
indeed, this is consistent with what I have already mentioned above about Aquinas’s 
                                                        
24 Ibid., p. 191. 
 
25 De legibus. I., II., §5. 
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assertion of the divine right to rule. But, it makes little sense to talk about God having 
claim-rights, in the Hofeldian sense, because our duties do not simply correspond to 
God’s subjective rights; rather, our duties derive from God’s divine right.26 Suarez, then, 
cannot claim that every objective right (i.e., moral duty) under the natural law 
corresponds to some subjective right. Instead, he must make the more modest claim that 
some duties under the natural law imply individual rights.  
But notice, also, that the rights under consideration here are not natural rights in 
anything like the Hobbesian sense, i.e., prior to the natural law or independent of a theory 
of the good; rather, we should understand these rights in the Thomistic sense, as 
stemming from the natural law itself. As a result, on Suarez’s view, there can be no right 
to do evil because the natural law sets boundaries within which individuals have a right to 
do certain good things. Therefore, Suarez keeps Aquinas’s idea that natural rights define 
the boundaries within which individuals may permissibly act, while observing that such 
demarcation also creates some individual, subjective rights for those who may be affected 
by my actions. 
As an illustration of the above, let us look at the Thomistic theory of property in 
contrast to a liberal theory of property rights. On the one hand, the Thomists believe that 
because God gives all people common dominion over the earth and all things upon it, all 
property is naturally common. Now this makes certain actions impermissible for me; it 
seems clear that, since everyone shares ownership, I ought not interfere with others’ 
attempts to make use of this common property. Hence, a natural right arises: “a right not                                                         
26 This is true, especially considering Aquinas’s commitment to ethical voluntarism: all of the duties we 
have are the direct result of God’s commands. 
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to be interfered with in the acquiring of property.”27 But it is important to notice that this 
is far from advancing a liberal theory of private property rights. On the Thomistic theory, 
private ownership only occurs as an addition to the natural law. In other words, only 
human law can create an individual right to acquire property as one’s own; thus, it only 
makes sense to talk about private property within the context of civil society, governed 
by civil laws. On the other hand, according to Locke’s radically modern theory of a right 
to private property, it is possible to change the natural ownership status of a piece of 
property from commonly owned to privately owned by mixing one’s naturally owned 
labor with the land. Private property is an integral part of the natural law on Locke’s 
view. So we see the stark contrast between the medieval focus upon the common good 
and the modern focus upon individualism.28 
Grotius, unlike Suarez, rejects all three elements of the Thomistic theory of 
natural rights: the voluntarism, the teleological approach to natural law, and the appeals 
to theological arguments, instead choosing to treat natural law within a purely 
philosophical framework.29 To fully understand Grotius’s theory of natural rights, it is 
important to begin with a bit of context. Writing during the time of the Thirty Years’ War 
(1618-1648), Grotius personally observed the lack of restraint in war and thought that 
there was a special need to study the ethical and legal aspects of war; and, according to 
                                                        
27 Syse (2007), p. 195. Of course, Hobbes denies this. Knowing that all men have a common right to 
everything does not specify or imply anything about duties toward others. Contrary to the Thomist view, 
rights and duties are independent of a theory of the good for Hobbes. 
 
28 Syse (2007), p. 195. 
 
29 Eterovich (1972), p. 79. 
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Grotius, one cannot adequately study the ethics of war without first studying natural law 
and the law of nations.30 Further, taking into account the growing need within a European 
society, increasingly wracked by religious wars, for a moral theory detached from 
sectarian doctrine, Grotius argues that the validity of reasoning concerning natural law 
should and does stand up to scrutiny even if God does not exist: “all we have now said 
would take place, though we should even grant, what without the greatest Wickedness 
cannot be granted, that there is no God, or that he takes no Care of human Affairs.”31 
Consequently, Grotius turns to the human desire for social interaction and the need for 
societal order as the basis for his moral theory. 
In answer to a common objection to his theory, Grotius rejects the notion that 
private interest, rather than a regard for justice or virtue, rules human beings in all of their 
actions finding that the root of human conduct is rationality and sociability, which 
naturally lead individuals to establish mutually just relationships. There is no doubt that 
expediency or prudence motivates some to join together and form communities for their 
mutual benefit, but this is only a superficial description of human conduct. In fact, human 
beings look to one another to satisfy a more primal need for companionship even when                                                         
30 The fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries were some of the most tumultuous in European 
history. They were characterized by the rejection of authority both religious and political, the rediscovery 
of Greek and Roman art, literature, history, and philosophy, and the assertion of the autonomy of science 
from religion (Eterovich (1972), p. 60-61). But along with all of this cultural development came social 
unrest and increasing rivalry among political factions. Natural law theorists during this time recognized a 
need for more political and religious unity. Although they believed that only a strong central power could 
end the disintegration of the European nations, they also viewed political absolutism as a threat to order and 
stability. So early Protestant natural law theorists appeal to the natural law as a way to limit the sovereign 
power of kings and, as a corollary, establish the law of nations: rules which would guide interactions 
among nations toward peace and justice. They viewed natural law as the best hope for nations and 
individuals with competing interests to exist peacefully. 
 
31 Hugo Grotius. De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Rights of War and Peace) Natural Law and Enlightenment 
Classics. Richard Tuck (ed.). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund (2005), “Preliminary Discourse.” I. xi., p. 89. 
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there is no immediate advantage to be gained. As Grotius says: “the Mother of Natural 
Law is human Nature itself, which, though even the Necessity of our Circumstances 
should not require it, would of itself create in us a mutual Desire of Society.”32  
Grotius’s argument for this account of human action is reminiscent of Aristotle’s 
function argument. But, like the Stoics before him, Grotius’s understanding of human 
nature is very different from Aristotle’s. Grotius has a much expanded notion of the 
essential features of human nature. When he searches for the aspect of human nature that 
separates human beings from all other animals, he emphasizes that human beings have 
been created with a desire for society, facilitated by the capacity for speech and the 
ability to know and act in accordance with general moral principles. Thus, each human 
being as a social and moral agent is the proper subject of natural law.  
Having grounded natural law in the sociable and moral aspects of human nature, 
then, Grotius goes on to offer his definition of this law: he says,  
Natural Right is the Rule and Dictate of Right Reason, shewing the Moral  
Deformity or Moral Necessity there is in any Act, according to its 
Suitableness or Unsuitableness to a reasonable Nature, and consequently, 
that such an Act is either forbid or commanded by God, the Author of 
Nature.33  
 
What distinguishes the natural law from other laws, and Grotius’s definition of natural 
law from Aquinas’s, is that Grotius’s natural law demands acts that are, by their very 
nature, obligatory and forbids those acts that are, by their very nature, unlawful. Just as 
the necessary characteristics of things remain basically unchanged from the moment of 
                                                        
32 Ibid. I., xvii.,  p. 93. 
 
33 Ibid. I., xxi.,  p.150-151. 
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their existence, so too the necessary characteristics of human nature remain basically 
unchanged. It follows, then, that actions judged by right reason to agree with human 
nature are always good and actions judged to disagree are always bad.34 The above 
passage demonstrates one of Grotius’s important breaks with his scholastic predecessors. 
Grotius rejects voluntarism arguing that it is the independent reasonableness of the 
natural law, rather than the will of God, which binds human beings to obey the law. This 
new theory about the bindingness of natural law, called intellectualism or realism, paves 
the way for the modern view of individual rights most familiar to us today. Natural law 
binds human beings precisely because it is a law that corresponds to the nature of human 
beings qua human beings. It prescribes what is permissible and impermissible for human 
beings; thus, creating both natural (or human) duties and rights under that law.  
 Now I turn to the natural law theory of another influential early Protestant thinker 
and follower of Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf.35 Unlike previous natural law theorists, 
Pufendorf adopts the distinctively modern thought that the origin of the natural law is 
irrelevant for analyzing the nature of law itself and human beings’ obligation to obey that 
law. Pufendorf accuses his predecessors of indulging in metaphysical speculation and 
wishes instead, to shift the focus away from that which morally justifies our obedience to 
the law to the more practical study of the actual working legal system. So in order to get 
at what he sees as the heart of the matter, Pufendorf is happy to accept, without much 
discussion, some metaphysical assumptions, namely that God is the creator of the natural                                                         
34 Eterovich (1972), p. 83. 
 
35 For more on Pufendorf, see Knud Haakonsen’s Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the 
Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996), pp. 37-43. 
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law who guarantees that human beings will discover, through their rational natures, the 
reasonableness of that law.36 According to Pufendorf, understanding the concept of legal 
obligation, whose principles are inherent in the concept of legality itself, is the truly 
important issue.37 All other basic concepts of morality derive from the concept of law. 
For Pufendorf, human beings have an intuitive, not necessarily moral, sense of 
obligation that guides them when they make ordinary agreements and without this sense 
of obligation, the institution of legal contracts and agreements simply would not exist.  
Obligation, then, at base is a social relation in which one person directs the actions of 
another and ought to be distinguished from advice and coercion, where the one directing 
the actions of another has no real power over him, in the first case, because the one being 
directed is free to act or not according to his desire and, in the second, because the one 
directing has no right to require certain actions of the other. By contrast, obligation 
requires that the commanding power have good reasons to demand that the actions of the 
one being directed be limited, which when combined with the superior’s ability to reward 
and punish, produce within reasonable creatures a combination of reverence and fear. 
This is just what it means to be obligated, the one demanding something of me has a right 
to demand it because he can offer good reasons for his demand; and, if I disregard his 
right to rule over me, then I expect and fear just punishment.38 But, says Pufendorf, 
reverence alone ought to be sufficient for one to recognize his obligation to the superior                                                         
36 On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to the Natural Law. I., 3, §12. 
 
37 Michael Nutkiewicz. “Samuel Pufendorf: Obligation as the Basis of the State.” in Grotius, Pufendorf and 
Modern Natural Law. Knud Haakonssen (ed.). Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co. (1999), p. 191. 
 
38 On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to the Natural Law. II., 7, §2-3; 11, §1-13. 
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on the grounds of good judgment.39 Once one recognizes that he is obligated to obey 
some command, the inherent sense of obligation takes over, so that the fear of 
punishment no longer motivates me to obey the command. Rather, I act upon my 
recognition of the reasonableness of the command according to my own free will. 
Now Pufendorf admits that this picture does not always work as a justification for 
one’s obligations to the natural law because the reasons for that law are not always 
immediately available to rational human beings who have only a limited perspective on 
the universe. Ultimately, Pufendorf thinks of morality as deontologically based, although 
he accepts a teleological picture of the universe as the justification for natural law from 
the perspective of an omniscient being. Therefore, because human beings cannot fully 
grasp the justification of the moral law, we must instead study positive law separately as 
a working model and metaphor for the natural law. As a result, Pufendorf argues that 
legal and moral language only makes sense within the context of the assumptions and 
principles of a working legal system.40 In other words, without law no act would count as 
morally or legally pernicious. This view opposes Grotius’s natural law theory, which 
argues that obligation springs directly from our rational human nature. But Pufendorf 
does not completely abandon human reason because it is our rational nature that 
determines the bounds of legal and moral claims in the first place.  
So Pufendorf walks a fine line between the positions of Grotius and Hobbes. On 
the one hand, Pufendorf does not go as far as Grotius and the Stoics saying that the law of 
                                                        
39 Schneewind (1999), p. 219-220. 
 
40 Nutkiewicz (1999), p. 184-185. 
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nature is the dictate of right reason and entirely independent of divine command, nor, on 
the other hand, does he accept Hobbes’s view that the natural law is purely prudential. 
Instead, Pufendorf maintains the existence of the natural law as the grounds for political 
obligation, while he accepts the artificial aspect of political society. He regards the study 
of law as an autonomous discipline and the laws themselves as a set of rules grounded in 
reason.41 
Finally, before turning to Locke’s own view of the relationship between the 
natural law and natural rights, I briefly examine Thomas Hobbes’s contribution to the 
transition between natural law and natural rights. Hobbes is arguably the most influential 
figure participating in this modern debate; he is especially important given the context of 
understanding Locke’s attempt to mediate the two positions.42 Additionally, Hobbes puts 
forth a radical theory of political philosophy that continues to shape the field even today. 
Breaking more decisively with the Scholastic natural law tradition than anyone yet 
mentioned, Hobbes rejects both natural law (in the sense of a transcendent moral law or 
theory of the good) as necessary for the existence of natural rights and the Thomistic 
teleological framework. But at the same time, Hobbes embraces traditional natural law 
                                                        
41 Ibid., p. 186. 
 
42 Although it is unclear whether Locke was directly acquainted with the Leviathan (first appearing in 
1651), he certainly would have known of the infamous work by his contemporary through its critics. At any 
rate, Locke’s Essays contain a number of covert references to Hobbes. Von Leyden explains Locke’s 
reluctance to mention Hobbes by name suggesting that the issues under discussion would have been so well 
known in connection with the controversy surrounding Hobbes that to mention his name would have been 
almost redundant ((1954), p. 38). Indeed, it is quite clear that Hobbes’s radical views interested and 
fascinated Locke during the seventeenth century. 
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terminology using it to found the modern doctrine of natural rights, which later becomes 
a key feature of modern liberalism.43  
Yet, Hobbes’s methodology is not the only unconventional aspect of his political 
philosophy. Because he rejects the notion of a transcendent moral law that governs 
human actions and dictates individual rights, understanding the role of natural rights in 
Hobbes’s political philosophy also requires challenging traditional norms. For Hobbes, 
individual rights do not necessarily correspond to other individual duties; his most 
fundamental rule of nature, that everyone has “the right to everything,” for example, does 
not entitle the right-holder to noninterference because that would be a logical 
contradiction.44 Indeed, though it seems inconsistent, Hobbes’s extreme individualism 
and contention that the natural state of man is a state of absolute liberty, leads him also to 
advocate the absolute power of the state over the individual because this absolutist 
picture of the state is the only possible means to ensure peace, i.e., the only condition 
guaranteeing the safety and security of all against the perils of the state of nature. So 
individual claim-rights with corresponding duties are not natural, but artificial.45 
According to Hobbes, it is precisely the urgent need to protect the natural right to self-
preservation that justifies an authoritarian state and the rejection of individual liberty 
rights within civil society. This creates an unusual tension within Hobbes’s work: 
figuring out how to combine an authoritarian political theory with an individualistic one. 
Hobbes’s answer is, of course, the social contract.                                                         
43 Syse (2007), p. 148. 
 
44 C.f., Suarez’s Thomistic theory of property above. 
 
45 Leviathan., chapter XIII. 
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In this section, I have outlined the key contributions of Locke’s predecessors to 
the natural law debate. This discussion serves as the background against which we may 
understand Locke’s own place within the debate. As we shall next see, Locke draws upon 
many of the theorists mentioned above in developing his own theory about the 
relationship between natural law and natural rights.  
 
III. Locke’s Doctrine of Limited Natural Rights 
I now turn to Locke’s own thoughts about natural law and natural rights. Because 
Locke can be read as a moderator of sorts endorsing some aspects of each of the above 
theories and rejecting others, the greatest difficulty he and his interpreters face is 
portraying his ideas as unambiguous and consistent. This is not an easy task. Still, I think 
we may find in Locke a common thread running through his work without which there 
would be no complete picture. This common thread is what I refer to as the doctrine of 
limited natural rights.  
From the older conception of natural law, Locke borrows the idea of man’s 
subordination to a law, which is, in a sense, internal to him, though he rejects the 
Scholastic contention that the law is known by revelation or otherwise written on one’s 
heart. Agreeing with the relatively recent trend toward secularizing the natural law, as 
first seen in the work of Grotius and later taken to its logical conclusion in Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, Locke argues that the natural law must be known by reason or “the light of 
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nature.”46 But whereas Hobbes’s commitment to developing a secularized natural law 
theory leads him to an unlimited, though morally and politically decisive, natural right, 
Locke sees individuals as partaking, through their reasoning capacities, in a moral or 
divine natural law, which limits their natural rights. So Locke understands unlimited 
rights to be just as dangerous as unlimited rule and seeks a doctrine that strikes the 
correct balance between the power of citizens and the power of the state. 
To this end, let us look at the specific ways in which the natural law tradition 
influences Locke’s work. First, Locke refers directly to the Stoic notion of natural law in 
the first book of the Essays equating the natural law with “that single good” which the 
Stoics thought was most praiseworthy, namely virtue.47 Here Locke affirms his 
agreement with the general ancient belief in a universal standard for living well given in 
nature, but he also asserts his agreement with the Stoics, in contrast to Aristotle, that 
living well requires more than simply individual flourishing.  
                                                        
46 Locke distinguishes himself both from the Cambridge Platonists, who assert that human beings are 
rational in virtue of their possession of an innate set of moral principles, and from ancient and medieval 
proponents of natural law, who believe that human beings have reason insofar as they partake in some 
degree of divine reason. Unlike these, Locke was careful to distinguish between reason as the discursive 
faculty of human beings and ‘right reason,’ i.e., a set of moral principles that govern moral decisions. 
According to Locke, human beings are born with the former but not the latter. So Locke’s starting point is 
the simple biological or psychological fact that human beings are endowed with the ability to reason. For a 
thorough explanation of the opponents Locke has in mind at the beginning of Book I of ECHU and the 
seventeenth century debate surrounding innate ideas to which Locke takes himself to be responding see 
Douglas Greenlee’s “Locke and the Controversy Over Innate Ideas.” Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. 
33, No. 2. (Apr.-Jun., 1972), pp. 251-264. I return to this issue in sections II and IV of chapter 3. 
 
47 Essays. I., p. 109. 
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However, though Locke’s view of natural law and virtue often sounds similar to 
that of the Stoics,48 he also makes an important distinction that the Stoics do not. Locke 
distinguishes between right reason as “principles of action from which spring all virtues 
and whatever is necessary for the proper moulding of morals” and the faculty of reason in 
human beings, which “forms trains of thought and deduces proofs.”49 This is an 
important distinction because for Locke the law of nature must be a decree of divine will, 
which is discovered by human reason, rather than a deterministic system of scientific law; 
otherwise, Locke argues, the commands and prohibitions of the natural law would be in 
vain. As it stands, the Stoic’s deterministic view of the natural law is unjust because it 
cannot account for why bad things happen to good people. But the natural law must be 
just, says Locke, if it is to be a reasonable guide to human action and given that the world 
contains so much apparent injustice, only a natural law that comes from God, who 
guarantees punishment for the wicked and rewards for the virtuous in the afterlife will be 
properly just.50 Therefore, the law of nature is not the universal order of which human 
nature is merely a part; but it is a moral law given by a divine lawgiver, external to 
human beings, out in the world to be discovered by human reason.51 Thus, we see Locke 
                                                        
48 In the Second Treatise, Locke often equates the law of nature with reason, which does not obviously 
mean man’s reasoning faculty, but something more like the Stoic idea of an independent system of 
deterministic laws. Also, Locke says several times throughout his corpus that the natural law is 
discoverable by each individual (T.T. II.§6; Essays I), which is a recognizably Stoic idea. 
 
49 Essays I., p. 111. 
  
50 Ibid., p. 111-113. 
 
51 Ibid. 
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using the voluntarism introduced by the Scholastics to correct for what he sees as lacking 
in the Stoic view of natural law. 
Additionally, Locke’s attempt to bring together different strands of natural law 
theory can be seen perhaps nowhere clearer than in his discussions about how human 
beings come to know the natural law. Although throughout the Essays Locke affirms 
Thomistic voluntarism embodied by the tenet that God both creates and lends obligatory 
force to the natural law, he also denies the equally Thomistic idea that one can gain 
knowledge of the laws of nature from tradition and faith.52 The early Locke is thoroughly 
empiricist regarding the question of the capacity for human beings to know the natural 
law. Indeed, this is the most novel aspect of Locke’s own natural law theory: that moral 
laws are capable of demonstration and knowable through the operation of human reason 
upon data gained by sense experience. John Hancey captures Locke’s thinking quite well 
when he says: “Man was to be judged by a sovereign God, according to the law of nature. 
Therefore, it was only logical that the law be promulgated in such a manner as to make it 
intelligible to all who sought an understanding of it and the obligations it imposed.”53 In 
the Essays, Locke identifies only one path to knowledge of the natural law, the light of 
nature.54  He says further that since the light of nature “is neither tradition nor some 
                                                        
52 Ibid., p. 137-145. 
 
53 Hancey, James O. “John Locke and the Law of Nature,” Political Theory, Vol. 4, No. 4, (November 
1976), p. 441. 
 
54 Essays. IV., p. 147-159. 
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inward moral principle written in our minds by nature, there remains nothing by which it 
can be defined but reason and sense-perception.”55  
Yet, when the later, more mature, Locke seriously considers whether the law of 
nature is universally known, he admits that not everyone is capable of knowing the 
universal law using the light of nature alone and for these, belief may be the only path to 
knowledge of the natural law.56 So Locke appears to move back toward a more Thomistic 
view later in life, conceding the value of tradition and faith for those who are incapable or 
unwilling to use their reasoning faculty.57 Locke’s slide from optimism about an 
empiricist theory of human knowledge of moral principles to a somewhat reluctant 
accommodation of tradition and revelation may indicate disillusionment with the capacity 
of human reason to grasp moral principles or it may indicate disappointment in his own 
method of conceptual analysis as a means to understanding the moral law. But whatever 
the reason for the shift in thought, it creates a disturbing tension, since the idea that the 
natural law is discoverable by reason and based upon empirical evidence is one of the 
most distinctive features of Locke’s natural law moral theory. And the early Locke, at 
least, believes that the possibility of discovering the moral law beginning from a morally 
neutral foundation is key to producing a plausible natural law theory. We will more 
thoroughly examine this important point in the following chapter. 
 Despite Locke’s late slide back toward a more traditional theological 
understanding of how one might come to know the content of the natural law, earlier in                                                         
55 Ibid. 
 
56 The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695).  
 
57 Hancey (1976), p. 442-43.  
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his career, we find the Protestant thinkers predominantly shaping Locke’s view. Locke 
may have been inspired by both Grotius and Pufendorf in his description of the law of 
nature in the Second Treatise: “Reason, which is that Law [i.e., the law of nature], 
teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one 
ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”58 From this early 
version of the harm principle, it apparently follows that man is “bound to preserve 
himself” and “to preserve the rest of Mankind” assuming, as Locke seems to, that failing 
to harm someone in his life, health, liberty, and possessions is the same as preserving 
him. Here we see Locke following Grotius and Pufendorf in offering a more secularized 
justification for obedience to the natural law. However, if Locke, were to take this route, 
he, like all moral realists, would need to face an important question: how can reason 
discover the content of natural moral laws, e.g., that we ought not harm others? But 
Locke would face an even more difficult challenge: explaining how reason can discover 
the content of natural moral laws using empirical evidence alone. A critic, such as 
Hobbes, would object that the empirical evidence points in precisely the opposite 
direction: reason teaches us that there are no natural duties only natural rights. When we 
look around the world, we observe that the only rule seems to be survival or self-
preservation and this description of human interaction is almost certain to include 
harming others in some way. Even Locke himself repeats several times that many people 
                                                        
58 TT. II., §6. 
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do not seem to recognize the natural law,59 so it is clearly not self-evident and Locke has 
not yet shown that the natural moral law is demonstrable from sense experience.  
To these critics, then, Locke has no plausible response. Indeed, it is difficult to see 
how he might square his acceptance of Scholastic voluntarism with his empiricist 
epistemology. His best attempt seems to involve providing an empiricist proof for God’s 
existence, an astonishingly weak design argument, from which he derives the duty to 
preserve oneself and others.60 Because man is the “workmanship” of God, human beings 
do not actually own their own bodies, so the duty to preserve oneself and one’s fellow 
human beings is a debt of gratitude owed to the “one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise 
Maker.”61 But this is not convincing given that presumably even fewer people recognize 
the existence of God than recognize the harm principle or the duty of self-preservation. 
That Locke does not successfully demonstrate how reason provides the content of our 
duties is one great barrier to his development of a consistent natural law theory of moral 
obligation.  
In the following chapter, I show how something similar to Kant’s secular moral 
theory could fill the gap for Locke making consistent his natural law theory. But as it 
stands we find an awkward fit in Locke’s development of a theory that incorporates both 
aspects of a natural law theory and aspects of a natural rights theory. Thus, it should be 
unsurprising that the interpretive battle, which I discuss in the next section, continues to 
rage.                                                          
59 See for example, Essays. III., p. 137-145. 
 
60 Essays. I., p. 108. 
 
61 TT. II.§6. 
 43 
IV. Natural Law and Natural Rights in Locke’s Work 
 Having examined the tradition out of which Locke develops his early moral 
theory, let us now turn to the role that natural law and natural rights play in Locke’s own 
theory. Since von Leyden’s publication of Locke’s Essays, interpreters of Locke have 
been divided regarding the following question: are natural rights prior to or derivative of 
the natural law for Locke? Leo Strauss is the most prominent member of the former camp 
arguing that Locke is a radical individualist whose political theory is essentially the same 
as Hobbes’s.62 On this interpretation, human beings are born with unlimited freedom and 
political life is a social construct designed merely for the sake of protecting and 
promoting the primary natural right of self-preservation.63 So, Strauss attempts to show 
that Locke’s natural law is actually a Hobbesian rule of self-preservation based on one’s 
natural right, not on obedience to the moral law or divine law. On the other side, John 
Dunn, James Tully, and Richard Ashcraft argue that natural law is the true basis of 
Locke’s political theory and that individual rights derive from the natural law.64 These 
interpreters stress Locke’s deeply religious worldview and his appeals to natural law 
within his political theory. 
                                                        
62 Natural Right and History, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1953), p. 227. 
 
63 Syse (2007), p. 207. 
 
64 The Political Thought of John Locke. (1969), chapter 18; An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in 
Contexts. (1993), chapters 1 and 9; and Revolutionary Politics and ‘Locke’s Two Treatises of Government’ 
(1986), chapters 2 and 3, respectively. 
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More recently, A. John Simmons argues that neither group interprets Locke 
correctly.65 On Simmons’s view, natural rights and the natural law are equally 
fundamental for Locke because human beings, born into a world in which God places 
certain limits on their freedom, have both rights and duties naturally. This marks the 
crucial distinction between Hobbes and Locke. Since on Hobbes’s view there are no 
(moral) duties in the state of nature, there can be only competing rights, i.e., liberty rights 
or privileges. Liberty rights are really only rights in a loose sense, in that there is an 
absence of an obligation to refrain from doing anything. Locke also acknowledges 
something akin to liberty rights, but his gentler picture of the state of nature relegates the 
operation of such rights to a “zone of indifference,” argues Simmons, outside of the 
governance of the natural law.66 This structure makes room for an additional, more robust 
type of right. In accepting natural duties, Locke’s theory can accommodate claim-rights, 
protected rights that correspond to the duties of others.67 As a result of their differing 
views of human nature and natural freedom, Hobbes and Locke also develop divergent 
views of the proper form of government. Both philosophers recognize that unlimited 
freedom is dangerous, but they see different solutions to the problem: for Hobbes, a state 
with absolute power is the only solution, while Locke prefers to understand human beings 
as psychologically capable of limiting their own natural freedom. So, for Locke, human 
beings are born with limits and his faith in those natural limits shape his theory of 
government just as much as his faith in individual freedom.                                                          
65 The Lockean Theory of Rights (1992). 
 
66 Simmons (1992), p. 76. 
 
67 Syse (2007), p. 209-210. 
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Now, in one sense, this interpretive debate amounts to little more than an 
intellectual exercise because each of the above positions trade upon textual ambiguities 
and much of the puzzle arises simply because Locke was less rigorous about his use of 
rights terminology than we might have liked. So we must carefully guard against reading 
back into the text the structure of a more sophisticated contemporary rights theory. We do 
well to keep in mind, then, that both Locke and Hobbes are treading on relatively new 
territory when they venture into ‘rights talk’ and it is not clear that either one gave much 
thought to what exactly he meant by ‘rights’ or worried much at all about making sense 
of the complex relationship between rights and duties. To the extent that such thought is 
necessary for developing a genuine theory of rights, neither Locke nor Hobbes can be 
properly characterized as natural rights theorists.  
That being said, one need not have a perfectly worked out rights theory in order to 
say something interesting. What is clear is that Locke feared the excesses of both 
unrestrained freedom and unrestrained rule and both rights and duties play a role in 
striking the appropriate balance. Thus, I align myself with Simmons here insofar as he is 
correct that Locke uses rights terminology in several different contexts and not primarily 
as either prior to or derivative of natural duties. The approximate view, then, is that 
human beings are born with a natural right to freedom, but that freedom would be 
meaningless without certain limits; these limits appear in the form of duties to respect the 
rights of others and God’s commands.  
 First, it is fairly easy to show that Locke does not explicitly give rights the status 
ascribed to them by Strauss and his followers. Simply going by the numbers, whenever 
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Locke discusses morality or the natural law, virtually all of his observations and 
instructions concern duties.68 At the least, this would be odd if Locke were relying upon 
natural rights as foundational. In fact, he hardly even mentions rights outside of the Two 
Treatises and even within the Treatises, textual support for rights being prior to duties is 
lacking.69 Indeed, if any decisive relationship between rights and duties can be gleaned 
from Locke’s political works, the evidence suggests that they are nearly coextensive. 
Though Locke talks about individuals seeking self-preservation in the law of nature, once 
one has secured this right for himself, he also has a duty to preserve the rest of mankind. 
In fact, Locke actually refers to the right to self-preservation, so central to Strauss’s 
reading, as a duty coming directly from the natural law.70 Moreover, in his discussion of 
property rights, Locke insists that acquisition of property is limited by one’s duties to 
others. There are ample cases in which Locke refers to duties limiting rights, calling into 
question the idea that duties exist solely for the sake of securing one’s natural rights. 
Still, the Straussian line is not so easily cast aside given that this view relies more 
on what Locke does not say and what he fails to prove and less on what he does say and 
what he does prove. Strauss maintains that Locke’s natural law theory is inconsistent 
because though Locke says that the precepts of the natural law are discoverable by                                                         
68 For example, in chapter IV of the Two Treatises on slavery, he says that freedom is not having a right to 
do anything you wish, but to be free from the rule of an earthly sovereign and subject to the natural law (§ 
22-23).  
 
69 Even in the discussion of property rights (TT. II., chapter V), it is not clear that the right to private 
property is prior to the duties specified by the two provisos. Locke seems to argue that since God gives the 
land to all in common, it is God who dictates the terms of individual rights. But if, as Locke also asserts, 
human beings are the property of God, then how could my right to my body or to the land with which I mix 
my labor, be independent of divine reason or the duties specified by the natural moral law? 
 
70 Simmons (1992), p. 69. 
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reason, the validity of his argument relies upon a premise that could only be known by 
divine revelation. Locke emphasizes the necessity of divine sanctions backing the natural 
law; consequently, his theory requires proof of the afterlife, in which God rewards the 
virtuous and punishes the wicked, and human reason cannot provide such proof. Thus, 
Locke’s natural law is not a law of reason; it cannot be known in the state of nature and 
so it cannot guide the actions of individuals. Fortunately, all is not lost because Locke 
does manage to hold a consistent view of the state of nature as one within which 
individuals constantly strive to preserve themselves, says Strauss. This natural right can 
and does serve as the basis for action in the state of nature. Therefore, Locke’s natural 
law theory, despite appearances to the contrary, actually relies upon a Hobbesian right to 
self-preservation rather than obedience to an independent moral or divine law.71 
There is some truth to what Strauss says. Certainly, it is not completely ridiculous 
to think of the Second Treatise as a book about individual rights.72 Also, as I pointed out 
previously, Strauss is not the only one to criticize Locke’s natural law theory on the 
grounds that it is internally inconsistent and I think, as we will see next, he is correct that 
explaining how the content of our natural duties may be demonstrated is a major problem 
for Locke. However, I do not think that it helps matters to ignore large portions of text 
assuming that Locke was being, at best disingenuous and at worse obtuse, whenever he 
says that individuals living in the state of nature have natural duties and must live                                                         
71 Syse (2007), p. 207-208. 
 
72 Nathan Tarcov, for example, points to many places where Locke emphasizes “rights talk” over “duty 
talk,” both in the Treatises and in Education (“A ‘Non-Lockean’ Locke and the Character of Liberalism.” 
in Liberalism Reconsidered. (1983), p. 185-86). He speculates that Locke recognizes a psychological 
tendency for people to act with less resentment on what we characterize as a right than on what we 
characterize as a duty. 
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according to the natural law. In the following chapter, I suggest a more reasonable way of 
making Locke’s natural law theory consistent by searching for a more suitable secular 
moral law that can be discovered even while living within the state of nature (i.e., Kant’s 
moral law).  
The above doubts raised about interpreting Locke as a natural rights theorist lead 
others to suggest that perhaps it is duties rather than rights that take priority. There is 
more textual evidence to support this second view making it more difficult to argue 
against than the Straussian position, but, in the end, viewing Locke as a natural law 
theorist of a Thomistic stripe is nearly as problematic. Recall that Suarez, operating 
within a Thomistic framework, asserts that rights stem from the natural law and that there 
can be no rights besides those that are necessary for the fulfillment of God’s commands. 
While Locke discusses rights, such as parental rights, which stem from the duties that one 
has in relation to the natural law, he does not view all rights as subordinate to the natural 
law. Simmons describes the different contexts within which Locke discusses rights and 
their complex relationship to duties. He begins by pointing to four kinds of rights in the 
Treatises: (1) liberty rights, (2) moral powers, (3) optional claim rights, and (4) 
mandatory claim rights.73 The mistaken interpretation of Locke that sees him as deriving 
rights from natural duties comes from conflating the third and fourth types of rights. 
Mandatory rights are those that are held “as a direct consequence of duties that the 
rightholder has.”74 Basically, the idea here is that if I have a duty to do something, then I 
                                                        
73 Simmons (1992), p. 74. 
 
74 Ibid. 
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must have a right to do it and this correlates with others’ duties to allow me to do my 
duty. Locke’s commitment to mandatory rights can be seen most clearly in the way he 
derives parental rights from the parents’ duty to care for their children or to “preserve 
what they have begotten.”75 Optional rights, on the other hand, are rights, whose exercise 
are protected by duties of noninterference, but are still optional for the rights-holder. For 
example, I have the optional right to grow apples or peaches on my land. Should I decide 
to grow apples, others are bound to allow me to exercise my right to do so. Interpreters, 
such as Dunn, Tully, and Ashcraft, who see moral duties as foundational and rights as 
secondary, hold either that all rights are mandatory claim rights, i.e., rights are simply a 
means to the fulfillment of our duties, or that rights are derivative of the natural law 
because natural duties always limit the extent of our optional rights.76 
As Simmons argues, neither of the above reasons for understanding natural duties 
as prior to natural rights stands up to scrutiny. Mandatory claim rights are only one type 
of right on Locke’s theory and he allows plenty of space within which one has a right, in 
spite of not having a duty, to perform actions according to one’s own discretion. 
Simmons calls this a “robust zone of indifference,” a zone of protected liberty within 
which others have duties to allow me to exercise my right.77 If such optional rights are 
correlates of others’ duties rather than consequences of my own duties, then there seems 
to be no reason to think that duties are prior to rights. Also, even though it is true that                                                         
 
75 TT. I., §88; II., §56 and §58. 
 
76 Simmons (1992), p. 75. 
 
77 Ibid., p. 76. 
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Locke thinks that rights are always limited by the natural law, it does not follow that 
rights have a secondary status. The precepts of the law of nature define both duties and 
rights (e.g., the right to private property is part of the natural law, for Locke). We have 
both restrictive duties and protective rights as granted by Locke’s natural law. In other 
words, natural duties on Locke’s theory serve to protect my basic freedoms from the 
encroachment of others as much as they seek to limit my encroachment upon the 
freedoms of others.  
In this section, I have examined the reasons for thinking that Locke is either a 
natural rights theorist or a natural law theorist. I think it is quite clear that we ought to 
reject both views as they stand and I agree with Simmons that the most accurate 
representation of Locke’s considered thoughts regarding the relationship between rights 
and duties lies somewhere in the middle.  
 
V. Conclusion  
Although the influence of Locke’s natural law predecessors is evident in much of 
his work, he uses elements of many different theories to create a unique view of his own. 
Unfortunately, it is tough to see how such a piecemeal theory could manage to be 
consistent and it remains to be seen whether a successful Lockeian theory of moral 
obligation is available. Locke’s natural law theory revolves around two main questions: 
(a) an epistemological one, how human beings come to know the moral law and (b) a 
normative one, what gives this law its binding force. Locke fails to answer both questions 
well. He argues that human beings come to know the moral law through the operation of 
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reason upon sensory data. Though Locke never shows how it is that the content of moral 
laws can be deduced from sensory data, he also never gives up on the idea that the laws 
of nature can be demonstrated in this way. As for the moral question, Locke’s answer is 
equally ambiguous. He maintains, along with Aquinas, a voluntaristic view that God is 
the ultimate source of moral obligation, but also, with Grotius and Pufendorf, he holds 
that human reason operating upon sensory data plays an essential part in justifying the 
human obligation to obey God’s commands. So, in the end, Locke’s natural law theory 
points toward a complicated view of moral obligation. God commands the moral law, but 
because of God’s wisdom and justice, he would never expect human beings to be 
obligated to follow his commands unless they were capable of understanding their duties. 
This is why human beings have been endowed with the ability to reason about moral laws 
and this is why the moral laws must be capable of being known through reason.  
In the next chapter, I discuss these ambiguities and complexities in more detail. 
From the underdeveloped empiricist natural law theory that the early Locke espouses, but 
that the later Locke also seems to continue to endorse despite never offering any real 
proof, it is evident that in order to have a comprehensive theory of moral obligation 
Locke needs to borrow significantly from more plausible moral theories. I argue that 
Kant’s theory of moral obligation can supply a more promising answer to the 
epistemological and normative questions raised above. 
 52 
 
Part I, Chapter Three: 
 
Moral Obligation: The Problems of Knowability and Normativity 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 In Locke’s earliest attempt to sketch a theory of moral obligation, the Essays on 
the Law of Nature, he searches for the source of the moral law, the source of our 
knowledge of moral duties, and the source and nature of the moral authority attached to 
them. Additionally, later works, such as the Essay Concerning Human Understanding,78 
contain references to the earlier work and are peppered with attempts to build upon and 
fill in the details of his early moral theory. Even some of Locke’s most widely known 
arguments in his political writings, including the Two Treatises of Government,79 assume 
the truth of his natural law theory.80 So it would seem that Locke needs a comprehensive 
theory of moral obligation if his system is to be internally consistent. 
 As I understand it, however, there are two barriers to Locke’s natural law theory 
being a credible theory of moral obligation. He fails to answer two significant questions 
satisfactorily: (1) how can human beings know their moral obligations? And (2) what 
makes the natural law morally binding? The first, is a puzzle about knowing the content 
of the moral law: if Locke’s moral theory is to agree with his empiricist epistemology, he 
must show that the content of the moral law can be discovered by the operation of human                                                         
78 Alexander Campbell Fraser (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press (1894). 
 
79 Two Treatises of Government. Peter Laslett (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1960). 
 
80 Here I specifically refer to the arguments concerning political obligation, property rights, tyranny, and 
the dissolution of governments. 
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reasoning upon ideas gleaned from sense experience and cognitive reflection alone. 
Though Locke insists that it is possible to deduce the natural law from sensation and 
reflection, he never successfully carries out such a demonstration;81 and without a 
specific example to evaluate it is difficult to imagine how Locke’s conception of knowing 
moral obligations could avoid running afoul of the naturalistic fallacy. Initially, at least, 
the prospects look bleak for deriving normative rules governing human behavior from 
physical facts we observe in nature.  
The second question that gives Locke trouble is a puzzle about the source of 
moral obligation: even if Locke could successfully show that we derive our moral 
obligations from sensation and reflection, he still would need to explain what gives these 
rules moral authority. What distinguishes moral obligations from, for example, familial 
obligations, which we also might derive from empirical data? As I mention in passing in 
the previous chapter, in some passages, Locke seems to defend a moral voluntarist 
position according to which the authority of the law comes from the legitimacy of the 
legislator.82 In the case of the natural moral law, then, the legislator is the divine creator, 
who is perfectly legitimate giving the natural law perfect moral authority. So according to 
this divine command theory, the moral law, being God’s command, is binding upon us 
                                                        
81 Note that whatever Locke meant by demonstration, he most certainly did not think of demonstration in 
terms of Aristotelian syllogistic logic (ECHU. IV.xvii., §4). In this passage, Locke makes the simple point 
that one need not know the rules of syllogism in order to be capable of rational deliberation. So, whatever 
he means by demonstration it must not be too sophisticated. For a good discussion of the ambiguity of 
Locke’s concept of demonstration as it relates to his theory of moral obligation see Colman (1983), Chapter 
VI. 
 
82 For example, Essays. VI., p. 181. 
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because it is an expression of God’s perfect will.83 However, if being commanded by God 
is sufficient to make the natural law morally binding, Locke’s commitment to empiricist 
epistemology puts him in a difficult position once again. In this case, Locke’s naturalist 
empiricism would demand not only that human beings be able to discover the content of 
their moral obligations using only empirical evidence, but also that they be able to 
determine that the putative moral obligations they discover are indeed God’s commands 
and that they are morally binding because of that fact. Making these determinations, 
though, would require empirically verifying several other claims, i.e., that God exists, 
that he is a perfectly legitimate legislator, that he has a perfectly good will, that human 
beings are not being deceived in some way, etc. Finding empirical evidence for all of this 
seems unlikely.84  
In other passages though, Locke seems to defend a moral realist position, i.e., that 
there are moral facts in the world that constitute the natural law and knowing these moral 
facts along with certain facts about human nature makes the natural law binding upon 
us,85 but while it is clear that Locke thinks having access to the content of a law is a 
necessary condition for being bound to obey that law, he does not think it is sufficient. 
Locke seems to hold a twofold view of the source of normativity: God’s will gives the 
natural law external moral authority, while certain facts about human nature give the 
natural law internal moral authority. Still, successfully verifying the legitimacy of the                                                         
83 Essays. IV., p. 151-157; VI., p. 181-189. 
 
84 The only attempt at anything close to this comes at the very beginning of the Essays, but as I mentioned 
above, this is an astonishingly unconvincing attempt at a design argument. 
 
85 Essays. IV., p. 157-159. 
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sources of moral obligation using empirical data appears even less likely than being able 
to derive specific moral obligations from empirical observations.  
Thus, as it stands, Locke’s natural law theory lacks crucial elements of a theory of 
moral obligation and it seems doubtful that those crucial elements could be hidden 
somewhere within his corpus. Locke’s treatment of the natural law and how it might line 
up with his naturalist empiricism simply lacks the appropriate level of detail. On this 
point virtually everyone who has looked into the subject agrees.86 However, disagreement 
abounds regarding the broader implications of such a conclusion. Some, drawing 
attention to Locke’s decision not to publish his eight essays on the law of nature and what 
they interpret as his later hedonistic theory of moral motivation, choose to ignore 
references to the natural law in his later published works or to dismiss such references as 
residual claims left over from Locke’s misguided youth, which he was never able to 
substantiate, but which he ultimately found to have little bearing upon his most important 
arguments anyway.87 Others point to Locke’s final work, the Reasonableness of 
Christianity,88 as evidence that, in the end, although he wished to disavow entirely his 
                                                        
86 Because of this, J.B. Schneewind suggests that Locke does not have a credible theory of moral obligation 
and questions the acceptability of assembling one from a variety of works: “we risk serious historical 
distortion if we insist on piecing together a comprehensive moral theory from writings Locke never 
suggested should go together. He may not have had any such theory” (The Invention of Autonomy: A 
History of Modern Moral Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998), p. 142). 
 
87 Interpreters such as D.E. Flage (2000) and J.B. Schneewind (1994) maintain that it is not possible to 
reconcile Locke’s earlier and later thoughts on morality (Colman (2003), p. 125, fn. 2) and, as a result, 
attempt to explain away any references to natural law for the sake of consistency. 
 
88 In this final work (1695), Locke admits that perhaps not everyone is capable of discovering the natural 
law using reason and sensory data. He suggests that these individuals must instead rely upon belief to tell 
them what their moral obligations are (Works (1823), vol. 7, p. 140-143). This position contradicts his 
earlier claim in the Essays that the natural law cannot be known by divine revelation or tradition (III., p. 
137-145). 
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early natural law theory because he recognized that he was unable to make it consistent 
with his empiricist epistemology, he also realized that he needed to replace the failed 
moral theory with one that he found to be more palatable.89 Of course, both suggestions 
about Locke’s reasons for effectively abandoning his early natural law theory are merely 
speculative, since he leaves no explanation for his failure to deliver on his promissory 
note.90 Nonetheless, there are independent reasons for thinking that Locke should not 
simply discard his early natural law theory; he needs a convincing theory of moral 
obligation and, preferably, a convincing natural law theory.  
In this chapter, I argue that though we have seen that Locke’s natural law theory, 
in its present form, is too vague to count as a decisive theory of moral obligation, certain 
of Locke’s central arguments, including the development of a reasonable theory of 
political obligation, require that he have some coherent theory of moral obligation. I 
maintain such a theory of moral obligation is available—one that adequately responds to 
the two questions I raise above and fits within Locke’s metaphysical and epistemological 
framework. Moreover, this theory is also identifiable as a natural law theory, though it is 
not precisely the same type of natural law theory that the early Locke envisions. This 
complex moral theory has a surprising source: Kantian ethics. Incorporating a broadly 
Kantian analysis of the Formula of Humanity would provide Locke with an example of a 
deduction from observation and reflection to a normative principle, i.e., a duty to respect 
humanity. Also, though I think Kant and Locke are similarly imprecise about the source 
                                                        
89 Steven Forde. American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr. 2001), pp. 396-409. 
 
90 Essays. I and II. 
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of moral authority, I find Christine Korsgaard’s reconstruction of Kant’s conception of 
normativity both compelling in its own right91 and not too far removed from Locke’s 
naturalist empiricism. Thus, by using certain features of Kant’s moral theory to enrich 
Locke’s skeletal theory of natural law, I aim to provide Locke with a coherent and 
internally consistent theory of moral obligation. 
I organize the chapter as follows. In sections II and III, I explain the problems 
with the answers that Locke provides to the two fundamental questions concerning moral 
obligation. First, Locke asserts that we can deduce the natural law from sense experience, 
but without further details about how such a deduction might work, the naturalistic 
fallacy threatens to invalidate his assertion. Second, Locke is unclear about what justifies 
the claims that morality makes on us and whatever answer he gives requires empirical 
evidence that is not forthcoming. In the fourth section, I give my analysis of Kant’s 
Formula of Humanity and a Kantian solution to the problem of normativity in order to 
respond to the two crucial questions and I show that, were Locke to adopt these 
responses, he would have the tools at his disposal for developing a plausible natural law 
theory of moral obligation. Finally, in the last section, I explore the broader implications 
for such a complete theory of moral obligation and the work it would do for Locke in his 
political arguments. 
 
                                                         
91 Korsgaard defends this view in the Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(1996). I realize that there is some controversy among Kantians concerning the interpretive adequacy of 
Korsgaard’s view. But I wish to remain as neutral as possible with regard to this question and leave the real 
debate to the Kantians. For a fair treatment of this issue see Michael Smith’s review of the book in 
Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 49, No. 196 (Jul. 1999), pp. 384-394. 
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II. Locke’s Failed Moral Theory (Part A) 
As I note in the previous chapter, what is known as Locke’s natural law theory 
has been pieced together from a variety of sources. Although Locke mentions the law of 
nature in several places, he presents his most detailed thoughts about the natural law 
primarily in the Essays and in the second and fourth books of ECHU. In these two works, 
Locke attempts to explain how human beings know their moral obligations and what 
gives these principles moral authority. In this section, I explain the problems with 
Locke’s claim that the natural law can be deduced from sense experience in the same way 
that one might demonstrate a mathematical proof, e.g., a proof in Euclidean geometry.92  
First, because of Locke’s commitment to naturalist empiricism, which he defends 
in the first book of ECHU, Locke rejects the rationalist foundation upon which other 
natural law theories, both previous to and contemporary with his own, had been built and 
proposes an empirically based theory as an alternative.93 Thus, the law of nature, which is 
discovered through sense experience, replaces the rationalist concept of innate moral 
principles as the guide for human behavior. Arguing primarily against Cambridge 
Platonists, such as Henry More,94 Locke says that if moral principles are innate, they 
must be universally known. However, it seems that moral principles are not universally 
known because some individuals clearly demonstrate a better grasp of moral principles                                                         
92 Essays. VII., p. 199-201; ECHU. IV., iii., §18, IV., iv., §7 and 9; IV., xii., §8. 
 
93 Both medieval natural law theorists, such as Augustine and Aquinas, and the Cambridge Platonists, a 
group of seventeenth century moralists and theologians living in England during Locke’s time, base their 
natural law theories upon innate moral principles (Greenlee (1972), p. 253-254). 
  
94 An Antidote Against Atheism (1653). 
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than others. Therefore, moral principles must not be innate.95 According to Locke, the 
moral law is objective, i.e., exists independent of the human mind, and, consequently, is 
universally binding, even though it is not universally known; so, he thinks we need an 
alternative to the rationalist explanation for how human beings know moral principles 
that also accounts for the inequality in knowledge. The explanation says Locke, is that 
some faculty or faculties within the agent’s control must be responsible for discovering 
moral obligations and this faculty is the reasoning capacity.96  
Locke describes the process this way: we observe certain regularities in nature, 
e.g., the changing of the seasons, the process of germination and growth of plants, etc., 
and we infer that human beings also must be governed by certain fixed laws.97 Further, 
because, like Aristotle, Locke presupposes that the essence of human nature is rationality 
and that the supreme exercise of rationality is virtue, he reasons that these fixed laws, 
governing creatures with a specifically rational nature, must include not only physical 
laws, but also moral laws.98 Hence, in the second of his Essays, he argues that the 
objective moral law is derived from certain precepts observed through sense experience.99 
However, it is the responsibility of the individual to strive to discover these moral laws 
by exercising her reasoning capacity to the maximum extent and it is the failure to do so                                                         
95 Besides innate knowledge, Locke also rejects tradition and revelation as methods of knowledge upon 
which one might build a natural law theory (Essays. II., p. 122-135). 
 
96 Though Locke makes this point most forcefully in the earlier work (Essays. II. and VII.), he also 
maintains this idea in his later work (ECHU. II., xxi., §5-6). 
 
97 Essays. I., p. 109. 
 
98 Ibid., p. 113. 
 
99 Essays. II., p. 131-133. 
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that explains how some know the natural moral law, while others do not. Says Locke, “if 
man makes use properly of his reason and of the inborn faculties with which nature has 
equipped him, he can attain to the knowledge of this law [the natural law] without any 
teacher instructing him in his duties, any monitor reminding him of them.”100 Therefore, 
despite the disparity in the individual capacity for reason, the moral law is universally 
discoverable by all reasonable people at all times, because it is an objective principle and 
so always accessible to those with even the slightest capacity for reason. In short, the law 
of nature determines what is virtuous and valuable and it is discoverable through a 
process of turning the light of human reason upon precepts revealed by the senses. 
At first, Locke’s narrative about how human beings know the moral law seems 
promising. It stays true to his empiricist epistemology; it explains, better than the 
rationalist picture, the disparity of moral knowledge among individuals; and it responds 
better to the moral skeptic since it promises to begin from the most neutral and accessible 
ground possible, i.e., sensory data. However, when we further examine and put this idea 
to the test, it begins to look less convincing. Notice that the above description of the 
process through which human beings discover the moral law says nothing specific about 
the content of this law. Also, the few details that Locke provides about what exactly he 
means when he says that the moral law is discoverable and demonstrable from sense 
experience do not survive criticism. Not only does he fail to illustrate how a 
demonstration of an actual moral principle from actual sense data might be possible, the 
                                                        
100 Ibid., p. 127. 
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only way that I could see his method of conceptual analysis ever succeeding in producing 
the proper sort of demonstration would be an obvious violation of the naturalistic fallacy. 
To see what I mean, let us look more closely at what Locke does say about the 
demonstration of the moral law. In the seventh of his Essays, Locke claims that so long as 
man makes proper use of his mental capacities he will attain knowledge, including 
knowledge of mathematical and moral truths. In the case of mathematics, the basis for 
reasoning is the nature and properties of figures and numbers; in the case of morality, 
reasoning begins from the idea of man as a rational being. Locke says:  
Since man has been made such as he is, equipped with reason and his 
other faculties and destined for this mode of life, there necessarily result 
from his inborn constitution some definite duties for him, which cannot be 
other than they are. In fact it seems to me to follow just as necessarily 
from the nature of man that, if he is a man, he is bound to love and 
worship God and also to fulfil [sic] other things appropriate to the rational 
nature, i.e., to observe the law of nature, as it follows from the nature of a 
triangle that, if it is a triangle, its three angles are equal to two right 
angles.101 
 
Here Locke draws a parallel between mathematical and moral knowledge: just as we 
might demonstrate from the concept ‘triangle’, as a figure having three sides and three 
angles, the sum of which is 180°, and from the concept ‘right angle’, as being equal to 
90°, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, so might we 
demonstrate from the concept ‘man’, as a rational creature, that he has particular duties, 
i.e., to love and worship God, to be just, to respect the property of others, not to murder, 
to live harmoniously with others in civil society, etc. Natural moral duties, then, follow 
                                                        
101 Essays. VII., p. 199-201. 
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by necessity, though perhaps not by logical necessity, from the correct definition of 
‘human being’.102 
 There is, however, a serious problem with Locke’s idea of moral demonstration 
being analogous to mathematical demonstration. Unlike definitions of mathematical 
concepts, such as ‘triangle’ or ‘right angle’, there is considerable disagreement regarding 
definitions of moral terms and because Locke adopts Aristotle’s thought that the defining 
characteristic of a human being is the ability to reason, he must also accept the 
teleological machinery that comes along with the view. The problem is that that 
teleological machinery presupposes a particular definition of the good, which is highly 
controversial. According to Aristotle, the final good for human beings is happiness, or 
living well and living well includes acting virtuously, i.e., acting in accordance with 
one’s moral duties. So far there is not much to disagree with, but what is controversial is 
that Aristotle also thinks that the ability to reason is man’s natural function and, therefore, 
one cannot achieve happiness or live well without exercising his reasoning capacity to the 
highest degree, but Aristotle does not fully explain the link between reason and virtue. 
So, if Locke wishes to convince us that the content of our moral duties can be derived 
from the proper definition of ‘human being’, as ‘rational creature’ in the Aristotelian 
sense, he must provide the missing link between rationality and virtue.  
One possibility is that Locke means to say that acting rationally just is evidence 
that one is acting virtuously, i.e., in accordance with one’s natural moral duties. However, 
if Locke’s argument is that the idea of ‘rational human nature’ somehow contains or 
                                                        
102 Von Leyden. “Introduction.” (1954), p. 54-56. 
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entails the content of our moral duties, then pointing to instances of acting in accordance 
with one’s natural moral duties as evidence of rationality makes his definition circular. In 
order to avoid circularity and to remain consistent with his empiricism, Locke must show 
that ‘rational creature’ is the proper definition of ‘human being’ based upon independent 
empirical evidence. In other words, before Locke can even begin to think about deriving 
specific moral duties from the definition of ‘human being’, he must convince us, and the 
moral skeptic, that his definition is the correct one and he must do so using the most 
morally neutral and accessible ground possible, i.e., sensory data. 
 Now, the only external access to human nature available to us through empirical 
means is our observation of the behavior of others and ourselves. However, I doubt that 
observation of human behavior yields anything like scientific proof that human beings are 
essentially rational creatures with natural moral duties. At most, such observation reveals 
only general patterns of ‘reasonable’ behavior, for example, human beings tend to 
cooperate with others for their mutual benefit and most recognize cheating as a violation 
of some basic norm of fairness. But raw sense data simply cannot relate such ‘reasonable’ 
behavior to recognition of and obedience to the moral law in any meaningful way as 
Locke would need to prove that his definition of ‘human being’ as ‘rational creature’ is 
correct. In fact, recent findings of moral psychologists suggest that the empirical evidence 
actually disproves the very connection between rationality and virtue that Locke, 
Aristotle, and others had presumed.103 Of course, Hobbes predicted this result during 
Locke’s time arguing that observation of human behavior, far from indicating a 
                                                        
103 See, for example, John Doris’s discussion of situationism in Lack of Character (2005). 
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predisposition to follow the moral law, actually suggests human beings are essentially 
self-interested,104 which Hobbes thinks explains the reasonableness of exiting the state of 
nature.105 Thus, it is difficult to see how one could prove, using empirical evidence alone, 
that human beings are essentially rational, where rationality relates to following the moral 
law. Therefore, if we reject Locke’s definition of ‘rational human nature’, then we must 
also reject his conclusion that the content of our moral duties can be derived from his 
definition.106 
In addition to presupposing obedience to the natural moral law as necessary for 
his definition of ‘rational human being’, Locke’s description of moral demonstration falls 
short in another important respect. Suppose, for instance, I wish to know whether the                                                         
104 Although Hobbes and Locke agree that human beings act rationally, meaning that they act according to 
some natural law, they disagree about the content of the natural law. For Hobbes, the primary natural law is 
the duty of self-preservation, but for Locke the natural law is God’s law, so the primary law might be 
something like the Golden Rule; consequently, since Hobbes and Locke disagree about the content of the 
natural law, they disagree about what it means for human beings to act rationally. But because Hobbes does 
offer a definition of ‘rational human being’ that rivals Locke’s definition, he forces Locke to defend his 
account of human nature as the proper one from which we can derive the content of the natural law. 
Unfortunately, I think the only way that the moral law could be demonstrated from ‘rational human nature’ 
is if we assume that rationality entails morality and such a move clearly begs the question. As the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates, the most rational choice is not always the most virtuous one. 
 
105 Leviathan. XIII-XV. 
 
106 Locke also presupposes knowledge of the natural moral law for definitions of other moral terms. In 
ECHU, Locke describes moral demonstration in a different way: he says if one first takes abstract moral 
propositions, such as “where there is no property there is no injustice,” and analyzes them in such a way as 
to make the relations among the terms explicit, then it would be possible for one to demonstrate the truth of 
this and other moral propositions in just the same way that one would demonstrate the truth of a 
mathematical proposition, such as “a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones.” Here again though, 
the supposed demonstration of the truth of these moral propositions is heavily dependent upon Locke’s 
narrow definitions of particular terms. In reference to the above abstract moral proposition, Locke says, 
“for the idea of property being a right to anything, and the idea to which the name ‘injustice’ is given being 
the invasion or violation of that right, it is evident that…this proposition [is] true.” But in order to establish 
that ‘property’ means having a right to anything and that ‘injustice’ refers to the violation of such a right, 
we would need to presuppose some rule or norm specifying particular rights and duties. Once again, Locke 
does not explain how we might demonstrate the content of the moral law, but instead assumes that our 
moral duties are clear to us from the idea of “a supreme Being…on whom we depend” and ourselves “as 
understanding, rational creatures” (ECHU. IV., iii., §18). 
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proposition “murder is wrong” is true. How might I analyze this claim according to 
Locke’s theory of moral demonstration? First, according to the metaphysical and 
epistemological framework that Locke develops in ECHU, all propositions or claims, 
including moral propositions, contain simple and complex ideas. On the one hand, simple 
ideas are concepts that we passively receive through sensation and reflection;107 on the 
other hand, the mind actively constructs complex ideas from the simple ideas it 
receives.108 Locke thinks individual moral concepts, such as ‘theft’, ‘lying’, ‘murder’, 
‘dueling’, and ‘stealing’ are among the class of complex ideas and can be analyzed and 
broken down into their component parts, i.e., simple ideas and relations among simple 
ideas.109 So, in order to determine whether the claim “murder is wrong” is true, we must 
break down the complex idea ‘murder’ into its simple ideas and then compare that set of 
simple ideas to the set of simple ideas composing the relevant moral law in something 
like the following way: 
First, from reflection on the operations of our own minds, we have the 
ideas of willing, considering, purposing beforehand, malice, or wishing ill 
to another; and also of life, or perception, and self-motion. Secondly, from 
sensation we have the collection of those simple sensible ideas which are 
to be found in a man, and of some action, whereby we put an end to 
perception and motion in the man; all of which simple ideas are 
comprehended in the word murder…if I have the will of a supreme 
invisible Lawgiver for my rule, then, as I supposed the action commanded 
or forbidden by God, I call it good or evil, sin or duty…their [the moral 
                                                        
107 ECHU. II., vii. 
 
108 Either by: (1) combining simple ideas, (2) relating or comparing two simple or complex ideas, or (3) 
abstracting them away from even more complex ideas (ECHU. II., xii., §1). 
 
109 For Locke’s analysis of these terms see ECHU (‘theft,’ II., xii., §5); (‘lying,’ II., xxii., §9); (‘murder,’ 
II., xxviii., §14); (‘dueling,’ II., xxviii., §15); and (‘stealing,’ II., xxviii., §16). 
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terms’] rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement 
with those patterns prescribed by some law.110 
 
If the pattern of simple ideas making up the action I identify as murder matches the 
pattern of the simple ideas composing the moral law (the moral law being something like: 
human beings ought not engage in the wrongful death of one by another), then the 
proposition “murder is wrong or vicious” is true.  
By now the second problem with Locke’s explanation of moral demonstration 
should be becoming clearer. If conceptual analysis of moral terms, such as, ‘murder’ 
yield simple ideas that are purely descriptive, then although Locke succeeds in staying 
true to his empiricist epistemology, he does not succeed in deriving moral duties from 
sense data. Nowhere in Locke’s own analysis of the term in the first six lines of the 
passage quoted above does the idea ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ or any other unequivocally 
normative indicator appear.111 So I do not see how a comparison between the simple 
ideas contained in a moral concept and the simple ideas contained in the relevant moral 
law could provide information about the truth of a moral proposition, which is a 
normative statement. As it is, in the above analysis, Locke simply assumes the existence 
of God’s law as the moral law and even this he states as a conditional, as only one option 
among many rules we might use to judge the truth of a moral proposition. If this is what 
Locke means by moral demonstration, namely, a comparison of the analysis of a moral 
term with some rule in order to determine whether it agrees or disagrees with the rule,                                                         
110 ECHU. II., xxviii., §14 (emphasis original). 
 
111 He uses ‘malice’ and ‘wishing ill to another’, but either these terms are complex ideas that need further 
analysis in order to make their normative import explicit, or they are purely descriptive terms as well and 
do not shed any light upon the truth of the proposition ‘murder is wrong’. 
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then he certainly does not show that the moral law can be discovered from morally 
neutral precepts received through sensation and reflection.  
So, could we demonstrate the natural moral law from the definition of ‘human 
being’ as ‘rational creature’ and an analysis of the simple ideas composing complex 
moral terms in some other way? In other words, could we determine that we have a moral 
duty not to murder by analyzing an act of murder? I think this is possible only if complex 
moral terms themselves contain simple ideas of ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘duty’, 
etc. or we assume some principle of normativity prior to analysis and somehow read into 
the descriptive analysis our predetermined moral duties. We will examine whether the 
former possibility is a live option for Locke next in the discussion of moral realism, but, 
initially, this seems arbitrary because, even leaving aside the question of whether ideas 
like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are simple ones, if our minds actively construct complex ideas 
out of simple ideas, as Locke contends, then it seems as if we could toss the simple idea 
‘wrong’ into any set of simple ideas in order to create a complex moral term.112  
The latter possibility is almost certainly a non-starter because it is a clear violation 
of the naturalistic fallacy. Even if I assume that I have a duty not to murder, nothing in 
the physical description of an act of murder could clearly distinguish it from the physical 
description of, say, killing in self-defense. The problem here is not in using empirical 
evidence in order to explain why murder is wrong (this could be accomplished simply by                                                         
112 However, Locke also insists that the natural law be discovered by reason and not constructed by it. This 
is a crucial difference between Locke’s theory of moral obligation and Kant’s, as we shall see in the third 
section. But technically, for Locke, if we are using combination, relation, or abstraction to make complex 
ideas out of simple ones, we are not creating anything. We are simply passively receiving the building 
blocks provided by sensation and reflection and actively using our minds to expand our knowledge base. 
But this seems to imply that there is a right and wrong way to put simple ideas together, which seems odd. 
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referring to murder’s sociological impact upon communities and individuals perhaps), but 
in identifying an act of murder in the first place. From an empirical standpoint, the 
physical description of acts of justified and unjustified killing are exactly the same.113 
Hence, I could not derive a normative conclusion about an act of murder from only the 
empirical description of such an act without illicitly deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. 
A final possibility that I would like to suggest here is that perhaps by 
demonstration, Locke means something analogous to the metaphysical theory of 
supervenience or emergence, according to which the concept ‘object’ supervenes upon a 
group of related properties arranged in a particular way.114 If Locke were to borrow this 
idea, then, he might think that normativity supervenes on or emerges from a particular 
arrangement of purely descriptive simple ideas. For example, again taking Locke’s 
conceptual analysis of the term ‘murder’: from the ideas of “willing, considering, 
purposing beforehand, malice, or wishing ill to another; and…life, or perception, and 
self-motion” and from the idea of an action resulting in “an end to perception and motion 
in [a] man” existing within two individual bodies in close proximity to each other, under 
specified circumstances, might emerge the complex idea of ‘wrongful killing’. The 
arrangement certainly would be complicated, perhaps too complicated to conceptualize; 
                                                        
113 One might object that what distinguishes justified and unjustified killing is the killer’s intention and 
though I think this is true, I do not think intention is the sort of thing that could necessarily be captured by 
empirical evidence. Also, even if we could know the killer’s intent through empirical means, by asking him 
to take a lie-detector test or looking at MRI scans, for example, this would again be purely descriptive. So, 
although having a malicious intent might be the distinguishing mark of an act of murder, I do not see how 
this could help Locke to avoid the naturalistic fallacy. The murderer’s state of mind can only be labeled 
wrong within the context of a normative theory. 
 
114 This view is especially popular among non-reductive physicalists, such as Donald Davidson. See his 
article “Mental Events” (1980) and for a survey, see Jaegwon Kim’s Supervenience and Mind (1993). 
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nonetheless, I think something along these lines may yield a plausible account of moral 
demonstration and were we to include simple ideas describing the killer’s state-of-mind 
as part of the arrangement, it would be even more promising. But there is no solid 
evidence that Locke had anything like this in mind in his discussion of deriving moral 
duties from sense data. Thus, we are forced to conclude at this point that, upon closer 
review, Locke’s idea that the moral law may be derived from ideas gained through sense 
experience does not persuasively respond to the first question about how human beings 
might know their moral obligations. 
 
III. Locke’s Failed Moral Theory (Part B) 
Now let us examine whether Locke has more success answering the second 
question regarding the source of moral authority. The aim here is to explain what justifies 
the claims that morality makes upon us. As I have mentioned, Locke scholars debate two 
possible answers: either Locke is a voluntarist or he is a moral realist about the source of 
bindingness.115 According to the Pufendorfian type of voluntarism (or divine command 
theory) that Locke seems to endorse, although the content of the moral law is 
independent of God’s will and as a result, non-arbitrary and discoverable by human                                                         
115 There is a third possibility. Other Locke scholars, the most famous among them being Strauss, interpret 
Locke as a hedonistic utilitarian, no different from Hobbes. This fits with Strauss’s interpretation of Locke 
as primarily a natural rights theorist, which I discussed in section IV of the previous chapter. Strauss argues 
that, for both Hobbes and Locke, the basis for the natural law is the natural right to self-preservation and 
the source of the civil law’s bindingness is the capacity of the sovereign to enforce his will through the 
promise of reward and the threat of punishment (Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press (1953)). This view, if it can be properly characterized as a theory of moral obligation, is 
another type of voluntarism, but one in which the source of the obligation, when one exists, is wholly 
artificial and dependent upon the will of an earthly sovereign. Indeed, on this interpretation the natural 
world itself is morally indifferent, so there would be no sense of obligation or duty without the imposition 
of the sovereign’s will; and, obviously, there are no obligations, moral or otherwise, governing the state of 
nature since it is not ruled by a sovereign. 
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reason, it only has the “force of law”it is only obligatorybecause it is legislated by 
God, who alone has the power to enforce the moral law.116 By contrast, according to 
Grotius’s brand of moral reason, which Locke also appears to accept, we would have 
moral duties even if God did not exist and there were no effective sovereign because 
obedience to the moral law is obligatory independent of who the legislator is or how the 
law comes to be.117 Moral realists deny that the natural world is morally indifferent 
claiming instead that there are moral facts in the world that make some actions right and 
some actions wrong. Thus, for realists, questions about moral authority reduce to 
questions about the moral facts in the world. 
Now, it is tempting to read the early Locke in his writings on natural law as 
advocating a voluntarism of the sort Pufendorf defends. In one passage in the Essays, 
Locke appears to support this view explaining the following scenario: “at God’s 
command the binding force of this law [the natural law] can lapse, for this actually 
happened, as we read, in the case of the Israelites when they departed from Egypt and 
journeyed to Palestine.”118 Here, Locke describes a time when God seems to suspend the 
Israelites’ natural moral obligation to respect the property rights of the Egyptians. So it 
looks as if the bindingness of the natural law is contingent upon God’s will and that God 
has the authority to change it. However, Locke goes on to point out that, actually, it is not 
the law or God’s will that has changed in this case. Rather, he says, because the 
circumstances have changed, it is the case that the natural law no longer applies in the                                                         
116 Korsgaard (1996), p. 23-24. 
 
117 The Rights of War and Peace. Richard Tuck, (ed.) Indianapolis: Liberty Fund (2005), p. 1748. 
 
118 Essays. VII,, p. 201. 
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same way. In other words, were God ever to suspend or change the natural law on a 
whim and without good cause, then the law would be arbitrary. But because God can 
expect human beings neither to obey a law that they cannot predict nor to obey a divine 
legislator whose commands appear to them to be arbitrary and irrational, there must be a 
discernable reason that the Israelites were free to acquire the property of the Egyptians in 
this particular case.119 This argument, admittedly, has problems, but what is important for 
the point at hand is that, like Pufendorf, Locke expressly avoids the strong voluntarist 
position, advocated by some moralists, for instance, during the Reformation that God 
could, at any time, change or suspend the natural law at his whim. Though Locke 
certainly thinks that the natural law expresses God’s will and is at least externally binding 
for this reason, unlike Pufendorf, he also thinks that the commands of the natural law 
derive their binding force, at least in part, from their discoverability.120 So, though he 
clearly thinks God’s will plays an important role in making the natural law authoritative, 
God’s legislative power is not in itself the entire explanation. 
The second possible interpretation of Locke’s justification for the natural law 
being morally binding is moral realism. There is at least one independent reason to 
interpret Locke as a realist. As I examined at some length above, Locke’s early natural 
law theory depends upon his claim that human beings are capable of discovering the                                                         
119 It is important to notice that this is a point not about moral motivation, but about moral obligation. 
Locke does not argue that God would not command moral laws that contradict human reason or keep his 
commands concealed from human beings because such commands would fail to inspire the correct 
sentiments that cause human beings to act rightly. Rather, he thinks such commands would fail to be laws 
for human beings; reasonable creatures quite simply cannot be obligated to obey unreasonable or 
inconspicuous commands. 
 
120 In his sixth essay, Locke says that it is “a rational apprehension of what is right” that puts us under and 
obligation (VI., p. 185). 
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natural law through sense experience and observation alone; and it seems to me that one 
way to make sense of the idea that moral obligations are demonstrable from empirical 
evidence is to read Locke as a moral realist. If this is right, Locke thinks that sense 
experience provides more than merely physical facts about the world; it also provides us 
with certain moral facts, which our reasoning faculty then uses to derive the moral law. I 
think that Locke may have such a view in mind in ECHU when he adds reflection to the 
list of faculties that help us to perceive our world. Looking back at the passage where 
Locke performs the conceptual analysis on the moral concept ‘murder’, we see that 
reflection provides us with certain simple ideas that emit at least a tinge of normativity, 
e.g., malice, or wishing ill to another, while sensation provides purely descriptive ones. 
Thus, it is not much of a leap to think that, through reflection, we receive simple ideas 
that are moral facts about the world showing that Locke tends toward a realist perspective 
regarding moral authority. In addition, Locke directly refers to reason’s recognition of the 
moral law as the source of moral authority in an earlier passage, which ties obligation to 
the will: 
All obligation binds conscience and lays a bond on the mind itself, so that 
not fear of punishment, but a rational apprehension of what is right, puts 
us under an obligation, and conscience passes judgment on morals, and, if 
we are guilty of a crime, declares that we deserve punishment. 121 
 
This passage is similar to Grotius’s definition of the natural law as a decree of the 
judgment made by right reason and consequently decreed by God.122 Thus, it is also 
plausible to read Locke as agreeing with Grotius in thinking that moral authority just is                                                         
121 Essays. VI., p. 185 (emphasis mine). 
 
122 The Rights of War and Peace (2005), p. 150-151. 
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the comprehension of the moral law and the recognition of one’s specific moral duties 
that binds the conscience.  
Unfortunately, unless we decide this interpretive debate purely on the basis of the 
number of passages in support of each interpretation, looking at individual passages out 
of context will not help to settle the dispute about whether Locke is a voluntarist or a 
realist. He is simply unclear regarding the source of moral authority, making statements 
in support of both horns of this up-dated version of Euthyphro’s dilemma. What is clear 
is that Locke wishes to avoid the extremes of each position. He fears both the 
arbitrariness, or at least inconspicuousness, of an ethical voluntarism that says the moral 
law has authority because it is God’s command and conversely, the lack of strong moral 
authority of a moral realism divorced from some definite standard or judge of morality. 
Hence, I think that Locke’s actual position may lie somewhere in the middle. But 
whatever interpretation of Locke’s account of the source of moral authority one settles 
upon, Locke will need to deal with worries about consistency because his empiricism 
causes trouble for each. 
First, I have already touched upon the problems with thinking that voluntarism 
and empiricism could be compatible. At the least, such a project would require an a 
posteriori proof of God’s existence. While Locke does assume the truth of such an 
empirical proof (which takes the vague form of a design argument) one gets the distinct 
impression that this is merely an after-thought, not intended as support for a particular 
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argument.123 Either Locke fails to recognize or he ignores the difficulty his empiricism 
causes for him when he claims that we are bound to obey the natural moral law because it 
is God’s decree.  
Second, although I think moral realism is compatible with Locke’s naturalist 
empiricism, the difficulty with this interpretation is that moral realism itself offers a 
rather weak justification for the claims morality makes upon us. It seems that without an 
unambiguous measure or judge of the moral law, even if we could know that we have 
truly discovered a moral fact, it is at least arguable whether the mere recognition of one’s 
obligation gives that obligation moral authority. In the following section, I look at Kant’s 
defense of this type of moral internalism based upon an objective view of human nature. 
As I have already discussed, this seems to be a move that Locke attempts as well, but 
because he fails to develop a non-contentious definition of ‘rational human nature’, his 
view cannot serve as a credible basis for moral realism. We will see whether Kant has a 
more credible definition of human nature and whether it can serve as the basis for a 
plausible theory of moral authority in the next section. 
In this section, I have shown that Locke’s natural law theory fails to respond to 
the two crucial questions around which any complete theory of moral obligation must be 
built: (1) how do we know our natural moral obligations? And (2) what gives these 
obligations moral authority? To the first, he answers that we can demonstrate the moral 
law from sense experience. This response has two problems. First, he argues that we can                                                         
123 In addition to the statement of this view at the beginning of the Essays, Locke also waves his had at a 
design argument in ECHU at IV., x., §3-6. But nowhere does he vehemently defend such a view suggesting 
that either he is unaware of the difficulties his empiricism causes for a voluntarist position, or he simply 
does not think of himself as a voluntarist. 
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derive our natural moral duties from the proper definition of ‘human being’ as ‘rational 
creature’, but his definition of ‘rational human nature’ is circular. Second, if conceptual 
analysis of complex moral ideas, such as ‘murder’, yields a purely descriptive set of 
simple ideas, then Locke cannot derive natural moral duties from moral propositions 
without committing the naturalistic fallacy. To the second question, Locke responds that 
the moral law is binding either because it is a manifestation of God’s will or because it is 
intrinsically binding for rational creatures who discover it. Both of these potential 
responses to the problem of normativity fail, however, when we try to understand how 
they might work with Locke’s naturalist empiricism. Therefore, Locke does not have a 
convincing account of moral obligation and my task in the next section is to prove that 
were Locke to adopt a broadly Kantian theory of moral obligation, he would be able to 
answer these two crucial questions. 
 
IV. A Kantian Solution 
In this section, I introduce a Kantian analysis of the Formula of Humanity that 
explains how we come to know our moral obligations and I discuss the merits of 
Korsgaard’s solution to the question about moral authority or what justifies the claims 
that morality makes upon us, which she calls “reflective endorsement.” In so doing, I 
begin to shape a comprehensive theory of moral obligation that answers the two crucial 
questions that we have been focusing upon throughout this chapter and, which Locke 
could use to correct and further develop his own moral theory. But, before turning to the 
Kantian solution, to ensure that, in the end, the compromise moral theory we have 
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remains, at its core, Lockeian, i.e., one that Locke could endorse without giving up the 
key features of his own underdeveloped moral theory specified in chapter two, we must 
first identify key features of natural law theories in general.  
As I see it, there are three minimum qualifications for classifying a theory of 
moral obligation as a natural law theory, in the broadest terms. First, a moral theory that 
is a natural law theory must be committed to a basic version of moral realism, i.e., the 
idea that some moral propositions are literally true because they correspond to facts in the 
world. Second, all natural law theories recognize an important or deep connection 
between human nature (however it is defined) and the natural moral law. This connection 
is important for the human capacity to know and to be bound by the natural law. Third, 
the natural law must be linked to practical reason; in other words, the natural law must be 
a sufficient guide to human behavior. 
By now it should be clear that Locke’s moral theory, rough as it is, more than 
meets these basic requirements for being a natural law theory. Though Locke talks a fair 
amount about God’s authority with regard to the natural law, it is not God’s authority (or, 
at any rate, it is not only God’s authority) that gives the law its force; Locke is committed 
to moral realism thinking that the natural moral law may be derived from certain facts 
about human nature and the natural world.124 And while the natural law certainly could 
                                                        
124 There is an ongoing debate in contemporary metaethics concerning whether one can consistently 
maintain both naturalism and moral realism. Naturalists believe that all facts about the world must be 
scientific facts. But because it seems impossible to prove true any moral proposition, such as, ‘unlawful 
killing is wrong’, by referring to a set of scientific (or empirical) facts only, it seems that the moral realist 
must claim that the relevant facts are not scientific facts, but facts of a different sort, i.e., normative. So 
moral realists cannot be naturalists. I actually think that in order for Locke to keep his natural law theory of 
moral obligation, he must relax his commitment to his naturalist empiricism somewhat. But I also think that 
the distinction between rationalists and empiricists is not as stark as many view it.   
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never conflict with God’s will, the law of nature is morally binding and a proper guide to 
human behavior precisely because it is founded upon an unchanging human nature, in 
conformity with human rationality, and discoverable by human reason. It should also be 
clear that Locke’s commitment to naturalist empiricism clashes with aspects of all three 
qualifications above. So I argue that saving Locke’s natural law theory of moral 
obligation necessitates relaxing that allegiance and embracing more of a rationalist point 
of view.  
Keeping all of this in mind, then, let us now examine Kant’s moral theory. Recall 
that Locke says that the moral law is universally discoverable by and accessible to all 
reasonable people at all times, it is an objective law, and that the rational nature of human 
beings determines their particular duties. Kant says something similar about what he calls 
the “supreme practical principle” of morality for human beings: if such a principle exists, 
it must be “an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, [constituting] an objective 
principle of the will and thus can serve as a universal practical law.”125 According to 
Kant, this universal practical imperative, known as the Formula of Humanity, is the 
following: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”126  
Now I think it is possible to read Kant’s justification for this second formulation 
of the moral law as an example of a moral demonstration. But, unlike Locke, who insists 
upon deriving the content of the natural moral law from empirical evidence alone, Kant                                                         
125 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Mary Gregor (trans. and ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (1997), 4:429, p. 37 (emphasis original). 
 
126 GMM. 4:429, p. 38. 
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offers an a priori demonstration of the content of the supreme practical imperative. He 
begins from a subjective conception of the imperative and moves toward an objective 
one. Kant says that human beings necessarily understand their own existence with 
reference to a basic assumption of the practical imperative: “rational nature exists as an 
end in itself;” in other words, each individual is compelled by her nature as a rational 
being to think of herself as being an end, i.e., having intrinsic value.127 This realization is 
what Korsgaard calls having a “moral identity.”128 Moreover, as a result of this 
realization attained through a process of self-reflection, one has certain expectations 
about the way she ought to be treated. Indeed, it is this deep understanding of oneself as 
having moral worth from which all other laws of practical reasoning governing the will 
are derived.129 However, the demonstration of the moral law happens in the move from a 
purely subjective proposition, ‘I am a rational being existing as an end in myself and 
others should so act that they use my humanity always as an end and never merely as a 
means’, to the objective, universal practical imperative, which applies to all creatures 
with a rational nature. This is where Locke could most benefit from Kant’s wisdom. So 
what might a Kantian demonstration from the realization that ‘I am a being worthy of 
moral respect, who should be treated as such’ to the universal obligation that ‘I should 
treat all rational beings as worthy of respect’ look like? 
First, this move from the subjective to the objective requires that I recognize 
myself not merely as a rational being, but as one among many members of a society of                                                         
127 Ibid., p. 37. 
 
128 Korsgaard (1996), p. 132. 
 
129 GMM. 4:429, p. 37-38. 
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rational beings. Focusing upon our shared humanity shows that the Formula of Humanity 
is about respecting humanity in general, not just respecting any particular instantiation of 
humanity. Once I recognize, through a process of reflecting upon my own human nature, 
that because I am a rational being, I have intrinsic value and others owe me a duty of 
respect, I also recognize that those who owe me respect could not be bound by such a 
duty without themselves being rational.130 Hence, if I truly believe that such a duty exists 
for others with respect to myself, then, in order to avoid contradiction, I must also believe 
that this duty applies to all rational beings, including myself, and in this way I have 
derived the objective, universal practical imperative: always treat oneself and others as an 
end, and never merely as a means.  
Now my straightforward description of Kant’s view above is based upon a 
rationalist doctrine131 and although Locke rejects the rationalist idea that the natural 
                                                        
130 GMM. 4:448, p. 53-54. Korsgaard helpfully discusses the process of deriving the objective moral 
imperative from the subjective understanding. There is a worry about whether my explanation for the 
objectivity of the moral law could convince the egoist who is a committed solipsist. If consciousness is 
truly private and we have no access to the thoughts and intentions of others, then the exercise of putting 
ourselves in one another’s shoes, so to speak, does not seem possible. And there is no contradiction in the 
thought ‘well, the moral law may apply to you in this way, but I am an exceptional creature and so the 
moral law does not apply to me in the same way’. In response to this objection, Korsgaard denies that 
reasons and consciousness are internally illuminating, rather they are reflective; and she argues that human 
beings are “social animals in a deep way.” So, when we expect someone to obey a duty, we think that there 
are reasons to obey the duty and we think those reasons are themselves objective; there is no need to move 
from the subjective to the objective on Korsgaard’s view because the subjective is only a phenomenon, not 
part of the real explanation for the universal practical imperative ((1996), p. 132-145). 
 
131 GMM. 4:454, p. 58-59. However, Kant certainly does recognize ‘human being’ as a unique creature that 
must participate in both the noumenal and in the phenomenal worlds. That is why he explains that moral 
obligations must be principles of practical reason that are discovered through theoretical reason. They are 
synthetic a priori propositions (like the principles of mathematics). I think it is also worth pointing out that 
empirical evidence reinforces this rationalist demonstration because I can also reasonably suppose that 
others are rational and have a sense of the moral law by observing their behavior, interacting with them in 
different ways, and discussing reasons for acting. From the right type of observations and interactions, I can 
deduce that a particular individual has a rational nature; and, therefore, is deserving of my respect. Through 
these sorts of activities, individuals both express and affirm their humanity. 
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moral law is composed of innate moral principles, I think Locke actually accepts Kant’s 
rationalism. For, in denying the possibility of innate moral principles, Locke does not 
deny the possibility of a priori knowledge; rather, what he finds objectionable about the 
earlier rationalist natural law theories is that their claims about how human beings know 
the moral law are inconsistent with our empirical observations of human behavior. If the 
moral law were, in truth, ‘written on the hearts of men’, then everyone would agree about 
its content and different cultures around the world would acknowledge the same basic 
moral principles. But this is not the case. By contrast, Locke seems explicitly to agree 
with Kant that the moral law can be demonstrated from the proper definition of ‘rational 
human nature’; for example, Locke says that the law of nature is tied to the very essence 
of man. He says that man’s moral duties “necessarily follow from his very 
nature…natural law stands and falls together with the nature of man as it is at present”132 
and this is a rationalist view. 
However, Locke also asserts that we could find empirical evidence to substantiate 
the claim that human beings are essentially rational creatures who recognize that they 
have natural moral obligations, an assertion, which I rejected in section II of this chapter. 
Kant also agrees that there are limits to such an empiricist approach to the nature of 
morality. He argues that evidence from sense experience can neither prove that human 
beings are rational and autonomous, nor fully demonstrate the grounds for our moral 
duties; these ideas must be known a priori,133 hence, my rationalist interpretation of 
                                                        
132 Essays VII., p. 201. 
 
133 GMM. 4:431, p. 39; 4:442-445, p. 48-51. 
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Kant’s moral demonstration above. But while I think that rationalism provides a solid 
foundation for understanding human nature and demonstrating general moral obligations, 
or what Kant calls imperfect duties, I do not think we can rely upon rationalism to 
provide us with knowledge of the content of specific moral obligations, or what Kant 
calls perfect duties.134  
Sense experience and observation reinforce a priori principles and provide facts 
about the world that are necessary for knowing our specific moral obligations and making 
the moral law a practical guide for human behavior. Although I can reason out the 
general moral obligation that I ought to respect humanity, knowing what that duty of 
respect entails in particular situations requires knowing some empirical data. For 
instance, given the correct definition of the term ‘murder’ I may be able to deduce a 
priori that murder is wrong from the Formula of Humanity. But in order to condemn a 
particular act of murder as a violation of the duty to respect humanity, I need to know 
some empirical information to help me identify the act as murder in the first place, e.g., 
physical facts gained through sensation and reflection (similar to those Locke offers in 
his description, which I cite in section II above); facts about human psychology and the 
psychology of the individual parties involved; and perhaps facts about the impact such an 
act would have upon society and its members. From all of this I would know that acting 
upon my desire to shoot Sally would be a violation of my duty to respect humanity. So, 
were Locke to accept a rationalist starting point for his demonstration of the natural moral                                                         
134 In fact, Kant admits this as well in the Critique of Practical Reason where he says “since the matter of a 
practical law, that is, an object of maxim, can never be given otherwise than empirically whereas a free 
will, as independent of empirical conditions…must nevertheless be determinable, a free will must find a 
determining ground in the law but independently of the matter of the law” (I., 1., §6, 5:29, p. 162 (emphasis 
original)). 
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law: the a priori definition of human being, as ‘rational creature’, and, following from 
that, my Kantian justification for the Formula of Humanity, he could then incorporate 
empirical data in order to derive specific moral laws. But without this rationalist 
foundation, I fail to see how Locke might demonstrate the moral law from empiricist 
precepts alone. 
Thus far, I have established that Kant’s rationalist foundation for the moral law 
could help Locke to show that human beings come to know their moral obligations 
through a series of a priori and a posteriori demonstrations combining a rationalist 
definition of ‘rational human nature’ with empirical facts in order to derive specific moral 
obligations. In this final part of this section, I discuss Korsgaard’s solution to the problem 
of normativity because I think it is a credible theory of moral authority and I show that 
although Locke and Kant (via Korsgaard) fundamentally disagree about what justifies the 
demands that morality makes upon us, both think that normativity itself is part of the 
fabric of observation and reflection for rational beings. In other words, though Kant and 
Locke take the objects of observation and reflection to be different—for Kant, reason 
creates normativity by reflecting upon its fundamental rational nature and willing the 
moral law, while for Locke, one discovers the natural moral law by observing and 
reflecting upon objective facts about the world gained through sense experience as a 
rational being135—they agree that human beings cannot be obligated to obey the moral 
law unless they have the ability to recognize its commands as binding upon them and 
                                                        
135 On the difference between Locke and Kant, there is a clear statement of Locke’s view concerning 
reason’s role in morality’s authority at Essays I., p. 111. 
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they agree that that ability to recognize the moral law as authoritative, in turn, depends 
upon certain facts about human nature. 
Kant is most often interpreted as a constructivist on the question of what gives the 
law moral authority.136 According to this view, the claims that morality makes are 
binding upon us because, as rational creatures, we recognize a certain type of authority in 
ourselves (i.e., because I see myself as capable of self-conscious reflection concerning 
my own actions, I have the capacity to act autonomously, which gives me a kind of 
authority over myself) and the claims of morality are ones that I would will for myself.137 
So, I recognize the commands of the moral law as binding upon me and other rational 
beings because normativity comes from my own free will.  
Korsgaard, filling in some of the details of the above viewpoint, offers a slightly 
modified version of Kantian constructivism. She calls her view “reflective endorsement.” 
The main feature of Korsgaard’s view is that the source of moral obligation is reason’s 
reflective endorsement of our desires; moral duties come from the will’s judgment of 
each desire according to a law that “arises from the nature of the will.”138 She argues that, 
according to Kant, an autonomous moral agent deliberates about his actions by testing 
each of his desires or impulses to determine whether it is a reason to act. A desire or 
impulse is a reason to act if it stems from one’s consistent or genuine will and it is the 
                                                        
136 Rawls was perhaps the most famous proponent of this interpretation. Although, recently, Allen Wood 
(Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007)) has argued for a realist interpretation of 
Kant, which might provide a better point of intersection between Locke and Kant. 
 
137 Korsgaard (1996), p. 19. 
 
138 Ibid., p. 97-98. 
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sort of thing one could make public or will as a universal law. The difference between 
this and the more typical constructivist position is that the “reasons sought here are 
practical reasons; the idea is to show that morality is good for us.”139 So, reflective 
endorsement is the test used to “establish the normativity of all [our] particular motives 
and inclinations” and to guide our actions in such a way as to give full expression to our 
very humanity.140  
Now I think that Locke could make use of Korsgaard’s reflective endorsement 
view of moral authority in order to bolster his appeal to moral realism and his ability to 
solve the problem of normativity. What justifies morality’s claims upon us is that we are 
rational beings capable of evaluating our actions from an objective standard of the right 
or the good and as such, our judgments have a particular authority that the judgments of 
non-rational beings do not have. But for Locke, contra Korsgaard, that objective standard 
of the right or the good is independent of our rational nature. The light of reason or 
common sense is capable of discovering this independent standard, but Locke insists that 
our reasoning capacity in no way imposes a moral standard upon the world. Here Kant 
would object to Locke’s moral realism because if the moral law is external to the will, 
then the will is not absolutely free and freedom is the key to autonomy according to 
Kant.141 But I do not see how the moral law’s being external to the human will threatens 
the autonomy of rational creatures. As rational beings, we are free to accept or to deny 
our obligations whether they come from reason reflectively endorsing our desires or from                                                         
139 Ibid.,  p. 19. 
 
140 Ibid., p. 89. 
 
141 GMM. 4:447-448, p. 52-54. 
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reason discovering the moral law from facts about the world and facts about human 
nature.142 We are not free, however, to avoid the evaluation of our actions from that 
objective standpoint. This is something that rational beings do automatically or 
intuitively. 
The process of observation and reflection is the distinguishing feature of a rational 
human nature that makes moral authority possible and because of this, human nature is 
such that knowing the law is enough to put one under an obligation. Again, it is this 
ability to reflect upon our actions and desires according to what is good for us that is the 
expression of our very humanity and, as such, it gives us access to a more complex level 
of conception, the moral realm. So, were Locke to adopt such a view, he would say that it 
is not just the ability to judge our actions against a moral law, but also the ability to judge 
our actions against a moral law, obedience to which has been empirically proven to be 
what is best for us in the end, that constitutes the source of normativity. 
 In addition, the natural law is not merely consistent with human nature; rather, by 
obeying the natural law, human beings develop their natures as rational creatures. So 
when an individual chooses to act against the law of nature by committing murder, for 
instance, he is not acting rationally; he is not obeying that which his reason tells him are 
his duties. But as long as human beings make proper use of their mental faculties and 
other essential features of their characters, they can arrive at certainty, i.e., moral and 
mathematical truths. The natural law helps human beings to fulfill their essential natures;                                                         
142 Kant’s argument seems to be that there is a contradiction in denying our moral obligations. Rational 
creatures express their very natures in following the moral law, but in order to do this, they must also be 
autonomous and, therefore, free. But if the moral law is external to the will, then the will is not free; 
therefore, the law must be internal. In other words, the will itself must give the law to itself.  
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natural laws are good for human nature and certain duties do follow from man’s 
constitution as a rational being. Locke argues that from the nature of man as a rational 
being we can derive certain duties: to revere God, to promote justice, to have regard for 
the property of others, to live in an ordered society with others.143 Thus, it is reason that 
allows human beings both to ask and to answer the question about the source of moral 
bindingness.  
 In this section, I have shown that by relaxing his commitment to empiricism, 
Locke’s natural law theory of moral obligation can be modified in such a way as to 
answer the two big questions: how do we know our moral obligations and what is the 
source of their authority? With regard to the first question, Locke must simply adopt 
Kant’s definition of human being as a rational being and my description of the a priori 
demonstration of the general moral law as the rationalist foundation upon which to build 
his a posteriori demonstration of specific moral obligations. This is a complete 
explanation of how human beings come to know the natural moral law. With regard to 
the second question, the repair of Locke’s theory is more complicated. Because moral 
realism is weak on the question of what gives the law moral authority, Locke must 
incorporate some standard for judging that the moral obligations that we derive are in fact 
principles that guide us to do what is best. Locke thinks that there is an objective moral 
standard that applies to us and is best for us because of certain facts about human nature 
and certain facts about the world. Korsgaard lays out facts about human nature that Locke 
can borrow to explain why it is good for us to do certain duties prescribed by the natural                                                         
143 C.f., Aquinas’s list of natural inclinations in section II of chapter two above. 
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moral law. Human beings are the only creatures capable of evaluating actions according 
to an objective standard and this capability is intuitive, it is impossible for us not to 
evaluate our actions in such a way. Therefore, what gives the moral law authority is our 
evaluation of our own actions according to the objective, natural moral law.  
Finally, going back to the Lockeian test. This view remains a natural law theory 
because it relies upon the principles of moral realism; it maintains that the connection 
between human nature and the natural law is crucial for knowing and being bound by the 
law; and it provides principles of practical reason according to which human beings 
discover the guide to their behavior. Though Locke must give up his search for a pure 
naturalist empiricism, accepting a Kantian rationalist foundation makes it possible to 
demonstrate the natural moral law and given that the result is a more plausible natural 
law theory of moral obligation, I would say that relaxing his commitment to empiricism 
is a small price to pay. 
 
V. Broader Implications 
To conclude this chapter, I want to discuss some of the broader implications of 
the theory of moral obligation I have put forward for Locke’s later works in order to 
make explicit the connection between the two parts of this project. First, several of 
Locke’s remarks in the Second Treatise clearly originate from the Essays. He discusses 
the state of nature as having a law of nature governing it;144 and that the law of nature 
                                                        
144 TT. II., §6, §7, and §19 should be compared with Essays. V., p. 63 and VIII., p. 115. 
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does not “cease in society,” rather, civil laws derive their justice from the natural law.145 
Most notably, in chapter five of the Two Treatises in his discussion of property there are 
several references to the early natural law theory. Here Locke builds his case that the 
right to private property is part of the natural law and prior to civil society, the seeds of 
which he sows in the eighth of his early essays.146 Also, political obligation, as I discuss 
in the upcoming two chapters, is a species of moral obligation. So making sense of 
Locke’s theory of political obligation presupposes that he has a coherent theory of moral 
obligation as well. I will show that having a comprehensive theory of moral obligation is 
essential for Locke’s consent theory of moral obligation. In the following chapter, I argue 
for a natural duty to consent according to which individuals have a moral obligation to 
consent to be bound by the civil law.  
If the view I have defended here is correct, Locke comes closer to having a 
complete theory of moral obligation than most scholars give him credit for. Thus, our 
ultimate goal in this and the previous chapter has been to distinguish the salvageable parts 
of Locke’s moral theory from those that cannot be saved and, using the precision of a 
skilled surgeon, to reconstruct a whole theory combining the healthier parts with those 
which Kant donates. 
                                                        
145 TT. II., §12 and §135. 
 
146 TT. II., §30, §31, §37, §51.  
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Part II, Chapter Four: 
 
Locke’s Theory of Political Obligation: A Reinterpretation 
 
 
I. Introduction 
According to the standard view, Locke endorses two separate theories of 
obligation, one absolutist and the other voluntaristic.147 Whereas human beings are 
morally bound to obey the natural law by their rational natures, they are morally bound to 
obey civil laws only by their voluntary consent. On the surface, it seems that Locke 
cannot consistently maintain both theories because absolutism and voluntarism seem 
incompatible: if all moral duties derive from our shared rational human nature and bind 
us precisely because we are rational, then there is no room for voluntarism—no room for 
individual autonomy in deciding which moral duties are binding—at least not without 
encroaching upon the supposed absolute authority of the natural law.148 If political 
obligations are a subset of moral duties, then should they not also derive from our shared 
rational human nature and bind us by nature, rather than by consent?  
One obvious way to deal with the apparent incompatibility is to argue that natural 
law and civil law have authority over different domains. In other words, some moral 
                                                        
147 This type of voluntarism ought not be confused with the normative theological voluntarism (or divine 
command theory) I discuss in the previous two chapters with reference to the authority of moral 
obligations. For the purposes of this and the following chapter, voluntarism refers to the view that special 
obligations (i.e., those that are owed to a specific subset of people in contrast to natural duties that are owed 
to all people) can only be acquired through the voluntary act of the agent to whom obligations then belong. 
 
148 In fact, Locke himself acknowledges the incompatibility of voluntarism and the authority of natural 
duties in his prohibition against allowing an individual to voluntarily sell himself into slavery. Voluntarily 
choosing to hand over control of one’s body to another is impermissible because slavery is fundamentally 
opposed to the natural law. According to the natural law we each have a natural right to private property, 
which includes a right to our bodies  (TT. II., §23). 
 90 
duties are absolute and binding upon us because they derive from a universal law of 
nature, while other moral duties are acquired and binding upon us only if we first 
voluntarily agree to be so bound. This is a central claim of the standard account. And, 
building upon this claim, advocates of the view argue that since natural laws neither 
dictate the proper form of government nor particular civil statutes, it follows that political 
obligation belongs to the latter category of special moral duties. Moreover, as a staunch 
supporter of voluntarism regarding political obligation, Locke must have intended that his 
consent theory exclude the universal moral imperatives associated with his natural law 
theory.149 However, there is available a deeper interpretation of Locke’s theory of 
political obligation which reveals this dichotomy to be perhaps one of the greatest 
misapprehensions about Locke.  
In this chapter, I challenge the standard interpretation of Locke’s theory of 
political obligation and I argue that although consent is necessary and sufficient for 
political obligation, there are nonetheless universal moral constraints upon the individual 
choice to consent. Thus, though it is true that individuals are bound to obey only those 
political institutions to which they have consented, there is a natural moral duty to 
consent when certain conditions are met. These conditions are as follows. First, consent 
must make it possible for an individual to satisfy more of his moral obligations than he 
would if he failed to consent. This first condition requires a second: the political 
institution in question, usually the state, must be reasonably just. Once these conditions 
                                                        
149 This is especially true with reference to those who wish to interpret Locke as a utilitarian or a 
philosophical anarchist. See, for example, Strauss’s Natural Right and History (1957) and Simmons’s On 
the Edge of Anarchy (1993). 
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are met, it is possible to criticize those who fail to consent for immoral, irrational, or 
unprincipled reasons. On my interpretation, then, Locke views consent as the necessary 
vehicle through which, most if not all, individuals living in civil society fulfill their 
natural moral duties. 
I proceed as follows. In section II, I raise a difficult conceptual challenge to the 
standard view, i.e., consent is not a viable theory of political obligation because it gives 
too much respect to those who fail to consent for unacceptable reasons, and I show that 
appealing to Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent cannot stave off the objection. I also point 
out two additional interpretive challenges to the standard view: natural duties limit 
consent in Locke’s argument against selling oneself into slavery and in his views about 
property acquisition. These two examples call into question Locke’s status as a steadfast 
voluntarist. Then, in the third section, I defend my reinterpretation of Locke’s theory of 
political obligation arguing that in addition to the moral obligation to obey the law 
acquired through consent, he ought to introduce a meta-obligation governing the choice 
to consent. Adopting this natural moral duty to consent would solve several problems. 
First, it addresses the two interpretive challenges to the standard consent theory line 
raised in section II. Second, it makes Locke’s theory of political obligation more 
consistent with his view of the relationship between citizen and state and his defense of a 
remedial right to revolution. In addition to these interpretive advantages, my 
reconstruction of Locke’s theory of political obligation adequately responds to the 
conceptual challenge to standard consent theory and has additional conceptual advantages 
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over other popular contemporary theories of political obligation. Finally, in section IV, I 
raise and respond to two objections to my interpretation. 
 
II. Challenges to the Standard View 
In the Second Treatise, Locke explains the origins of political society. This 
project primarily concerns the two closely related questions of how and why an organized 
community might emerge from a previously unorganized throng of individuals. The 
simple answer to both questions is consent: the self-interested agreement among the 
members of a putative group living in the state of nature to give up some of their 
individual rights in exchange for the safety and security of living in civil society. Says 
Locke, voluntary consent “puts Men out of a State of Nature [and] into that of a 
Commonwealth.”150 So, Locke’s consent theory of political obligation is integral to his 
developmental story about the creation and evolution of civil society.  
The above explanation for the original establishment of an organized 
commonwealth has the advantage of being simple and intuitively plausible; however, the 
full narrative about how consent might also ensure the continued existence of such a 
commonwealth is more complicated than this exchange of liberties for conveniences 
initially conveys. For, if it were only self-interest, which depends upon the perceived 
personal benefits gained from being a member of the group, that induced individuals to 
enter a political community, then once one decides that the benefits of living within civil 
society no longer outweigh the costs, it would seem that she is free to return to the state                                                         
150 TT. II., §89 (emphasis original). 
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of nature regardless of whether the group has actually failed to uphold its part of the 
exchange.151 This explanation, then, would leave open the real possibility of political 
anarchy, which Locke wishes to avoid.152 Hence, in order to ensure the survival of 
organized political communities, the agreement to become a member of a particular 
community must carry certain responsibilities.  
Fortunately, Locke recognizes this worry about self-interest as a motive for 
entering civil society and clearly intends for the act of consent to be more than merely a 
prudential exchange of liberties for conveniences. While one might initially choose to 
enter civil society because he is motivated by self-interest, this choice has significant 
normative consequences. The agreement among the members of a newly formed 
commonwealth establishes a social contract, which morally binds all parties to perform 
certain acts in accordance with their obligation to the group. Locke says that by choosing 
to enter into civil society one “authorizes the Society…to make Laws for him as the 
publick [sic] good of the Society shall require; to the Execution whereof, his own 
assistance (as to his own Decrees) is due.”153 The choice to enter into a particular civil                                                         
151 This seems to be an especially difficult problem for Locke, as opposed to Hobbes, for instance, since 
Locke envisions the state of nature as one in which, at least some, individuals are capable of discovering 
and following the natural law (i.e., moral law). The “inconveniences” of living in the state of nature seem 
not to impose as much of a cost, especially if the alternative requires giving up certain liberties that one 
deems particularly important. Moreover, even if we take into account the severe costs of living among 
others in the state of nature without any established standard of justice, Locke still thinks that those 
potential costs (e.g., the risks of vigilante justice) would be easier to bear than the actual costs (e.g., the 
complete loss of individual freedom) associated with living under the rule of a tyrant. That some 
individuals who have lived within civil society could decide that it is more beneficial for them to return to 
the state of nature, then, is a real possibility for Locke, though it may not be for those who tend toward 
Hobbes’ nastier picture of the state of nature. 
 
152 He speaks of the “Patron[s] of Anarchy” with derision at TT. II., §94. 
 
153 TT. II., §89. 
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society is a sign that one accepts a moral obligation to obey the established rules of that 
society, regardless of whether those rules actually serve his immediate personal interests, 
and to treat those rules as if he himself had established them as a guide to his own 
behavior and the behavior of his fellow citizens. Thus, the decision to enter into civil 
society is not to be taken lightly. It is a pledge to recognize the authority of a particular 
government and so long as that government fulfills its correlative moral obligations, 
which it also acquires through the social contract, its constituents are not in fact justified 
in returning to the state of nature. In this way, personal consent explains not only the 
initial move from the state of nature into a commonwealth, but also the sustained 
existence of the commonwealth composed of the original members and their obligations 
to the group as a whole.154 
The heart of the consent theorist’s doctrine, then, is the claim that “no man is 
obligated to support or comply with any political power unless he has personally 
consented to its authority over him.”155 Simply put, consent is necessary and sufficient 
for political obligation. Thus, according to the standard interpretation of Locke’s consent 
theory of political obligation, if we wish to know whether an individual is obligated to 
obey the law of his state, the only relevant question to ask is whether he has consented. 
Stated as such, consent theory has several advantages. First, consent is a simple and 
direct way to evaluate whether an individual is politically obligated. Second, it provides 
some indication of state legitimacy. Third, it explains government’s obligation to respect                                                         
154 Notice that explaining the sustained existence of the commonwealth and establishing the obligation to 
obey the law for those born after the initial social contract will require the consent of future generations. 
 
155 Simmons. Moral Principles and Political Obligations (1979), p. 57. 
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individual autonomy, which is central to the argument for representative democracy. Of 
course, whether these admittedly oversimplified advantages are sufficient to recommend 
consent as the solution to the problem of political obligation will depend upon a 
comparison with the advantages of other possible solutions, but I do not wish to dwell on 
the issue here. Suffice it to say that the advantages of consent theory are significant 
enough to warrant consideration as a plausible theory of political obligation.156  
However, despite its advantages there are also some serious objections to consent 
theory. Perhaps the most widely known objection is what I call descriptive inadequacy: 
the charge that most citizens living within any particular political society have not 
consented and are, therefore, not obligated to obey their government. This objection 
challenges the validity of actual consent on practical grounds. It says that although a 
genuine act of consent, theoretically, would bind citizens to obey their governments, the 
way in which actual citizens usually find themselves subject to a particular regime does 
not allow for such acts of genuine consent and any proposed theory of political obligation 
that fails to explain how most people are politically obligated surely ought to be rejected. 
I address this first objection elsewhere.157  
Here, though, I wish to focus upon a different objection: the charge that consent is 
too permissive a theory of political obligation. The problem is that being committed to 
political voluntarism means that there can be no moral constraints upon the choice to 
consent. So, the objection goes, even if individuals could perform acts of genuine 
                                                        
156 I treat this issue in more detail in chapter five. 
 
157 Again, see chapter five. 
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consent, consent itself is invalid as a theory of political obligation because it gives too 
much credence to “immoral, irrational, and unprincipled failures to consent.”158  
This second objection challenges consent on theoretical grounds. If consent is 
necessary and sufficient for political obligation and there are no moral constraints upon 
the choice to consent, then it seems that people could avoid acquiring certain moral 
obligations without having any justification or even giving it any thought. But if the 
obligation to obey the law can be so easily circumvented, then it is difficult to see in what 
sense it is a moral obligation at all. That consent theory cannot adequately distinguish 
between dissenters, who genuinely wish to withhold consent for principled reasons and, 
therefore, arguably ought to be free of any political obligation, and non-consenters, who 
simply fail to consent without having (good) reasons that might release them from their 
political obligations, is a serious barrier to explaining how anyone might acquire a moral 
obligation to obey the law.  
The complaint that consent theory is too permissive can be fleshed out further in 
terms of a type of free-rider problem, but not as it is usually understood. Hobbes clearly 
lays out what we recognize as the classic free-rider problem in chapter XV of the 
Leviathan where he discusses the fate of “the Foole.” The free-riding fool exploits others’ 
willingness to fulfill their moral obligations by strategically and, whenever possible, 
surreptitiously violating his own moral obligations. He willingly breaks contracts that he 
has voluntarily agreed to honor when doing so would be to his benefit and, consequently, 
cannot be trusted to abide by the fundamental principles of a secure political community.                                                         
158 Christiano, Thomas. “Political Authority.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online). Paraphrasing 
Joseph Raz’s Morality of Freedom (1986). 
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Thus, allowing the free-rider to remain in civil society would be a violation of the natural 
law of self-preservation and when he is discovered, Hobbes says, he must be cast out.  
Now, the situation that best characterizes those who fail to consent without 
adequate reasons is slightly different, though I think it is still correct to say that non-
consenters are free-riders of a particular sort. Similar to Hobbes’s description of the free-
rider problem and its exemplar, “the Foole,” the non-consenter seems to exploit those 
who accept the moral authority of the law because she benefits from the security of a 
system in which most individuals morally bind themselves. But, according to the standard 
interpretation, non-consenters have not acquired a moral obligation to obey the law 
precisely because they, unlike Hobbes’s “Foole,” have not voluntarily agreed to be so 
bound. So on what grounds can we criticize those who fail to consent without offering 
good reasons? What moral obligation have they violated if not the obligation to obey the 
law? 
An advocate of the standard view might answer the above questions by appealing 
to Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent. He might argue that these so-called ‘non-consenters’ 
are free-riding in precisely the Hobbesian sense because by living within civil society and 
enjoying the benefits that such an arrangement affords them, they are in fact implicitly 
demonstrating their agreement to obey the laws of that political community. So-called 
‘non-consenters’ have acquired the obligation to obey the law through tacit consent. 
Therefore, when they subsequently fail to obey the law, they breach the social contract 
that they have implicitly agreed to and they violate the corresponding moral obligation 
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that they have acquired by their “very being” within that civil society.159 And again, 
society has every right to criticize those who ignore their moral obligations.   
In essence, the advocate of the standard consent view responds to the objection 
that consent is overly permissive by saying that alleged ‘non-consenters’ cannot hide 
behind the excuse that they have not (expressly) consented and are, therefore, not bound 
to obey the law because they have in fact implicitly, but no less actually, consented in 
choosing to remain. Being a non-consenter, according to the standard view, then, requires 
more than merely failing to acknowledge that one is bound to obey the law; it requires 
opting out of the system altogether it seems and because of the severe risks attached to 
such a move, it is unlikely that anyone would do so without principled reasons. But even 
if someone did opt out for immoral, irrational, or unprincipled reasons, he clearly would 
not be free-riding. So, when we take into consideration Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent, 
the over-permissive objection seems to lose its force; the standard view, in point of fact, 
does not give too much respect to unjustified failures to consent. Instead, those who do 
not expressly consent face two options: either they must demonstrate their genuine 
dissent by openly protesting or leaving entirely or if they choose to remain in civil society 
without voicing dissent, they must understand that they leave themselves open to being 
treated as if they have actually consented. 
However, this response does not entirely disarm the objection. First, tacit consent 
is overly permissive in the opposite direction because rather than saying that no one or 
almost no one consents to the state, it assumes that everyone in the territory at any given                                                         
159 TT. II., §119. 
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time has consented. Though advocates of the standard view are correct to pursue the 
intuition that we can criticize non-consenters for somehow free-riding upon the backs of 
those who openly consent, it is not true that non-consenters who remain within society 
have, in any sense, agreed to obey the law. It seems that, according to Locke’s account of 
tacit consent, one could unintentionally, but somehow voluntarily, accept the authority of 
the state. However, one could easily drive on the highway, own a house, and reside 
within the territory of a state (for example, if one were a political dissident) without ever 
intending to consent or even recognizing that one might be politically obligated on 
account of such actions. If Locke thinks that one may unintentionally consent, he surely 
holds the wrong conception of consent.160 I maintain that consenting requires just as 
much moral, rational, and principled reasoning as dissenting. By relying upon tacit 
consent, the advocate of the standard consent theory view responds to the charge of over-
permissiveness with over-permissiveness in the direction of the opposite extreme. The 
more plausible solution lies somewhere in the middle. 
Second, given the above difficulties with tacit consent, it may help to describe 
Locke as advocating a slightly different view of political obligation whereby citizens 
acquire a moral obligation to obey the law in exchange for the benefits gained from living 
within society. This benefit view would allow Locke to avoid worries about whether 
supposed ‘non-consenters’ have actually agreed to be politically obligated, while at the 
same time remaining completely unaware of their obligation. The problem for advocates 
of the standard interpretation, however, is that this would move Locke away from consent                                                         
160 Here I agree with Simmons’s suggestion that Locke seems to be confusing consent with assent in his 
decisive critique of Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent (1979), p. 83-94. 
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theory and toward a theory of political obligation based upon the benefits one gains from 
living in civil society, a reciprocation theory.161 Whereas the essential feature of consent 
theory is the voluntariness of one’s obligation, the essential feature of the reciprocation 
theory is one’s having received certain benefits, regardless of whether she wishes to be so 
benefitted.162 Thus, the advocate of the standard view cannot explain how it is possible to 
criticize non-consenters, who free-ride by failing to politically obligate themselves, 
without compromising Locke’s commitment to political voluntarism because both 
Locke’s account of tacit consent and the modification of it as a reciprocation theory 
eschew voluntarism.  
It certainly looks as though the objection that consent is too permissive a theory of 
political obligation cannot be easily addressed by the standard interpretation and I think 
that this theoretical objection threatens consent theory in a way that advocates of that 
view have overlooked. If this objection cannot be answered, Locke’s theory of political 
obligation is in serious trouble. So a more plausible interpretation must explain how 
Locke can avoid this objection. In the next section, I offer a reinterpretation of Locke’s 
theory of political obligation and explain its advantages in this regard. But before I move 
to my own interpretation, I wish to point out two other problems with the standard view. 
In addition to the above conceptual issue, there are some perhaps surprising 
interpretive problems with the standard view. First, it is not obvious that Locke is the 
diehard voluntarist that proponents of the standard view make him out to be. Focusing                                                         
161 Simmons (1993), p. 249. 
 
162 Nozick develops his long-standing criticism of the benefit or reciprocation view precisely along these 
lines in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), p. 90-95.  
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upon consent as the only indication of whether one is bound to obey the law overlooks 
the important role that moral duties play as a check upon individual choice in Locke’s 
theory. He clearly recognizes that there are and ought to be limitations upon consent 
when he argues that one cannot voluntarily sell oneself into slavery, for instance.163 
Locke’s explanation for this position is as follows: because freedom is necessary to fulfill 
one’s natural duty of self-preservation, one cannot consent to give up his freedom and 
become the slave of another. Being bound by the natural law to preserve oneself, he says, 
entails that human beings are not free to hand over absolute control of their lives to 
another: “No body can give more Power than he has himself; and he that cannot take 
away his own Life, cannot give another power over it.”164 Here we see the natural duty of 
self-preservation trumping free choice. So, according to Locke, consent does not exclude 
universal moral imperatives associated with natural law theory; on the contrary, one’s 
natural moral duties limit the power to consent. 
Additionally, even during his discussion of property—often cited by the most 
ardent defenders of Locke’s voluntarism—natural duties play an important role. Because 
Locke seems to argue so vehemently that property is such that “without a Man’s own 
consent it cannot be taken away from him”165 and since he places so much emphasis upon 
the protection of private property as a main reason for individuals to enter into civil 
society in the first place, it is tempting to claim that he also thinks consent ought to be the 
                                                        
163 TT. II., §23. 
 
164 Ibid. 
 
165 TT. II., §193 (emphasis original). 
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sole basis for political obligation. Indeed, this has been almost exclusively the reading of 
Locke’s theory of political obligation; however, there are good reasons to question this as 
an overgeneralization. 
Advocates of the standard view often have an exceedingly shallow account of 
Locke’s state of nature as a state where individuals live according to their own rules. But 
it is more than simply a state in which men are born free from political coercion; for 
individuals living in the state of nature importantly are not absolutely free. They are 
obligated by the law of nature to obey their natural duties, among them, to preserve 
themselves and others, to treat people with respect, and to keep promises.166 Also, as I 
mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, Locke does not intend for the natural law to 
loosen entirely its grip upon man’s will once he crosses the threshold into civil society.167 
On the contrary, Locke’s optimism about the influence of natural moral duties within the 
political realm and the ability of human beings to limit themselves through their rational 
natures, leads him to argue for the sufficiency of a limited and unobtrusive government.  
According to Locke, natural duties limit all of our rights in the state of nature, 
including the right to own property. In the first case, because God gave the resources of 
the earth to all in common as necessary for their survival, making use of those resources 
cannot be a matter requiring consent. In a sense, everyone has an equal claim to as much 
as he needs for his own survival, but anything beyond the basic minimum must be limited 
                                                        
166 TT. II., §6. Also, unlike Hobbes, Locke distinguishes between the state of nature and the state of war 
the main difference being that in the state of war, there is no moral law binding the parties living under 
such circumstances (TT. II, §16-18).  
 
167 Laslett, Peter. “Introduction” in Two Treatises of Government (1998), p. 100. 
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by natural duties. So although it is not consent that limits our natural right to acquire 
property in the state of nature, that right is not totally without boundaries. Locke 
expresses this by specifying the two provisos limiting one’s right to acquire property. 
First, the sufficiency proviso: that we must leave “enough, and as good…in common for 
others.”168 Secondly, along the same lines, one must also be guided by the spoilage 
proviso: no one may acquire more than he can make use of before his supply spoils. He 
says that we are to keep within the “bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for [our] 
use.”169  
Though Locke relies heavily upon consent and natural rights in developing his 
theory of property ownership, his basic position is this: in the state of nature where there 
is a vast supply of unclaimed territory it is not necessary to secure the consent of others in 
order to lay claim to property.170 However, once one has laid claim to a plot of land by 
increasing its value through physical labor, he removes that piece of land from the 
common and it then falls under the principle of consent. Once the piece of land is 
privately owned, someone else may claim it only if the current owner agrees to transfer 
his right of ownership to that other.171 Thus, our right to the acquisition of property in the 
state of nature is not solely guided by consent; instead, it is the principle of justice and the                                                         
168 TT. II., §27. 
 
169 Ibid., §31 (emphasis original). 
 
170 TT. II., §28-30. I realize that, technically speaking, what I refer to as “unclaimed” territory in the state 
of nature is actually owned by everyone in common. According to Locke, God gives the resources of earth 
to everyone to use as necessary for his or her survival. 
 
171 For a thorough, analytic examination of Locke’s labor theory of property acquisition see Lawrence 
Becker’s Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (1977), p. 32-56. 
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bounds set by reason that determine the natural moral duties limiting our right to acquire 
property. It is this natural sense of moral duty that I examine in the next section in order 
to show that there is another more plausible interpretation of Locke’s political theory. 
In this section, I have laid out a theoretical challenge to the standard consent 
theory of political obligation and raised additional challenges to this view in the spirit of 
Locke’s own reliance upon natural moral duties as limits to the individual power to 
consent. The limits that Locke places upon consent as seen in his rejection of the 
possibility of voluntarily selling oneself into slavery and in his principled limitations on 
property acquisition in the state of nature call into question Locke’s unfaltering 
commitment to voluntarism. Still, those who wish to read Locke as a consent theorist 
about political obligation are right to emphasize the role that the state of nature plays in 
his theory. It is his conception of the state of nature, where human beings live together, 
their actions being bound by the law of nature, without any common superior (besides 
God), that Locke understands as the background against which the aims of civil 
government should be understood. Now I turn to my interpretation of Locke’s theory of 
political obligation, which attempts to take into account the above problems with the 
standard view and to place consent theory back on solid ground. 
 
III. The Natural Moral Duty to Consent 
In this section, I argue for a reinterpretation of Locke’s theory of political 
obligation, which not only has interpretive advantages over the standard view, 
acknowledging the limitations that Locke himself places upon consent and making his 
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theory of political obligation more consistent with his general account of the relationship 
between citizen and state and his support of a remedial right to revolution, but also has 
distinct conceptual advantages as it is a better theory of political obligation overall. In 
order for advocates of the standard consent theory line to maintain their view, they must 
turn a blind eye toward anything that challenges Locke’s commitment to voluntarism and 
in so doing, they adhere to a superficial account of Locke’s political theory.  
On the one hand, the conventional account ignores the role that natural duties play 
in defining the aims of the state. It emphasizes the personal safety and material security 
offered by the state, but overlooks the important moral benefits that the state also 
provides its citizens. This characterization makes the state seem primarily valuable only 
as a tool for survival and increasing prosperity, as a sort of necessary evil, rather than as 
an entity having moral value and being at least partially responsible for the moral 
improvement of its members. While it is certainly the case that Locke views the state as 
an instrument for securing life, liberty, and property,172 I argue that he also views it as 
having a moral purpose. On the other hand, consent ignores the role that natural duties 
play in defining the aims of citizens. Citizens are never completely free from the 
imperatives of the natural law and so it is always possible to evaluate their actions on the 
basis of their natural moral duties. But consent treats individuals as absolutely free with 
regard to deciding whether to accept the moral obligation to obey the law. So the basic 
standard consent account leaves some explanatory gaps and I aim to fill these gaps in 
what follows.                                                          
172 TT. II., §131. 
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To begin, I sketch a rough comparison between my interpretation and the 
interpretation I have been discussing in order to help us find our bearings. Like 
proponents of the standard interpretation, I retain Locke’s categorical commitment to 
actual, personal consent being necessary and sufficient for political obligation. But, 
unlike proponents of the standard interpretation, I argue that over and above the moral 
duty to obey the law that one acquires only after she has consented, given his other 
commitments, Locke should accept an additional natural moral duty that guides the 
individual decision to consent. This second, meta-obligation is a natural moral duty to 
consent when certain conditions obtain and is key to condemning, as morally 
impermissible, the failure to consent without (good) reasons. 
I find support for this natural moral duty to consent in three sources. First, the 
seeds of a theory of civil government according to which the state actually helps 
individuals to fulfill their natural moral duties lie hidden in Locke’s description of human 
nature and the state of nature. Though it is true that according to Locke’s vision of the 
state of nature it is possible for individuals to be moral, it is also true that, given a 
relatively just civil society, the majority of us would be morally better off living in civil 
society than we would be living in the state of nature. The reason for this is not merely 
that the state has the power to coerce individuals to comply with the law, but that the state 
empowers individuals to make better moral decisions and recognizing the authority of the 
state boosts individual accountability providing an additional reason to fulfill one’s moral 
obligations. Thus, it is rational for individuals to consent in order to improve their 
opportunities to be moral. Second, the natural moral duty to consent fits well with 
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Locke’s remedial right to revolution according to which revolution is only permissible 
when the state has done something unjust. If there are conditions under which dissent is 
obligatory, then it seems reasonable that there would be conditions under which consent 
is obligatory. Third, my reconstructive approach is more charitable to Locke saving his 
theory of political obligation from the charge of over-permissiveness and reviving 
consent, albeit a qualified version of consent, as a plausible solution to the contemporary 
problem of political obligation. 
Making sense of a natural moral duty to consent first requires returning to 
Locke’s vision of human nature and understanding how this affects Locke’s view of the 
natural state of human beings. A close look at these features also will help clarify the 
relationship between citizen and state. First, in his political works, Locke emphasizes that 
human beings living in the state of nature are all born free from and equal to one another. 
Beginning from what he regards as a common sense starting point, namely, that humans 
are the creatures, dependents, and servants of God, Locke goes on to argue that God, as 
the all-powerful creator, is in fact the only natural superior with the absolute right to 
demand that his subjects do his will.173 So although human beings are naturally subject to 
God, they are naturally subject to no earthly sovereign.174 Yet, even the earthly freedom 
                                                        
173 TT. II., §6. Locke echoes this sentiment in many places throughout his writings. We have already seen 
that he makes similar statements in the Essays. III., p. 111-113; IV., p. 151-157; and VI., p. 118-189. 
 
174 Locke directs this argument against Sir Robert Filmer, who was famous among Locke’s contemporaries 
for arguing for the divine right of kings: the idea that political power is naturally owed to the direct 
descendents of Adam (Patriarcha (1680)).  
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that human beings enjoy is not absolute175 because in addition to being born with the 
natural rights of freedom and equality, human beings are, by nature, rational and, as we 
have seen, this reasoning capacity is a precondition for moral obligation.176 According to 
Locke, the natural law is morally binding upon individual human beings because it is 
discoverable by human reason and from this it follows that there is a natural moral law 
governing the state of nature.177 Thus, human beings are born naturally subject to God 
and their rational nature, combined with certain empirical facts about the world, makes 
them naturally obligated to obey the natural moral law. 
Recall that Locke’s naturalist empiricism briefly mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph and examined at length in chapter three, exhibits a unique optimism about the 
ability of human beings to uncover the content of the natural moral law simply by 
observation and reflection. However, the previous examination of the problems with 
Locke’s underdeveloped natural law theory and my reconstruction of a Lockeian moral 
theory shows that this optimism does not take us very far. Still, though Locke thinks that 
knowing one’s moral obligations is sufficient for moral authority, he need not be 
committed to the stronger claim that knowing one’s moral obligations is also sufficient to 
motivate one to fulfill those obligations. While Locke certainly thinks that discovering 
                                                        
175 For, absolute freedom has no meaning, as Locke says: “where there is no Law, there is no freedom” 
(TT. II., §57 (emphasis original)), which I take to mean that were there no rules governing behavior, 
freedom would be practically meaningless. If, for example, there were no laws against stealing, then I 
would need to spend more time and energy defending my property and, consequently, I would be less free. 
 
176 TT. II., §57, §60, and §63. 
 
177 Ibid., §12 and §124. Indeed, he says that to rational creatures, the natural law is quite plain and 
intelligible, actually plainer and more intelligible than the civil law. The problem lies in trying to apply the 
natural law to specific circumstances and being able actually to fulfill one’s moral obligations. 
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basic moral principles may be nearly an automatic task for rational beings, he also 
acknowledges that actually living up to these principles is far from automatic. We can 
imagine three potential problems arising: those who fail to fulfill their moral obligations 
do so either because (1) they fail to discover the general principles of natural law; or (2) 
they discover the general principles of natural law, but fail correctly to apply those 
principles to specific circumstances in order to discover their particular moral 
obligations; or (3) they manage both to discover general principles and particular moral 
obligations, but through weakness of will are unable to perform the actions required by 
their moral obligations. Each of these potential moral failures is a failure of rationality. 
On Locke’s view, ordinary human beings rarely make the first mistake because 
the general principles of natural law are precepts of common sense, principles such as ‘do 
justice’ and ‘be charitable.’ He thinks that such general imperatives, what Kant calls 
imperfect duties, are quite obviously correct and necessary for even minimal cooperation 
among human beings living in common. Far more frequent are failures of the second and 
third types, namely, problems related to applying general principles to specific 
circumstances, e.g., ‘recognizing the just thing to do’ or ‘understanding what the 
principle of charity demands given this particular set of circumstances’, and mistakes 
arising from a weak will. Not only must individuals contend with an epistemic challenge: 
applying an unwritten, general natural law to everyday scenarios with many different and 
constantly changing variables, but they must also deal with several will-defeating factors. 
Various opinions, contrary interests, and the instinctual drive toward partiality all hinder 
 110 
the ability of individuals to fulfill their moral obligations, natural or otherwise.178 So 
while Locke is clearly optimistic about the ability of all individuals to discover the basic 
principles of the natural moral law through their natural reasoning capacities, he is also 
aware of the features of human nature that can become barriers to living according to 
these principles.  
Nonetheless, some, the most rational among us, are able to know the natural law, 
properly apply it, and set aside personal biases, etc. in order to fulfill their moral 
obligations. Admittedly, such reasonable persons are few, but if even ideally rational 
creatures were neither able to properly apply the natural law nor fulfill their moral 
obligations, it seems that Locke could not intelligibly speak about the differential moral 
capacities of individuals179 or the applicability of the natural law in the state of nature. 
Evidently, then, not all are misled by their inability to apply the natural law or by their 
passions and interests.180 Yet, because the reasoning capacity varies so widely among 
individuals, others, and perhaps the majority of individuals fail to fulfill their moral 
obligations when faced with ordinary moral challenges. Thus, it is not skepticism about 
the ability to know the imperatives of the natural law, but rather doubt about the ability to 
apply them and to maintain control over one’s passions that Locke thinks is the main 
cause of moral failure. 
                                                        
178 TT. II., §13, and §123-125. 
 
179 Ibid., §54. 
 
180 Seliger “Locke’s Natural Law and the Foundation of Politics.” Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. 24, 
No. 3 (Jul.-Sept., 1963), p. 352. 
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Moreover, certain aspects of the state of nature intensify these difficulties. Locke 
says that in the state of nature every person is judge for himself and every person has the 
executive power to enforce the law of nature;181 these factors surely increase the potential 
for individuals to fail to satisfy their natural moral duties. Were all human beings ideally 
rational, the natural state of man, in which each individual judges himself against the 
natural law but is also subject to all others insofar as everyone has the power to punish 
him if he violates the law, would be a perfectly just and peaceful state. However, all 
human beings are not ideally rational and I think Locke underestimates the difficulty of 
being moral given the wealth of individual control and the scarcity of individual 
accountability in the state of nature. If all have equal rights to both judge and enforce the 
law of nature without limitation, there is little incentive to hold oneself to high moral 
standards and injustices will inevitably occur. The two most common barriers to fulfilling 
one’s moral obligations, the epistemic challenge and weakness of will, have no remedy 
within the state of nature as Locke envisions it; rather, the state of nature appears to be a 
prisoners’ dilemma as Hobbes describes it. Thus, in the state of nature there is no security 
against either the innocent being punished or the guilty being disproportionately 
punished.  
Whereas there is little doubt that the state of nature poses special challenges to the 
capacity for individuals to fulfill their moral obligations, organized civil society actually 
helps to alleviate the most common problems that prevent citizens from fulfilling their 
moral obligations. In the state of nature, the laws are not written down and there is no                                                         
181 TT. II., §13. 
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impartial judge to adjudicate disputes; for Locke makes it clear that because the natural 
law is “unwritten, and so nowhere to be found but in the minds of Men, they who through 
Passion or Interest shall mis-cite it, or misapply it, cannot be so easily convinced of their 
mistake where there is no establish’d Judge.”182 Therefore, those who are most rational 
have a distinct advantage over those who are less astute in applying the general principles 
of the natural law to particular situations. By contrast, civil society minimizes the effects 
of this disparity among rational individuals. By consulting civil laws that are written by 
those who are most capable of figuring out which laws best serve the natural law and, 
thus, the common good, ordinary individuals can gain access to particular moral laws. 
Civil laws, when they are properly generated, then, serve as the particular application of 
the general natural law providing plain access to individual moral obligations. 
Additionally, epistemic challenges plague even the most well-intentioned 
individuals in the state of nature because, without an impartial judge to adjudicate 
interpretive disputes, disagreements are bound to arise and given the universal executive 
power to enforce the law of nature, even these relatively minor disputes could have grave 
and far-reaching consequences, as enemies rarely agree upon the definition of a 
proportional response. However, just states give individuals an opportunity to settle their 
disputes about the law in court in front of an impartial third-party, who has the authority 
to clarify the law and settle interpretive disagreements. Also, with all individuals 
transferring to the state their universal executive right to enforce the law of nature by 
punishing those who violate it, minor disagreements concerning what an appropriate                                                         
182 Ibid., §136. 
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punishment for a particular crime might be are contained and settled before they cause 
major harm. Institutionalizing judgment and enforcement of the law simply allows 
members of a group to avoid coordination problems stemming from epistemic mistakes 
that would otherwise result in escalating tensions. 
Also, the state helps to make individuals moral by minimizing the affects of 
particular will-defeating aspects of human nature. I mentioned above the variety of 
opinions, the contrariety of interests, and the drive toward partiality, all of which 
encourage individuals to focus upon themselves and those closest to themselves; such 
focus can easily lead to disputes in the state of nature. Here again the influence of the 
state counteracts the effects of these natural differences among individuals by taking on 
some of the responsibility for security and by settling disputes. The state also provides an 
extra incentive to strengthen the will, i.e., the fear of punishment. One of the great 
advantages of civil society over the state of nature is that a just civil society guarantees 
that one’s moral obligations line up with one’s self-interests much of the time. Therefore, 
entering into civil society makes satisfying one’s moral obligations easier. In fact, Locke 
says: “were it not for the corruption, and vitiousness of degenerate Men, there would 
be…no necessity that Men should separate from this great and natural Community, and 
by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.”183 
Now although the above proves that through the enforcement of compliance with 
civil laws, the state solves coordination problems that create injustices and provides 
incentives for less rational individuals to fulfill their moral obligations, I have not yet                                                         
183 Ibid., §128. 
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proven that citizens have a natural moral duty to agree to be morally obligated to obey the 
law. So it is not enough to show that there is a natural moral duty to consent. Compliance 
with the law and obedience to the law are distinguished by two different psychological 
states within the mind of the agent. Whereas it is possible for me to comply with the law 
purely by accident, e.g., when my actions happen to correspond with the law’s command, 
or for reasons completely unrelated to recognition of the authority of the state, e.g., fear 
of punishment, I only obey the law when I take the existence of the law itself as a reason 
to do what the law requires. But whereas the actions of one who complies with the law 
and one who obeys the law often coincide, it is the intentions that indicate one’s level of 
commitment to the law. 
To illustrate this important distinction further, let us look at an analogy. Suppose I 
decide to hire a personal trainer at my gym who gives me advice about how to stay 
healthy and keep my body in good condition. He tells me that for best results I should eat 
a balanced diet, drink at least eight glasses of water each day, get plenty of rest, and do at 
least an hour of cardiovascular training four days each week and an hour of weight 
training two days each week. Now I could follow his advice for several reasons. I might 
simply enjoy working out and eating well; I might want to take care of my body to 
impress my friends; I might want to relieve stress and become healthier so I can live 
longer; or I might recognize that by following the recommendations of the trainer, who is 
an expert in his field, I am most likely to meet goals such as improving my health and 
staying in shape.  
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Only acting upon the final reason listed would count as an act of obedience 
because here I recognize the trainer’s authority and I see that his expertise gives me what 
I need to meet my goals. But beyond the fact that it would be prudent for me to hire the 
trainer, since statistically I would be more likely to succeed following his 
recommendations than I would be going for it on my own, there is another reason that I 
might hire a personal trainer. Having to check-in each week with a trainer, whose job it is 
to hold me accountable to work to meet my goals, provides a psychological component: 
an additional incentive for me to obey the rules that I would not have were I accountable 
only to myself. This psychological component can be the crucial difference between 
success and failure; indeed, this is surely a common rationale for hiring a personal trainer. 
Therefore, just as I might choose to hire a personal trainer to provide expertise and 
accountability in order to help me to do what is required to become healthier, I might also 
choose to consent to the state because it also provides expertise and accountability to help 
me do what is required to become more moral.  
The difference between the two cases is that while I do not have a natural moral 
duty to keep my body in excellent condition,184 I do have a natural moral duty to do what 
I can to make myself more moral. If I recognize the general moral principle that I ought 
not cause harm to others185 and I recognize that I sometimes fail to satisfy my moral 
obligations because I incorrectly apply this general principle to particular situations or my 
                                                        
184 Although I suppose Locke may think it is possible to derive a natural moral duty to stay healthy from 
the natural moral duty of self-preservation, I do not think we could derive a natural moral duty to stay 
maximally healthy, i.e., in excellent shape, from this natural moral duty. 
 
185 As we saw in the preceding chapter, Locke himself states the harm principle at TT. II., §6. 
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will succumbs to my passions, then I should also recognize an obligation to do whatever I 
can to prevent these, and similar, failures of rationality. As we have seen, entering into 
civil society is one successful strategy for preventing these types of failures of rationality, 
but merely agreeing to comply with the law is not enough, since compliance is unreliable 
being contingent upon accidental factors, such as whether my self-interests coincide with 
the demands of the law. Instead, I owe to my fellow citizens an obligation to obey the 
law. Only a promise to obey the law of one’s state provides the requisite stable 
psychological component ensuring others that I respect the harm principle and that I am 
committed to limiting the harm that my failure to fulfill my moral obligations could cause 
them. Therefore, Locke is committed to thinking that most, if not all, individuals living in 
civil society owe their fellow citizens a natural moral duty to politically obligate 
themselves—a natural duty to consent. 
The natural moral duty to consent also makes Locke’s theory of political 
obligation more consistent with his defense of a remedial right to revolution. According 
to Locke, the only way in which ordinary individuals can directly check the political 
judgment of their governments is by means of revolt. The decision to start a revolution 
ought not to be taken lightly, however, for it is justified or condemned by the natural law 
and is not a matter of will, but of right.186 Once again, we see Locke using the natural law 
to limit the individual’s decision; here, though, the topic is not the individual choice to 
consent but rather the circumstances under which it would be appropriate to dissent. 
Thus, I agree with the overwhelming majority of Locke scholars who argue that he                                                         
186 TT. II., §176. We find further evidence that Locke supports a remedial right in §207 where he argues 
that rebellion ought to be a last resort and in §233 where he says it is justified on the basis of self-defense. 
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embraces a remedial right to revolution meaning that revolution is only justified when the 
state has egregiously harmed those who have agreed to its authority.187  
Nevertheless, it is the most important political right that human beings enjoy 
because it rests upon the principle of self-preservation and is justified by the principle of 
natural equality. Giving up their unlimited individual rights to enforce the laws of nature, 
members of a community, instead, agree to be bound by a contract under which they 
transfer some of their individual authority to the sovereign ruler. As a result of this social 
contract, then, the ruler has certain obligations in virtue of his authority, namely to 
protect basic rights and to guard the common interest of the citizens living within the 
commonwealth. As long as the ruler continues to uphold his end of the agreement, his 
authority remains legitimate and citizens are bound to obey the laws. However, whenever 
the ruler governs according to his own interests, rather than those of the governed, he 
effectively forfeits his right to rule; and whenever he demonstrates his intention to usurp 
the basic rights of the governed, he forfeits something much more serious, his right to be 
treated as a peace-loving individual.188 This constitutes an injustice done to those whom 
the state is most required to protect and guide and demonstrates Locke’s defense of a 
remedial right to revolution. Says Locke, “Force is to be opposed to nothing, but to 
unjust and unlawful Force; whoever makes any opposition in any other Case, draws on                                                         
187 For instance, Allen Buchanan interprets Locke this way in “Theories of Secession.” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs. Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter, 1997), pp. 31-61. 
 
188 TT. II. §219. The debate about whether one can forfeit one’s basic rights has a long-standing history in 
political philosophy. Locke’s position is not without problems, but these can be set aside for the purposes 
of this paper. Jeremy Waldron offers an excellent overview of the problems with Locke’s view of forfeiture 
as it relates to his theory of punishment. See his God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in 
Locke’s Political Thought (2002), p. 143-150. 
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himself a just Condemnation both from God and Man.”189 When the ruler breaks the 
contract by overstepping the bounds of his authority, he has set himself up as a tyrant—of 
no more use to the community than a pirate or a robber. 
Finally, this reinterpretation of Locke’s theory of political obligation has several 
advantages over the standard interpretation and charity urges that we attribute to Locke 
the best interpretation available. First, the natural moral duty to consent responds to the 
theoretical and interpretive challenges raised in the previous section. It allows us to 
criticize those who fail to consent for unacceptable reasons because such individuals 
really are failing to uphold a particular moral obligation that does in fact bind them. 
Because this moral obligation is a natural moral obligation, we need not worry about 
whether non-consenters have acquired such an obligation. The moral obligation to 
consent binds all rational individuals by nature. Still, we cannot criticize non-consenters 
for failing to uphold their moral duty to obey the law; rather it is the meta-obligation of 
the duty to consent that they fail to uphold and it is on the basis of this that we may 
criticize them as free-riders. Also, this interpretation not only responds to the objection 
that consent theory is too permissive and is consistent with the qualifications that Locke 
himself places upon consent (in his doctrines of the impermissibility of selling oneself 
into slavery and property acquisition), but also is neither divorced from nor opposed to 
his early natural law theory of moral obligation. So it also has the advantage of making 
Locke’s corpus more internally consistent nicely blending his natural law theory with his 
theory of political obligation.                                                          
189 TT. II., §204. 
 119 
Second, the natural duty to consent is the best theory of political obligation given 
all of the options. All of the prevailing theories supporting the contention that there is a 
moral obligation to obey the law have serious flaws, the most important of which being 
that even theories that explain the obligation to treat one’s fellow citizens well, cannot 
explain how that obligation could be owed to the state. In other words, they cannot 
explain the moral authority of the state. The natural moral duty to consent has the 
advantage of giving the state independent moral authority because though individuals 
owe the duty to consent to their fellow citizens, they cannot fulfill that duty without also 
becoming obligated to obey the state. I do not have space to defend this claim further 
here, but I fully defend it next, in chapter five. 
In sum, were it possible for all individuals to observe and apply the natural law 
perfectly, we would all live together in the state of nature united by universal obedience 
to the natural law. But as it is, the majority of individuals need civil laws to guide them in 
their quest to fulfill their moral obligations. Indeed, the less rational ones, who tend to 
make mistakes that prevent them from fulfilling their moral obligations, would have 
virtually no chance at being moral were it not for the existence of the more rational. But 
in order for the more competent students of the natural law to teach those who are less 
competent, they need a suitable instrument to convey their wisdom. Political obligation is 
such an instrument. 
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IV. Objections 
 In this final section, I address two objections to my view. First, even if I have 
shown that the less competent student of natural law has a moral obligation to consent, 
why should the more competent one politically obligate herself? After all, if the more 
competent individuals are capable of fulfilling their moral obligations without the 
psychological benefit of consenting to the state what moral reason do they have for 
entering into civil society or politically obligating themselves? Second, if the less 
competent student of the natural law is less competent because she has trouble applying 
the natural law, how can she determine whether the civil laws of her state have been 
properly written to reflect the natural law or whether her state is just or whether her state 
has the expertise or can even provide the accountability ensuring that obedience will 
make her more moral? In short, how can the morally inept individual be certain that the 
conditions are met under which she has a natural moral duty to consent? Determining the 
correct answer to any of these questions seems to require the ability to apply the natural 
law. 
 I respond, first, that the moral saints among us, obviously, have prudential reasons 
to enter into civil society. So it is not as if they would have absolutely no reason to leave 
the state of nature or be tempted to cloister themselves away from the rest of civil society. 
But beyond the merely prudential, they too have moral reasons. As extraordinarily 
competent students of the natural moral law, they should recognize that even if 
consenting to the state would not make them personally more moral, they have an interest 
in increasing justice in the world by helping those to whom satisfying their moral 
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obligations does not come so easily. They have a duty as moral exemplars to provide the 
expertise and accountability that others require in order to fulfill their moral obligations. 
Furthermore, Locke recognizes a moral duty not only to self-preservation, but also to the 
preservation of mankind190 and it is difficult to see how one might discharge such a duty 
without entering into civil society. Of course, even in the state of nature I could discharge 
this duty by feeding my starving neighbor, once I have provided for my family and 
myself, but it seems clear that, especially regarding this particular moral duty, more 
justice could be done collectively. So it is reasonable to think that the pursuit of justice 
would lead the most rational as well as the least rational to enter into civil society.  
 As for the second objection I reply first, although those who are less rational often 
fail to properly apply the natural law, they are not necessarily incapable of recognizing 
when others apply the natural law properly. Just as I might know certain nutritional 
guidelines and rules of exercising, but fail to apply those rules properly, and nonetheless 
be capable of distinguishing better and worse trainers, e.g., by the results I see in others 
who employ them, those who often fail to apply the natural law correctly may 
nonetheless be capable of distinguishing just and unjust states. Also, though some may 
have trouble discerning the just thing to do in specific and complicated circumstances, 
they may have no trouble discerning justice in the broad strokes. Remember that, 
according to Locke, even those who make mistakes in applying the natural law, or fail 
due to weakness of will, are as capable as others of discovering the general principles of 
natural law. Given that Locke thinks that everyone is capable of recognizing when the                                                         
190 TT. II., §6. 
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natural law is being correctly interpreted, there is no reason to presume that those who 
need the state for moral improvement will be incompetent judges of justice, especially 
when it comes to recognizing whether their state has engaged in an injustice against 
themselves. 
Also, although each particular society will contain only a few of the nearly ideal 
reasoners, not all of those will end up in positions of leadership within the government. 
So rational individuals outside of such leadership positions have a responsibility to 
educate their fellow citizens about the moral benefits of the state and the best ways to 
fulfill their moral obligations to others. It is up to them to help others to recognize their 
natural moral duty to consent. 
In conclusion, the civil law is the instrument by means of which most individuals 
succeed in satisfying their moral obligations. Without the existence of civil laws and the 
prevalence of those who are competent to derive civil laws from the natural law, most 
would be incapable of exercising justice except, perhaps, by accident. Therefore, there is 
a natural moral duty to consent that will allow ordinary individuals to fulfill their moral 
obligations and placing this limit upon consent makes Locke’s theory of political 
obligation more palatable. 
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Part II, Chapter Five: 
 
Political Obligation:  
The Anarchist Challenge and the Natural Duty to Consent 
 
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I offer an alternative interpretation of Locke’s theory of 
political obligation according to which Locke’s concept of consent is more accurately 
understood as a natural duty than as a prudential exchange of liberties for conveniences. 
Though perhaps interesting in its own right, this interpretive point would be of little 
consequence if the theory itself turns out to be philosophically untenable. Thus, in this 
final chapter, I move beyond the interpretive question to assessing the credibility of the 
natural duty to consent as a theory of political obligation. I argue that, in light of the 
anarchist challenge, we ought to revisit the possibility that express consent could ground 
political obligation and I show that the natural duty to consent stands as a formidable 
contender in the political obligation debate. 
The contemporary debate concerning what has been called the problem of 
political obligation hopes to answer the following question: is there a duty to obey the 
law? At first blush, the answer seems so obvious as to be trivial. Of course individuals 
have a duty to obey the law, since that just is what it means for there to be law: laws 
bestow duties upon the individuals to whom they apply.191 However, the substantive                                                         
191 This is one answer to the general philosophical question: what is law? It assumes that there are more or 
less universal characteristics of the nature of law and the rule of law that can be discerned through 
philosophical analysis. So long as a law is formulated correctly, according to whatever social conventions 
have been agreed upon, it has the authority to obligate those to whom it applies. These were the terms in 
which the earlier debate among legal positivists and natural law theorists took place (e.g., H.L.A. Hart and 
Lon Fuller in the Harvard Law Review in 1958).  
 124 
philosophical issue that I wish to discuss here does not concern the nature of law or the 
rule of law; rather, the true controversy driving this debate surrounds the normative 
grounding for legal duties. So the real question is: is there a moral duty to obey the law? 
The task, then, for those, including myself, who wish to defend an account of political 
obligation, is to explain this moral obligation by answering several additional questions: 
how is it that one is obligated to obey the laws of one’s state? Does such an obligation 
come about because of the nature of political institutions or the nature of citizenship, 
neither, both? Is the individual obligation to obey the law grounded in one’s transactions, 
one’s associations, or one’s natural duties?192  
The worry about justifying obedience to the law is nothing new; in fact, it is 
nearly as old as philosophy itself. Plato raises the issue in the Crito when Socrates refuses 
to escape from prison after having been convicted and condemned to death by an 
Athenian jury. In defense of his decision to remain in prison and face execution, Socrates 
offers several arguments, which, though admittedly underdeveloped, hint at various 
theories of political obligation that remain live options still today.193 Of the various 
theories suggested by Plato, the one that has received perhaps the most attention from 
later philosophers is social contract or consent theory, the full development of which 
occurs in the seventeenth century with Hobbes and Locke.  
Consent may be described as the most intuitively appealing and purest form of 
political obligation because of its similarity to the social practice of making promises.                                                         
192 This division of approaches to political obligation was introduced by Simmons in his article “Civil 
Disobedience and the Duty to Obey the Law” (2003), pp. 50-61. 
 
193 Plato’s Crito (54c and following). 
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Just as promising involves one individual granting moral authority to another, thereby 
establishing for himself a moral obligation, consenting involves an individual directly 
transferring moral authority to a political institution, thereby establishing a moral 
obligation for himself. In both cases, one party deliberately and voluntarily accepts moral 
obligation by granting moral authority to the other party. It is difficult to deny that such a 
deliberate and voluntary act could bestow moral obligation upon the actor.194 If I promise 
to water your plants while you are on vacation, for example, it seems clear that I have 
bound myself to water your plants every so often and it seems clear that if I fail to do so, 
I have wronged you; I have failed to discharge one of my moral obligations. Similarly, if 
I consent to obey a law that says I may not smoke in hospitals, but later decide to light up 
while visiting my hospitalized cousin, I fail to discharge one of my moral obligations. By 
consenting, I have morally bound myself to obey the law and if I disobey, I have morally 
wronged the state. So consent seems to explain well how one might acquire a moral duty 
to obey the law.  
But despite its initial appeal, we have seen that the consent theory of political 
obligation faces serious objections. In the previous chapter, while discussing a theoretical 
objection to consent theory, i.e., the over-permissive objection, I mentioned that the main 
objection to consent theory is a practical one. The worry is not that consent differs from 
promising in that an act of genuine consent might somehow fail to create moral 
                                                        
194 Although Hume raises an additional theoretical objection (different from the over-permissive objection 
I raise in chapter four) to consent and the practice of promise-keeping in general arguing that one cannot 
voluntarily acquire moral obligations, but that moral obligations are natural belonging to one regardless of 
her agreement  (“Of the Original Contract” (1752)).  
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obligation; but rather, that consent is not a “suitably general ground for political 
obligation”195 because, unlike the social practice of making promises, few, if any, citizens 
actually perform such acts of genuine consent. In other words, consent theory, as a theory 
of political obligation, is descriptively inadequate because it fails to accurately represent 
the way most individuals find themselves under the jurisdiction of political institutions. 
In the second section below, I discuss this practical objection to consent theory. 
 Recently and largely in response to the descriptive inadequacy claim against 
consent theory, three main camps have emerged. First, there are those who defend the 
concept of political obligation by attempting to modify consent theory196 or by offering 
other transactional accounts of political obligation.197 Second, there are political 
philosophers who accept the descriptive inadequacy objection as fatal not only for 
consent theory, but for all transactional accounts alike and so argue for a moral duty to 
obey the law on other grounds, i.e., norms tied to citizenship198 or some natural duty.199 
Finally, there are anarchists who are skeptical of the whole concept of political obligation                                                         
195 Simmons (1979), p. 79. 
 
196 For example, Hanna Pitkin (1965 and 1966) defends hypothetical consent and similarly, David Estlund 
(2008) offers a unique version of hypothetical consent, which he calls normative consent. Also, Harry 
Beran (1987) defends a reform consent view according to which he argues that consent ought to ground 
political obligation and that it would do so provided certain conditions are met (e.g., improved civic 
education, citizens being granted the right to initiate changes to the constitution, etc.). 
 
197 George Klosko (1992) offers a theory according to which one’s political obligations are due in 
exchange for the benefits gained from living in civil society; and A.D.M. Walker (1988) is a proponent of 
gratitude as the basis for political obligation. 
 
198 Here I refer to associative theories, such as Ronald Dworkin’s (1986). 
 
199 John Rawls (1979, revised ed. 1999) was the first to defend a theory of political obligation based upon 
the natural duty of justice and C.H. Wellman defends a hybrid view based upon samaritan duties and the 
principle of fairness (2001, 2005). 
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and reject any theory claiming that individuals have independent moral reasons to obey 
the law and, more importantly, any theory claiming that states have moral authority as a 
result of these independent moral reasons.200 
In what follows, I explain the descriptive inadequacy objection to consent theory 
in the second section. Then, beginning with section III, I evaluate the prevailing attempts 
to show that there is a moral duty to obey the law and I conclude that while some possible 
theories of political obligation clearly have advantages over others, none is completely 
successful. So the anarchist challenge looms large (section IV). I argue that, in light of 
this, we ought to revisit the possibility that express consent could ground political 
obligation. Finally, I explain the advantages of my own theory, the natural duty to 
consent, and offer reasons for thinking that this evolution of standard consent theory 
deserves further attention as a possible solution to the problem of political obligation in 
the fifth section. 
 
II. The Case Against Consent Theory: Descriptive Inadequacy 
 Since the emergence of modern liberal democracies, the belief that political 
authority depends upon the consent of the governed has gained wide acceptance. 
However, relatively few political philosophers actually defend consent as a viable theory 
of political obligation. In this section, I explore the reasons for this disconnect. 
                                                        
200 Robert Paul Wolff (1970, revised ed. 1998) defends philosophical anarchism on the grounds that, in 
principle, political obligation fails because it violates the absolute obligation of individual autonomy. 
Simmons is perhaps the most avid proponent of philosophical anarchism today (see, e.g., 1979, 2001, and 
2005 (co-authored with C.H. Wellman)). 
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 According to Locke’s familiar account of consent theory, there are two ways one 
may consent: expressly or tacitly. On the one hand, express consent consists in one 
performing an explicit, voluntary act demonstrating agreement to the terms of a contract 
and acknowledgment of one’s obligations, e.g., signing a lease to rent an apartment or 
swearing an oath. On the other hand, one tacitly consents by withholding dissent, but 
only under the right conditions, e.g., the home owners’ association votes to repave all of 
the driveways in my neighborhood unless someone objects, and the group notifies 
everyone who may be affected that any objections must be put in writing and delivered 
before the end of the month. If at the end of the month no one has objected, everyone in 
the neighborhood has tacitly consented to having her driveway repaved.201 In these and 
similar ordinary scenarios, consent proves to be a quite common and reasonable way of 
accepting certain types of obligation. However, it seems that the same cannot be said for 
consent in political contexts. Those who criticize Locke’s view argue that, even leaving 
aside the question of whether citizens actually perform acts of genuine consent, it is 
simply not clear that citizens ever even find themselves in circumstances under which it 
would be appropriate to consent, either expressly or tacitly, to their governments.202 Still, 
before we accept defeat so quickly on Locke’s behalf, we ought to investigate the merits 
of actions often pointed to as indicative of one’s consent and acceptance of political 
obligation.  
                                                        
201 As Simmons rightly points out, tacit consent is best understood as a “mode of expression,” rather than 
the lack of expression ((1979), p. 83-84). 
 
202 Simmons (1979), p. 79. 
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 First, political participation is often taken to be a signal of express consent.203 The 
claim is that, given that certain fairness conditions are met, anyone who participates in a 
political procedure by, for instance, voting in a presidential election, demonstrates his 
intent to abide by the results of that procedure and his acceptance of the moral duty to 
obey the law. According to this argument, casting a ballot on election-day is the political 
equivalent of signing a contract promising to abide by the rules and regulations of the 
particular political community of which one is a member. More specifically, voting is a 
sign of one’s agreement with the presupposition that the majority decision binds all 
participants, even those who happen to be in the voting minority. This account contains 
elements of a reasonable model of political voluntarism because assuming that the 
election is fair and effective, voting is a voluntary undertaking and a fair procedure for 
political decision-making. Nevertheless, the most that the political participation account 
can show is that political participation creates an obligation to abide by the outcome of a 
particular election, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient for political obligation in 
general.204  
There are four main criticisms of the political participation view. (1) Voting 
cannot be necessary for political obligation because we do not think that individuals who 
do not have the legal right to vote (e.g., immigrants or foreign visitors) or who do not 
have the opportunity to vote in some elections (e.g., individuals who come of voting age 
between election years) are, as a result, free from political obligation. (2) Further, voting 
                                                        
203 See, for instance, John Plamenatz’s Man and Society, Vol. 1 (1967). p. 220-224. 
 
204 Beran (1987), p. 70-71. 
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is not necessary for political obligation because if (1) is correct, it is not the act of 
political participation that creates the obligation, but rather something about the fairness 
of the procedure itself and voting in democratic elections is surely not the only fair 
political procedure available. (3) Along the same lines, voting cannot be sufficient to 
ground political obligation; for, it is not the voting itself, but rather the agreement to 
abide by the outcome that creates the obligation. While voting for Barack Obama may be 
an indication of one’s willingness to grant him moral authority over oneself, political 
obligation requires more than agreeing to abide by the commands of a particular ruler. 
This is precisely the concern that gives rise to the fourth and strongest criticism of the 
political participation view. (4) Voting is not sufficient because it cannot explain why 
citizens are bound to obey the founding documents or signify agreement with the 
fundamental principles or form of their governments. Even if we assume that voting in a 
particular election indicates one’s acceptance of an obligation to abide by the outcome of 
that election and maybe even the outcomes of other sufficiently similar elections, that 
does not imply that one accepts the outcomes of all other democratic procedures.205 As a 
result, if I do not have the opportunity to change the system by which political decisions 
are made, I cannot accept those decisions as binding because I have not consented to the 
system itself.  
The four above claims cast doubt upon the idea that political participation is either 
necessary or sufficient to create political obligation. So with the soundness of this 
account called into question, the descriptive inadequacy claim against consent theory is                                                         
205 Ibid., p. 71-74. 
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strengthened. While express consent may work in the context in which Locke most 
readily discusses it, i.e., for individuals born into the state of nature, who then decide to 
join together to form a commonwealth and government from the ground up, the prospects 
for using consent as a justification for political obligation in general look grim. No 
citizens existing after this initial social contract (except perhaps naturalized citizens) have 
ever expressly consented to their governments. Therefore, it appears that, unless we can 
find an alternative theory of political obligation, no citizen existing after this initial social 
contract is politically obligated. 
Because of the glaring problems with express consent, it is tempting instead to 
turn to tacit consent and this is precisely the move that Locke makes in response to the 
descriptive inadequacy objection;206 however, as we have already seen, tacit consent has 
problems of its own. In the preceding chapter, I show that tacit consent cannot solve the 
theoretical objection that express consent theory is overly permissive (releasing 
individuals from their moral obligations to obey the law without sufficient reason) 
because Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent seems to allow that one could unintentionally, 
though somehow voluntarily accept the authority of the state. Tacit consent, then, is 
overly permissive in the opposite direction because it assumes that everyone has in fact 
consented. For similar reasons, tacit consent cannot save Locke’s theory of political 
obligation from the practical objection here. Recall that Locke contends that ordinary 
acts, such as using the roads, owning land, and residing in a territory, either temporarily 
or permanently, are examples of tacit consent. In short, he says that it is the “enjoyment”                                                         
206 TT. II., §119-122. 
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of any conveniences resulting from a stable political system that bind citizens to 
obedience.207 But, once again, this view assumes that one’s enjoyment of conveniences is 
an indication of one’s acceptance of an obligation and without the awareness of having 
given one’s acceptance, I fail to see how such ordinary actions could be indications of 
one’s tacitly consenting to anything. Such a conception of tacit consent lacks the element 
of voluntarism that supposedly justifies the state’s moral authority on this view.208  
Today, few political theorists continue to claim that enjoying the benefits of 
residency is a sign of consent209 because most recognize that there are a number of 
contingent, but no less decisive, factors that severely limit or in some cases completely 
eclipse one’s exit options making voluntarily residing in a particular territory all but 
impossible. Individuals have strong reasons for not leaving their homeland even when 
there is severe oppression: some may believe that it is better to work to change the system 
from within, many do not want to leave their families, neighbors, and homes behind, 
many cannot afford to pack up everything and move, neighboring states may be unwilling 
to take in immigrants, etc. Because of these hardships, many argue that the excessive 
                                                        
207 Ibid., §119. 
 
208 Simmons argues that Locke’s mistake comes from confusing acts that are “signs of [genuine] consent” 
with acts that “imply consent.” According to Simmons’ distinction, the context in which the act is 
performed determines whether the agent intended the act to be an expression of consent and whether such 
an act would normally be understood as a sign of consent. Hence, real consensual acts are “signs of 
consent,” while an act that resembles a real consensual act, but is disqualified because of the context in 
which it occurs, is an act that merely “implies consent” ((1987), p. 88). 
 
209 As far as I can tell, W.D. Ross was the last to defend an unqualified view of consent through residency 
in The Right and the Good (1967), p. 27. 
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sacrifices attached to emigration make the choice to remain a choice in name only.210 
Once again it appears that the conditions that must be in place in order for one to consent 
simply do not hold. Thus, it seems that tacit consent meets the same fate as express 
consent; both fail to be adequate explanations for the alleged political obligation of most 
citizens. 
 
III. Responses to Descriptive Inadequacy 
Many political philosophers are convinced that, despite its intuitive appeal, the 
descriptive inadequacy of consent theory takes it completely out of the running as a 
prospective theory of political obligation. The main worry is that if we accept what seems 
undeniable, that under the status quo few citizens ever have an opportunity to voluntarily 
consent to obey their own states, we must also grant that most are in fact not obligated to 
obey the law. And, at this point, we concede the debate to the anarchists. So, virtually all 
recent defenders of political obligation assume that all citizens of at least reasonably just 
states are non-voluntarily obligated to obey the law and they take their task to be 
explaining how this could be the case.  
As I say in the first section, the descriptive inadequacy claim against consent has 
met with responses from three different groups: those who defend modified versions of 
consent or other transactional accounts, those who seek grounding for political obligation 
outside of transactional accounts, and those who altogether deny that individuals are 
politically obligated. In this and the following section, I make the case for each of the                                                         
210 Hume first raises this criticism of social contract theories in “Of the Original Contract” (1752). See 
also, Simmons (1979), p. 98-100. 
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prevailing attempts to solve the problem of political obligation and I identify the main 
anarchist criticisms of each.  
First, because Locke’s concept of tacit consent amounts to very littlebecoming 
so watered down that he takes almost any action or at least any exercise of freedom 
within an organized state to be a sign of consent and, thus, a grounding of political 
obligationsome who study Locke question his status as a traditional consent theorist. 
Hanna Pitkin is perhaps the most well known of those who hold such a view.211 She 
argues that if Locke thinks that residing within a particular territory is sufficient to 
demonstrate consent, he is committed to an absurd position. Consent through residency 
entails that those living in a territory controlled by a tyrant consent to tyranny, but Locke 
claims that it is impossible to be bound to obey any despotic government, since tyrannical 
actions strip a ruler of his political authority rendering the social contract between ruler 
and citizen null and void.212 Therefore, holding such a view would be a contradiction for 
Locke. 
In order to save Locke from such absurdity, Pitkin argues that he must intend tacit 
consent to be a special type of consent given only to “the terms of the original contract 
which the founders of the commonwealth made.”213 Therefore, one may agree to obey 
certain laws within the territory of a tyrannical government (i.e., those just laws that 
resulted from the original contract) without consenting to the rule of the current regime in                                                         
211 “Obligation and Consent, I and II,” in American Political Science Review. Vol. 59 and 60, (December 
1965 and March 1966). 
 
212 TT. II., §23. 
 
213 Pitkin (December 1965), p. 995. 
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power. She concludes that Locke did not really intend personal consent to be the ground 
of political obligation; instead, she interprets Locke as claiming that our obligations arise 
from the merits of the original contract. In other words, the basis of political obligation is 
not an actual voluntary agreement, but the moral quality of the government or laws in 
question, which is determined by what current rational citizens would hypothetically 
agree to and by what past rational citizens did in fact agree to. In this way, Pitkin’s 
interpretation bypasses descriptive inadequacy because she grants that individuals do not 
actually consent, but argues that they need not do so in order to be bound. Instead, 
citizens are bound by hypothetical consent, i.e., what they would have consented to if 
they had been given the opportunity. 
David Estlund in his recent book, Democratic Authority,214 defends a variation of 
Pitkin’s hypothetical consent theory, which he calls normative consent. According to 
Estlund, (just) governments have the moral authority to enforce the laws they create 
because individuals are bound to obey certain forms of government for normative 
reasons. Since there is no moral reason to think that one should escape the obligation to 
obey by immorally withholding one’s consent, individuals are bound on the basis of what 
they would be expected to consent to if they were acting morally.215 Relying upon the 
principle of epistemic proceduralism, Estlund argues that it is the tendency of democratic 
procedures to yield correct decisions that accounts for “the degree of authority that we 
                                                        
214 Estlund (2008). 
 
215 Ibid., p. 7-12. Notice that such a view would work as a response to the over-permissive objection as 
well. 
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think [they] should have.”216 Thus, he takes seriously the fourth criticism raised in the 
previous section against the political participation view: if citizens are politically 
obligated, it cannot be because the outcome of any particular political procedure is 
correct, rather, it must be because the procedure itself, being fair and effective, generally 
yields correct or just results. 
The final modification of consent theory that I want to look at here is Harry 
Beran’s reformed consent theory. Beran argues that consent could be a viable basis for 
political obligation provided that we make certain significant, but feasible reforms to the 
structure of our political systems.217 Among the reforms required to make consent a 
reasonable grounding of political obligation, he mentions (a) there must be a legal right to 
emigrate; (b) secession must be constitutionally permitted; and (c) a dissenters’ sub-
territory ought to be created.218 Beran also thinks that such reforms could be achieved 
only within representative democracies that have a political education system that teaches 
the importance of membership in democratic societies, the elements of which include: (a) 
that the democratic state is a voluntary association; (b) that the ultimate right of political 
decision-making rests with all of the adult members of the society; (c) that remaining in 
the territory after one legally comes of age reflects acceptance of membership and 
thereby is an expression of political obligation; (d) that taking part in elections places one 
                                                        
216 Ibid.,  p. 7. 
 
217 Michael Walzer makes a similar argument in Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and 
Citizenship (1970). 
 
218 Beran (1987), p. 125. 
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under an obligation to accept the outcome determined by the majority vote; and (e) that 
the obligations mentioned in (c) and (d) may be overridden by other moral 
considerations.219 His conclusion is that these reforms are necessary to make consent 
descriptively adequate. Were such reforms put into practice, being a member of a 
political system would be an appropriate indication of consent and acceptance of political 
obligation. 
Besides variations on consent theory, there are other theories of political 
obligation belonging to the same category known as transactional accounts. One such 
transactional view is the fairness or benefit theory.220 George Klosko, the main proponent 
of this view, argues that one is obligated to obey the state because of the benefits gained 
from living within civil society and such benefits would not be possible without the 
existence of the state.221 Obedience to the law, then, is our share of the exchange of legal 
protection for legal obligations; and were we to live within an orderly society without 
recognizing that we are obligated to obey the law, we would be unfairly free-riding on 
those who do accept such an obligation.222  
                                                        
219 Ibid.,  p.137. 
 
220 Given the similarities between the transactional accounts of consent theory and benefit theory, it is easy 
to see how Locke might slip from tacit consent to a benefit view. In both cases certain obligations are 
required in expectation of receiving certain benefits. The significant difference between the two is that the 
bindingness of consent theory lies in the voluntary acceptance of an obligation, whereas the bindingness of 
the benefit view consists in the acceptance (either voluntary or involuntary) of certain benefits. 
 
221 Klosko (1992). 
 
222 Notice that Klosko’s characterization of the free-rider problem is a classic free-rider problem, unlike the 
characterization of the over-permissive objection from section II, chapter four, because according to the 
benefit view, individuals are bound to obey the law without having voluntarily acquired the obligation. 
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The benefit view is especially attractive because obeying the law seems a 
relatively easy burden to bear in exchange for the safety and security of living within an 
orderly society. Immediately we see, also, that benefit theory has an advantage over 
consent theory on the descriptive adequacy front because whereas few, if any, actually 
consent to their governments, quite nearly everyone living in civil society benefits from 
political order and others’ obedience to the law. In other words, the benefit view sidesteps 
the requirement that citizens register their acceptance of such an obligation; those who 
receive certain benefits gained from living within civil society simply owe a debt of 
obedience to the state. So the benefit view seems to be a promising explanation for how 
most people could be obligated to obey the law. 
Now there is a second camp that wishes to defend the concept of political 
obligation. However, members of this camp, recognizing the often questionable moral 
status of historical transactions between states and citizens,223 locate the basis of political 
obligation not in the transactional history, but in some intrinsic connection between 
citizen and state. Such theories are called associative accounts of political obligation. 
First, those who defend associative accounts, such as Ronald Dworkin, argue that one’s 
duty to obey the laws of one’s state derive from the particular role that individuals, as 
citizens, play.224 On the associative view, the individual as a member of society is bound                                                         
223 For example, historically many states have gained territory by waging unjust wars and, as a result of 
such injustice, many citizens of occupied states have become citizens of occupying states by default. 
 
224 Dworkin defends an associative view based upon an analogy between a child’s relationship to his 
parents and a citizen’s relationship to the state: just as a child being a member of a family and dependent 
upon his parents to provide him with food, shelter, and clothing ought to obey his parents, so should a 
citizen obey the state, which provides her with similar necessities ((1986), p. 176-224). 
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to obey the state because at least part of what it means to be a member of any group 
involves abiding by the rules that govern the group. Furthermore, it is natural for 
members of a particular group to desire that their group flourishes and to wish to 
contribute to the achievement of their group’s aims. And because, like any other 
organization, the success of a state depends upon the cooperation of its members, 
citizenship appears to include a duty of obedience to the law. 
Second, natural duty accounts of political obligation base the moral duty to obey 
the law in some broader moral duty, such as the duty of justice or beneficence. Those 
who espouse natural duty accounts, such as John Rawls225 and Jeremy Waldron,226 argue 
that fulfilling our natural moral duties, at least in part, requires that we support 
institutions that promote corresponding moral principles. So by obeying the laws laid 
down by just institutions that apply to us and by working toward creating other just 
institutions yet to exist, we fulfill our natural duty to do justice. These accounts rely upon 
the simple assumption that one may fulfill a general moral duty by performing particular 
moral acts. 
Both associative and natural duty accounts have an advantage over transactional 
accounts in that the duty to obey the law belongs to citizens in virtue of the type of being 
that they are rather than in virtue of the type of action that they take. This allows 
associative and natural duty theories to avoid the descriptive inadequacy complaint 
because citizens are, in a sense, automatically bound; if it can be shown that the duty to                                                         
225 Rawls (1999), p. 99. 
 
226 Waldron (1993), pp. 3-30. 
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obey attaches to an essential feature of citizenship or humanity, then that duty must be 
universally binding. Also, it is at least initially plausible that membership in a political 
community carries with it certain responsibilities toward one’s fellow citizens and that 
human beings naturally have certain moral duties, the least of which being a duty to do 
justice. But as we shall later see, the anarchist turns these apparent advantages into 
liabilities for associative and natural duty accounts. Having now sketched the basic 
responses to the descriptive inadequacy objection, I turn, in the following section, to the 
daunting challenge posed by skeptics of political obligation.227  
 
IV. The Anarchist Challenge 
 Descriptive inadequacy is only one challenge for theorists of political obligation 
to overcome. But there lurks a weightier challenge from a more formidable opponent. 
The anarchist, who remains altogether skeptical of political obligation, agrees that 
consent fails because too few citizens actually, intentionally, and voluntarily accept 
political obligation; and because he also thinks that consent is the only theoretically 
adequate ground for political obligation, he rejects each of the alternative accounts as 
well. In this section, I review the anarchist’s challenge to each of the standard approaches 
to political obligation and I discuss one attempt to respond to the anarchist. Ultimately, I 
suggest that given the persistence of deep theoretical difficulties with other theories of 
political oblgation, express consent may actually turn out to be the most promising basis                                                         
227 I wish to mention one additional theory that falls outside of the classification scheme used above: C.H. 
Wellman’s samaritanism. Wellman also defends a theory of political obligation, but his is a hybrid view 
that does not fit as neatly into the standard categories as I have laid them out. So, I’ll address it, instead, in 
the following section as a potential response to the anarchist challenge. 
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for political obligation, even despite the charge of descriptive inadequacy. This sets the 
stage for an analysis and assessment of my own theory, the natural duty to consent, in the 
final section. 
The anarchist criticizes both transactional and associative accounts on the basis of 
the moral principles each relies upon to justify political obligation. First, transactional 
accounts falter because the moral principles invoked are not actually related to particular 
transactions between states and individuals. Those who wish to defend the benefit view 
of political obligation, for example, do so on the basis of the principle of fair play, which 
says that anyone who benefits from participation in a cooperative practice has an 
obligation to bear her share of the burdens associated with the practice. Advocates of this 
view claim that one’s fair share of participation in the cooperative practice known as civil 
society is obedience to the law, but the benefit account encounters a disquieting dilemma. 
Either the exchange of benefits for obligation is voluntary or it is non-voluntary. If it is 
voluntary, then citizens must be aware of the precise terms of the exchange and it is 
difficult to see how the obedience to obey at least some laws directly relates to particular 
benefits gained by the law-abiding. But, on the other hand, if the exchange of benefits is 
non-voluntary, then it would seem that individuals or institutions could place others 
under obligations simply by benefitting them. This certainly seems misguided. Nozick 
criticizes the benefit view precisely along these lines. He argues that in order for one to 
be obligated because of certain benefits he has gained from another, he first must be 
given the right of refusal and, for various reasons already mentioned, this may not be 
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possible within the cooperative scheme of civil society.228 So, the receipt of benefits or 
conveniences gained by living in civil society does not seem to be enough to ground a 
moral obligation to obey the law. 
Additionally, anarchists criticize associative theories also for invoking 
questionable normative principles. The sort of patriotic feelings that come from being 
closely associated with one’s compatriots may stir within us a sense of obligation to the 
state, but feeling a sense of obligation ought to be distinguished from actually having 
such an obligation. Just as a utilitarian might argue that, in spite of how one might feel, 
there is no relevant moral reason to count the well-being of one’s parent or one’s child 
above the well-being of any other person, we might argue that nationalism, or the mere 
feeling of closeness to one’s compatriots, does not and should not constitute a moral 
reason to obey the law. This seems correct especially when we consider the numerous 
historical examples of atrocities perpetrated by members of one group upon those deemed 
to be outsiders. In addition, were membership sufficient to generate an obligation to obey, 
then defenders of associative theories would be forced to accept the unpalatable 
conclusion that oppressed group ‘members’ living within unjust nations are obligated to 
obey the regime that is oppressing them. This is decidedly not in the spirit of what we 
expect a theory of political obligation to explain. Thus, membership, at least non-
voluntary membership, in a particular state is not sufficient to generate an obligation to 
obey either. 
                                                        
228 Nozick (1974), p. 90-95. 
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The objections raised in opposition to transactional and associative accounts make 
it reasonable to reject these approaches229 and to consider another type of approach in the 
search for a plausible theory of political obligation. As mentioned above, natural duty 
accounts have the advantage of appealing to natural moral duties, such as justice or 
beneficence, that belong to human beings not in virtue of their transactional or associative 
histories, but in virtue of the sort of beings they are. Hence, if the natural duty theorist 
can show that the duty to obey the law derives from one of our natural moral duties, he 
immediately avoids worries about connecting moral principles to transactions or 
associations. And since not even the anarchist denies that human beings have some non-
voluntary, natural moral duties, this seems not a bad place to start. Still, though defenders 
of natural duty accounts may have an advantage on this point, natural duty theories 
certainly are not without their own difficulties.  
The most troublesome objection to this approach is the particularity requirement. 
Simmons raises this objection arguing that any theory of political obligation relying upon 
the natural duty of justice must explain not only why we have an obligation to support 
just institutions, but why we have an obligation to support a particular just institution, 
i.e., our own state, because the obligation to obey the law is a special obligation owed to 
a particular group rather than to humanity in general.230 Even if one grants that we have 
natural moral duties and even if supporting and complying with just institutions is one                                                         
229 For a brief, but comprehensive, breakdown of the problems with transactional, associative, and natural 
duty theories see C.H. Wellman’s “Political Obligation and the Particularity Requirement” Legal Theory 
(2004), p. 97-98.  
 
230 Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? Co-authored with C.H. Wellman (2005), p. 166-168. 
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valid way to satisfy our natural moral duties, those duties do not seem to require that we 
support and comply with any particular political institution. For example, why should we 
think that I am failing to fulfill my natural duty of justice if instead of sending a fair share 
of my income to the IRS, I send it to some other equally just nonpolitical institution? In 
short, there are numerous ways to fulfill our natural duty to do justice besides obeying the 
(just) laws of the United States. But, claims the anarchist, it is precisely this type of 
special bond between community and citizen that theories of political obligation must 
account for.  
One account of political obligation that attempts to respond to Simmons’s 
particularity requirement is Wellman’s samaritanism.231 This hybrid view combines a 
natural duty account with a fairness theory. According to Wellman, the natural duty of 
justice fails to meet the anarchist’s objection because the value of justice “lacks the 
urgency necessary to empower others to create institutions that unilaterally bind us.”232 
However, if there were an alternative natural duty that was sufficiently urgent and 
relevant to the question of political obligation, it would better serve as a basis for political 
obligation. That natural duty, Wellman argues, is a duty of beneficence or what he calls 
samaritan duties: our duties to rescue others from harm when such assistance is not 
unreasonably burdensome. Further, because the state is in a unique position to rescue 
many from the dangers of the state of nature and because the state is only in such a                                                         
231 See “Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation” Ethics (Jul. 2001), pp. 735-759 and “Political 
Obligation and the Particularity Requirement” Legal Theory (2004), pp. 97-115. Also, for a more complete 
version of the response, see Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? (2005), p. 3-89. 
  
232 Wellman (2004), p. 105 (emphasis mine). 
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position so long as there is a system of political order in place, citizens have a duty to 
obey the laws of their state as their fair share of the contribution to that invaluable 
political order.233 
Now Wellman believes samaritanism satisfies Simmons’s particularity 
requirement because political stability is the only just way to avoid the dangers of the 
state of nature and political stability is not something that any one individual can achieve 
in isolation; it requires the social cooperation of those living in one place.234 As a citizen 
of the United States, then, I have a special duty to obey the laws of the U.S., and not any 
other just political system, because only the U.S. federal government is in a position to 
help me fulfill my samaritan duties. Consequently, I cannot simply choose to send my tax 
money to Oxfam because the burden of paying my income tax to the IRS is my share of 
the United States citizens’ collective duty to save others from the perils of the state of 
nature. And that burden includes allowing the government to limit my discretion about 
which political and non-political institutions I might support.235 
While I agree that samaritanism has advantages over pure natural duty of justice 
accounts, I maintain that it too falls short of answering the anarchist’s challenge. 
Understanding samaritanism’s shortcomings, though, first requires setting out an 
important distinction: there is a crucial difference between a state wielding moral 
authority over its constituents and a state justifiably coercing its constituents. In order for 
                                                        
233 Ibid., p. 107. 
 
234 Ibid., p. 109. 
 
235 Ibid., p. 110. 
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a state to have moral authority and correlatively, for citizens to have an independent 
moral obligation to obey the law, the duties invoked must be owed to the state directly. 
Otherwise, the state is merely justified in coercing its citizens to fulfill duties that they 
owe to others. This distinction marks the crucial point of disagreement between the 
anarchist and the proponent of political obligation. While Simmons and Wellman can 
both agree that we all have samaritan duties and that avoiding the severe threat posed by 
the dangers of the state of nature requires political order and even that the existence of the 
state is necessary to bring about political order,236 they can and do also disagree about 
what follows from their acceptance of these propositions. According to Simmons, the 
above amount to the state having a strong, perhaps even an extremely strong, justification 
for coercing its citizens; they do not, however, result in the state having moral authority 
or citizens having political obligation, as Wellman contends.  
The problem is that Wellman thinks the urgency of avoiding the perils of the state 
of nature combined with the principle of fairness and his claim that no single individual 
can fulfill her moral obligation to rescue others, without the existence of a strong state, 
gives the state moral authority.237 However, that the state plays an instrumental role, even 
perhaps an urgent instrumental role, in my fulfillment of one of my moral duties does not 
also give me a moral obligation to obey the state. Though obedience to the state happens 
to be practically necessary for the performance of my duty to rescue, it remains 
                                                        
236 None of these propositions is inconsistent with Simmons’s philosophical anarchism. 
 
237 “In the end, even if not all samaritan obligations require a specific action, the perils of the state of 
nature create the perfect duty to obey the laws of one’s state because the problems of the state of nature can 
be solved only via social cooperation” (2004), p. 110. 
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theoretically only incidental to my fulfillment of my moral duty because even urgent 
moral duties, such as the duty to rescue, are owed to the individuals who are potentially at 
risk and not to the state itself. My duty is to rescue others and that I could fulfill that duty 
without, at least intending to fulfill an additional moral duty to obey the state (e.g., by 
complying with the law for purely prudential reasons) calls into question the independent 
moral authority of the state.238 In other words, facilitating justice is not enough to give the 
state moral authority, though it may justify the state’s use of its coercive power. 
To illustrate this point, take as an analogy the following example. In the novel, 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, by Robert Louis Stevenson,239 Dr. Jekyll discovers a potion by 
which he transforms himself into a sinister creature, Mr. Hyde. At first, he enjoys the 
moral freedom the metamorphosis affords him, but eventually Jekyll begins 
spontaneously turning into Hyde, even without taking the potion, and he vows never to 
intentionally become Hyde again. One night, though, the urge overtakes him and after the 
transformation, Hyde violently kills Sir Danvers Carew.  
Now suppose that Jekyll, rather than passively writing a letter detailing his 
desperate cry for help, which he knew would be found only after his death, had instead                                                         238 I think Hobbes would agree with this analysis. Because the state of nature is incredibly dangerous and 
because the sovereign is the only one with enough power to guarantee the coordination necessary to avoid 
the state of nature through enforcing his will, individuals have strong prudential reasons to obey the 
sovereign. According to one interpretation of Hobbes’s view, then, avoiding the state of nature is so 
important as to justify giving the sovereign coercive power. Additionally, the utilitarian argument for the 
state relies upon a version of the justified coercion argument: because the state is the only institution with 
enough power and influence to organize society in such a way as to effectively bring about the greatest 
good for the greatest number, it is justified, on utilitarian grounds, in punishing those who break the law. 
Nevertheless, justified coercion is not the same as having moral authority. That the state is justified in 
coercing its citizens on instrumental grounds does not mean that its citizens necessarily have a moral 
obligation to obey its commands. 
 
239 Signet Classics (2003). 
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explained everything to his butler, Mr. Poole. Then suppose further that he had asked Mr. 
Poole, in the event of a spontaneous transformation, to restrain Hyde until his assistant 
were able to deliver the antidote and transform him back into the benevolent Jekyll. In 
my alternative ending, Jekyll has an urgent duty not to harm others and the only way for 
him to fulfill that duty is to enlist the help of Mr. Poole. Poole then acquires moral 
authority over Hyde through Jekyll’s consent. But without his consent, things would be 
different. Poole would be merely justified in coercing Hyde (e.g., by tying him up) 
because Jekyll’s unfortunate predicament alone is not enough to invest Poole with 
increased moral authority. Jekyll has a moral duty to others not to harm them, but he does 
not also have a duty to obey Poole unless he first consents.240 In the same way, the moral 
duty that I owe to my compatriots may justify the state having the power to legislate 
behavior because of the cooperative scheme in which we find ourselves, but it does not 
give the state independent moral authority. 
The supposedly fatal charge of descriptive inadequacy raised against consent 
theory is born of a worry about anarchism: accepting a theory of political obligation that 
cannot explain how the majority of citizens are obligated to obey their states certainly 
cannot respond to a theory that denies that individuals have such an obligation. However, 
in focusing upon descriptive inadequacy, the alternative theories fail to respond to the 
anarchist’s stronger theoretical objections. The largely unsuccessful campaign waged by 
defenders of political obligation force us to admit that further work defending political 
                                                        
240 Of course, the analogy only works if we leave aside questions of personal identity. I understand Hyde 
as Jekyll’s alter ego and I assume that Jekyll has the same relevant moral obligations both when he 
embodies the aspect of himself and when he embodies the aspect of the sinister monster, Hyde. 
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obligation is needed. And because I agree that all of the contemporary accounts have 
deep theoretical flaws, I propose, in the following section, that we revoke the dismissal of 
consent on the grounds of descriptive inadequacy and instead, face the objection straight 
on taking consent seriously as a theory of political obligation once again. 
 
V. The Case for the Natural Duty to Consent 
In the previous section, I established that natural duty accounts have a distinct 
advantage over other non-voluntary approaches to political obligation. Nevertheless, 
because of the tough challenges from the anarchist, I ruled out two candidates for 
particular natural duties upon which to build a theory of political obligation: Rawls’s 
natural duty of justice and Wellman’s samaritan duties. In fact, I doubt that any non-
voluntary account of political obligation could satisfy the anarchist. What the anarchist 
requires of the defender of political obligation is a “suitably general” moral principle, for 
instance, a natural duty, which could provide a special obligation binding all individuals 
living within a particular state to obey the laws of that state. If this is what is truly 
required to establish a moral duty to obey the law, anarchism is clearly the only 
reasonable option, since it seems obvious that no general moral principle could ever meet 
the particularity requirement. But I think there is one final move available to the weary 
defender of political obligation, combining a general moral duty with a voluntaristic 
account of political obligation. If we can show that there is a natural duty to voluntarily 
accept an obligation to obey a particular state, we can meet Simmons’s particularity 
requirement and successfully explain the moral obligation to obey the law. In this final 
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section, I show how my reinterpretation of Locke’s consent theory of political obligation 
based upon the natural moral duty to consent, which I defended in chapter four, responds 
to the anarchist challenge and supports the idea that individuals have a moral duty to 
obey the law. 
 
My Lockeian theory has several advantages over other theories of political 
obligation. First, it clarifies the relationship between citizen and state. The state is in a 
unique moral position with respect to us, as Rawls and Wellman, among others, rightly 
recognize. In addition to the obvious social, cultural, and financial benefits, the state 
provides moral benefits; for instance, it is in a position to help us to fulfill our duties 
toward others, as Wellman’s argument for samaritanism demonstrates. Another important 
moral benefit provided by the state is avoidance of injustices that occur purely out of a 
lack of social cooperation and epistemic disputes. Perhaps the best illustration of the 
state’s power in this regard is in the case of natural disasters. During these emergencies, 
if there is not a unified centralized authority making decisions and disseminating 
information, massive numbers of casualties will occur purely as a result of confusion 
caused by the lack of information distribution and cooperation. Additionally, there are 
other times when the moral action to take is not always immediately obvious. While 
common sense and the light of reason can often allow us to discern the action that will 
satisfy our natural moral duties, there are many cases in which the action prescribed by 
our duty not to harm others is not so obvious, for example, discerning the appropriate 
speed limit on a particular road. Thus, the state, unlike other entities with less broad-
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reaching power, such as individuals or private associations, is in the right position to be 
able to prevent these sorts of harms. 
Furthermore, as I mentioned in the preceding chapter, the state offers the 
opportunity to settle disputes more fairly by providing an impartial judge and a legal 
system ensuring that the punishment for failing to fulfill one’s obligations is justly carried 
out. Contrast this with Locke’s description of the state of nature in which all individuals 
have the executive right to judge and enforce punishment upon those who wrong 
others.241 Having a uniform system in place governed by an authoritative body, at the 
least, offers greater potential to uphold the values of fairness and equality by preventing 
the worst consequences of partiality, such as vigilantism and mob rule. Hence, it seems 
that entering into civil society gives individuals more opportunities to uphold certain 
values and to fulfill certain moral duties. 
However, as I illustrated with the Jekyll and Hyde example above, this important 
or even urgent moral role that the state plays is not enough to give it moral authority. 
Though I think I have a natural moral duty to leave the state of nature because I have a 
natural moral duty, which I owe to those who might be affected by my actions, to do 
whatever is in my power to prevent failures of moral rationality or to benefit them in 
whatever way is not unfairly burdensome to me, an additional step is required to give me 
a moral duty to obey the state.242 As I made the case for in chapter three, the capacity for 
                                                        
241 TT. II. §7-8. 
 
242 Thus, the difference between my view and Wellman’s view is that while I think individuals are bound 
to discharge their samaritan duties, that fact alone is not sufficient to give the state moral authority. Even if 
we add in the principle of fairness, this is still a duty owed to other individuals and not directly to the state. 
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justice combined with the freedom to choose good over evil (i.e., the combination of 
rationality and autonomy) gives human beings natural moral authority. Moral authority 
belongs to individual human beings naturally because they can exercise this authority 
apart from the laws of civil government and because ultimate moral authority rests with 
the individual even within civil society, the state gains moral authority only when 
individuals voluntarily agree to accept certain limits to their autonomy through consent. 
Yet, though one retains discretion in choosing to consent, one’s exercise of autonomy is 
not utterly free from moral restraint. Indeed, as I have emphasized throughout, freedom 
and obedience to the natural moral law are continually competing values for Locke. 
Therefore, although the notion that the state provides more and better opportunities for 
individuals to fulfill their natural moral duties does not quite justify a direct duty to obey 
the state, it can ground a duty to consent, i.e., a general duty to support just institutions, 
which requires my voluntarily acquiring a moral duty to obey the law.  
Perhaps the most important reason that individuals ought to consent to their states, 
though, is because the duty not to harm others requires that individuals demonstrate a 
willingness to obey the law. Like Ulysses, they tie themselves to the mast in consenting 
to the state; and in so doing they gain the trust of and increase the security of those 
around them. As I argue in the preceding chapter, Locke’s consent theory of political 
obligation ought to be modified to show that he is also committed to there being a natural 
duty to consent and I think that this duty is the key to any successful theory of political 
obligation. It is the natural duty to consent, which best respects autonomy, by allowing 
individuals to voluntarily incur an obligation to obey a particular state, while at the same 
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time recognizing the duties that citizens owe to one another because it makes the 
responsibility to accept the authority of a particular government part of what we owe to 
one another. Thus, individuals have a natural duty to transfer moral authority to the state, 
which they owe to their fellow citizens. 
By now my response to the anarchist should be clear. Mine is a thoroughly 
voluntaristic theory meaning that one is bound to obey the state only if one consents to 
obey. It is consent that binds because although I argue that one has a natural duty to 
consent, the obligation to a particular state comes only when one voluntarily transfers 
some part of his moral authority to that state. In addition, the voluntarism of the natural 
duty to consent meets the particularity requirement. Because consent requires directly 
transferring moral authority to a particular state, it explains the deep connection between 
the individual and her community. Finally, consent gives the state moral authority, rather 
than merely justifying its coercion. Again, when individuals consent, they directly 
transfer moral authority to a particular state; in other words, they agree to give up some 
of their independent moral authority to that state. 
As a consequence of my theory of political obligation, the state has no moral 
authority over those who do not voluntarily consent, but the state is justified in coercing 
non-consenting individuals in the service of the common good. So while I admit what 
many other contemporary theorists of political obligation are afraid to admit, namely, that 
under the status quo a majority of individuals are not morally obligated to obey the law, I 
do not think that such an admission gives the game away to the anarchist. Though the 
vast majority of individuals are not morally obligated to obey the law due to their lack of 
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consenting, it is not true that they ought not be so obligated. I suppose my position could 
be characterized as conditional anarchy, to borrow an adjective from the just war 
literature. Like conditional pacifists, who oppose war on the grounds that though it is 
theoretically possible to wage a just war, the loss of innocent lives that has been endemic 
of all actual wars makes it practically impossible, I argue that though very few, if any, 
actually manage to meet the standard of political obligation set by consent theory, there is 
no reason to disregard such a standard altogether. 
Lastly, I address two objections to my view. First, I seem not only to have opened 
the door for descriptive inadequacy, but also to have embraced it like one would embrace 
a long-lost child. Consent simply cannot explain how the majority of citizens are bound 
to obey the law because a majority of citizens have never had the opportunity to consent 
to their governments. However, this objection is not as strong as it initially seems.  
First, people do have the opportunity to consent to their governments in limited 
ways. For example, when one appears at the DMV to receive a drivers’ license, he has 
the opportunity to consent to obey the traffic laws of his state. Also, when individuals 
participate in local government by becoming members of the school board, for instance, 
they demonstrate their willingness to obey the rules of their district, or at least their 
willingness to work within the system to change the rules with which they disagree. 
Another opportunity to display one’s acceptance of political obligation is through 
voluntary enlistment in the military or other nonmilitary civil service organizations.243 In 
                                                        
243 Although some would argue that the disproportionately high number of poor people and minorities who 
join the military in the U.S. casts doubt upon the claim that it is truly voluntary, I do think most who enlist 
take themselves to be choosing to do so, thus accepting the obligation to obey a particular set of rules. 
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these and similar examples, the individuals who participate in these aspects of their 
governments understand that they are bound to obey particular rules as a direct result of 
their participation. Thus, I think that the state has limited moral authority at least in these 
and other cases while operating under the status quo.  
Still, the strongest version of the descriptive inadequacy objection need not deny 
that people consent in such ways, but only that this is sufficient to bind them generally to 
obey the state or that this is sufficient to bind most people. Basically, opponents of 
consent theory argue that there is simply no social contract between modern citizens and 
their states. Recall that the reasons for this are primarily that, unlike the original parties to 
the contract of whom Locke speaks, modern citizens have no say over the form of their 
governments and that due to the hardships of leaving home, modern citizens lack exit 
options. So even if they have fundamental disagreements with the structure of their 
governments, they have no real ability to challenge the foundation upon which their states 
were built and they have no chance to register their dissent by voting with their feet, so to 
speak. The objection is not that individuals do not ever have opportunities to consent, but 
that they do not have the opportunity to consent in the right way—the way that would 
bind them to obey the state. 
My response to the strong form of descriptive inadequacy follows. First, there is 
an ambiguity in the idea that there is no social contract between modern citizens and their 
states. Either the objector is making a theoretical claim: it is not possible to create a social 
contract under the conditions that actually obtain; or he is making a descriptive claim: 
people simply do not consent under the conditions that obtain. If he means the former, the 
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objection is false. If, after due consideration, one recognizes the justice of one’s state and 
accepts the state’s laws, then there is no need to have the opportunity to change the form 
of one’s government or to exit from one’s state. It is possible to consent if such a 
situation obtains. If, on the other hand, he means the latter descriptive claim, I grant that 
he is correct that currently few individuals consent to their governments. However, I fail 
to see how this might be an objection to my view because the descriptive fact that 
individuals do not consent does not mean that they ought not. I doubt seriously that the 
majority of those who do not accept the state’s moral authority consider themselves so 
free because of some philosophical position or that they have ever actually given it much 
thought at all. I think the more likely cause is simply apathy toward the system. While 
apathy is a serious problem, it does not preclude more motivated individuals from 
consenting. And were there a sufficient number of individuals refusing to consent on such 
philosophical grounds, they would be justified in protesting, seceding, or revolting; in 
which case, they would have the opportunity to form a more perfect union to which they 
actually consent.  
The second objection questions whether the natural duty to consent is 
superfluous: if the state is justified in coercing individuals who refuse to consent, then 
does not a duty to consent reduce to a duty to obey the state? What real work is consent 
doing in my theory that an ordinary natural duty of justice binding one to obey the state 
cannot do? First, I go some distance toward forestalling this objection when I show that a 
state being justified in coercing its citizens ought to be distinguished from a state having 
moral authority over its citizens. So when I say that the state is justified in coercing those 
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who do not consent, I do not also mean to imply that the state is justified because 
individuals have a moral duty to obey. The state is justified in coercing those who fail to 
consent because it is acting as an instrument of the citizens to whom non-consenters do 
have a genuine moral obligation. Also, the state has an obligation to protect those who 
have consented to its authority and it must do so by punishing those who fail to comply 
with the law. 
Further, consenting to obey the state is not equivalent to agreeing to comply with 
the law. Whereas one may be forced to comply with the law, obedience requires the 
freedom to understand and evaluate the law for oneself before choosing whether to 
consent. Yet, this does not give one the absolute freedom to consent to some laws and not 
to others because once one consents to a state or a system of laws, if she disagrees with a 
particular law, she must register her dissent through protesting or some other means. But 
it is in the flexibility needed for personal autonomy that consent does the heavy lifting. 
Consent allows individuals to retain their natural right to autonomy while fulfilling their 
natural duty to obey the moral law. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Despite the nearly universal disregard for consent theory in the contemporary 
debate regarding political obligation, there are some credible reasons to return to the idea. 
First, consent theory is intuitively appealing and the purest form of political obligation. 
Consent is intuitively appealing because, of all the theories of political obligation, it best 
respects the autonomy of individual human beings and it provides a straightforward 
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standard for evaluating political obligation. Secondly, the consent account is theoretically 
adequate or at least it raises the standard of theoretical adequacy on the other accounts. 
Consent is theoretically adequate because the moral principle invoked, i.e., that one ought 
to keep one’s promises, is valid. If one transfers moral authority and the choice to do so is 
sufficiently autonomous, then there is no doubt that he is bound; not even the anarchist 
denies this. Therefore, if I have been successful at showing that individuals have moral 
reasons to consent and that it is theoretically possible for them to do so, then there can be 
no doubt that they are morally obligated to obey the law. 
In the previous chapter, I challenge the standard reading of Locke’s consent 
theory of political obligation and I offer my own interpretation, which emphasizes 
Locke’s use of the natural law as a limit to his political voluntarism. Consent is not 
merely a prudent means of avoiding the inconveniences of the state of nature, but rather 
individuals have a natural moral duty to leave the state of nature, which they owe to those 
with whom they associate, and consent is the vehicle through which they must fulfill that 
duty. Once they have consented, they then have a moral duty to obey the laws of a 
particular state. In this final chapter, I have shown, at the very least, that the natural duty 
to consent stands as a formidable contender in the debate concerning political obligation 
and that Locke has something important to say to contributors to the contemporary 
debate. 
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Conclusions 
 
I said at the outset that Locke’s theories of moral and political obligation are 
instructive both in their successes and in their failures. Now, I want to take stock and 
offer some concluding remarks about exactly what I see as instructive in these theories. 
First, I think it is fair to say that both Locke’s early natural law theory and his later 
consent theory of political obligation are successful in their vision, but fail in their 
execution. I think that although Locke has many important ideas that continue to 
influence contemporary philosophers in fields from metaphysics to political theory, 
virtually all of those ideas could have been more detailed and more carefully explained 
and his theory of obligation is no exception. The ambiguities in many of Locke’s works 
are equally frustrating and fascinating as fertile ground for interpretation. Nonetheless, 
one gets the sense that Locke certainly put his finger on many important philosophical 
puzzles and did manage to articulate problems that had not been previously articulated, 
which, in itself, is a valuable service for posterity. 
Concerning his natural law theory, Locke ought to be commended for recognizing 
that the theological natural law theory associated with the Scholastics could never satisfy 
the moral skeptic and for being aware that any natural law theory that aims to be widely 
accepted must begin from ground that is as morally neutral as possible. Although the 
influence of Locke’s natural law predecessors is evident in much of his work, he uses 
elements of many different theories to create a unique view of his own. Unfortunately, it 
is tough to see how such a piecemeal theory could manage to be consistent. Though, as I 
argued in chapter three, I do not think a plausible natural law theory could be built upon 
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data given to us from raw sense experience alone, I also think that a theory of moral 
obligation completely divorced from human nature and the experiences of human beings 
is bound to fail. So, Locke’s empiricism does have a lesson to teach us about moral 
obligation.  
Additionally, Locke’s natural law theory revolves around two main questions: (1) 
an epistemological one, how human beings come to know the moral law and (2) a 
normative one, what gives this law its binding force. Although Locke fails to answer both 
questions well, he does seem to be asking the right ones. Any credible theory of moral 
obligation must begin from a rationalist foundation, such as Kant’s rational 
demonstration of the Formula of Humanity, and from that general moral principle of 
respecting humanity combined with ordinary experiences it is possible to discover more 
specific moral rules that constitute the application of the natural moral law. I also think 
there is something to the idea that morality is intuitive and knowable in most cases 
through common sense. Human beings are essentially rational, and though human nature 
is difficult to define precisely, Locke is right to point out that there is a particular element 
of our nature that leads us to evaluate the world in a normative way. Finally, Locke hints 
at moral realism as the justification for the claims that morality makes upon us and I think 
any credible solution to the problem of normativity must be a realist position. 
 Regarding political obligation, though the traditional consent theory view has 
received some well-deserved criticism, it has demonstrated remarkable staying power. 
Also, since all other theories of political obligation receive at least as much, if not more, 
valid criticism, I think Locke’s consent theory is worth another look. Despite the nearly 
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universal disregard for consent theory in the contemporary debate concerning political 
obligation, there are some credible reasons to return to the idea. First, consent theory is 
intuitively appealing and the purest form of political obligation. Consent is intuitively 
appealing because, of all the theories of political obligation, it best respects the autonomy 
of individual human beings and it provides a straightforward standard for evaluating 
political obligation. Secondly, the consent account is theoretically adequate or at least it 
raises the standard of theoretical adequacy on the other accounts. Consent is theoretically 
adequate because the moral principle invoked, i.e., that one ought to keep one’s promises, 
is valid. If one transfers moral authority and the choice to do so is sufficiently 
autonomous, then there is no doubt that he is bound; not even the anarchist denies this. 
Therefore, if I have been successful at showing that individuals have moral reasons to 
consent and that it is theoretically possible for them to do so, then there can be no doubt 
that they are morally obligated to obey the law. So I think Locke was right to pursue 
consent as the justification for the moral duty to obey the law. 
 Also, I hope that I have shown that, with some very reasonable clarifications, 
Locke’s consent theory is a formidable contender in the contemporary political obligation 
debate. Consent is not merely a prudent means of avoiding the inconveniences of the 
state of nature, but rather individuals have a natural moral duty to leave the state of 
nature, which they owe to those with whom they associate, and consent is the vehicle 
through which they must fulfill that duty. Without the existence of civil laws and the 
prevalence of those who are competent to derive civil laws from the natural law, most 
would be incapable of exercising justice except, perhaps, by accident. Therefore, there is 
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a natural moral duty to consent that will allow ordinary individuals to fulfill their moral 
obligations and placing this limit upon consent makes Locke’s theory of political 
obligation more palatable. I think consent is the most promising place to look for an 
adequate response to the anarchist challenge. Therefore, Locke has something important 
to say to contributors to the contemporary debate. 
 I hope I have given voice to some helpful responses to the toughest of Locke’s 
critics. More work needs to be done to explain the relationship between natural duties and 
natural rights, but something like Locke’s doctrine of limited natural rights seems to be 
the right place to begin in constructing a plausible political theory. At the very least, I 
think I have demonstrated that though incomplete, Locke’s theories of moral and political 
obligation offer valuable insight into the way in which human beings come to know their 
moral and political obligations and how they might be bound to obey the moral law and 
the laws of their own political institutions. 
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